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Preface
Every linguist knows how colossal Angelika’s impact on our field is. Hearing about
this would not be informative for anybody who might (virtually) pick up this volume,
including Angelika herself. So, instead of writing about, say, Angelika’s crucial role in the
development of our understanding of modality, we will write about what Angelika means
to us, as a teacher, advisor, mentor, colleague, and friend. We know that these words will
resonate with many of you (Angelika has meant so much to so many people). We just get to
be the lucky ones to tell Angelika publicly.
Ilaria: When I was still a confused undergraduate in Italy applying for graduate programs
in the US, I settled on UMass because of Angelika. When the time came during our first
year to form a committee for our generals paper, I naturally went to her, who - also very
naturally - turned me down. That could have been the end of the story (and the end of me).
But it wasn’t; I thought she had her reasons. Although I was a pretty good student in her
class, she hadn’t had the time to assess me outside routine homework assignments, and this
is when I learnt something important about Angelika: she takes everyone and everything
very seriously. So, I wrote my first generals paper in psycholinguistics instead (my second
was in semantics; I did convince her in the end). Through the years, I found out many other
things about Angelika’s views that I tried to incorporate into my own, and I don’t mean just
about semantics. I learnt that every student and every student’s project matters, that being a
honest advisor is as important as being a supportive one, that it is extremely important to
recognize others’ contribution to the discussion of a topic as you carve your space into it,
that as a woman in academia one should not feel obliged to always be pedagogical and that,
as a researcher in general, the best one can do is to become acquainted with the condition of
‘groping in the dark’. The list could go on, but I will stop here. I hope to have done some
justice to the wonderful and affectionate colleague that Angelika has been to everyone of us.
Paula: I would not have become a semanticist if not for Angelika, and I don’t think I would
have stayed one if not for her. She took me in at a time when I was an outsider in the
department (and trying to learn semantics on the side), and has never failed to support me
since. Throughout the whole dissertation writing process she took my work as seriously
as if it were her own (and held me to the same standards she would herself). She worked
alongside me during that long, hot, stress-filled, summer, and even drove to Northampton
once to discuss the final touches of the dissertation (so that I would not waste precious hours
on the trip to Amherst and back!). And, afterwards, when her advisor work was officially
done, she was still there for me at every step of the way. During all this time, I have learned
so many things from her. In her graduate classes I learnt what ‘research in action’ was,
and what ‘striving for the truth’ really meant. Her undergraduate classes showed me that
one could fascinate beginners without sacrificing rigour. She encouraged me (all of us)
to pursue bold hypotheses but to follow them through carefully and systematically. She
showed me how one could support one’s students to incredible extremes without fulfilling
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dangerous gender stereotypes (‘women in academia are expected to be mothers, men are
expected to be brilliant’, she warned me once). I could not have wished for a more brilliant,
generous, amazing advisor, mentor, and friend. Thank you, Angelika.
Rajesh: Angelika has been a dear friend, a valued colleague, and a source of inspiration and
support. I am not sure I would have come to UMass if it had not been for her encouragement.
I have always loved Angelika’s excitement and her mind which has shown me new things
which I hadn’t thought were possible. Angelika is never afraid of the new, of the unknown.
She is not one who relishes the comforts of the familiar. Getting to see her think has been
one of the highlights of my career so far. On a more quotidian note, I am grateful to her for
not one but two sacher tortes from Vienna and for running a cafe in her office, which I am
happy to report is still functional under a new administration.
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Death on the Freeway:





Abstract We propose to analyze well-known cases of ‘imaginative resistance’ from
the philosophical literature as involving the inference that particular content should
be attributed to either: (i) a character rather than the narrator or, (ii) an unreliable,
irrational, opinionated, and/or morally deviant ‘first person’ narrator who was
originally perceived to be a typical impersonal, omniscient, ‘effaced’ narrator. We
model the latter type of attribution in terms of two independently motivated linguistic
mechanisms: accommodation of a discourse referent and ‘cautious’ updating as a
model of non-cooperative information exchange.
1 Introduction
Consider the following fictional discourse from Weatherson (2004):
(1) Jack and Jill were arguing again. This was not in itself unusual, but this time
they were standing in the fast lane of I-95 having their argument. This was
causing traffic to bank up a bit. It wasn’t significantly worse than normally
happened around Providence, not that you could have told that from the
reactions of passing motorists. They were convinced that Jack and Jill, and
not the volume of traffic, were the primary causes of the slowdown. They all
forgot how bad traffic normally is along there. When Craig saw that the cause
of the bankup had been Jack and Jill, he took his gun out of the glovebox and
shot them. People then started driving over their bodies, and while the new
speed hump caused some people to slow down a bit, mostly traffic returned
to its normal speed. So Craig did the right thing, because Jack and Jill
should have taken their argument somewhere else where they wouldn’t
get in anyone’s way.
* We would like to thank Angelika Kratzer for sponsoring Emar’s visit to UMass, Amherst during the
2017 fall semester – an opportunity that led to this collaborative effort. Thanks also to the SuSurrus
participants at UMass, Amherst for insightful feedback about fictional truth. Finally, thanks to Phil
Bricker, Patrick Grafton-Cardwell, Chris Meacham, Alejandro Pérez Carballo, Roger Schwarzschild
and again Angelika for providing feedback on many of the ideas developed in this squib. Emar
Maier’s research is supported by NWO Vidi Grant 276-80-004. The usual disclaimers apply.
©2020 Daniel Altshuler and Emar Maier
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The final, bolded sentence of (1) is jarring. So much so that our engagement
with the fiction seems to break down. Why should this be, given that much of
what we find in fiction is strange, impossible, or immoral, without hindering our
engagement? For example, readers of Lolita may find Humbert Humbert repulsive,
but that doesn’t prevent them from engaging with the fiction, i.e. imagining as
prescribed by Nabokov’s text.
A related observation is that the bolded sentence of (1) seems false in the world
of the fiction. That is, it appears that the author of (1) cannot make it fictionally
true that Craig did the right thing. Why should this be, given that an author has
the authority to turn a human into a bug (as in in Kafka’s Metamorphosis), invent
playing cards who are loyal servants to the queen (as in Carroll’s Alice’s Adventures
in Wonderland) and describe (truthfully in the fiction) a sociopath who robs, rapes,
and assaults innocent people for his own amusement (as in Burgess’ A Clockwork
Orange)?
Such questions are familiar from the rich philosophical literature on imaginative
resistance: an instance in which “an otherwise competent imaginer finds it difficult
to engage in some sort of prompted imaginative activity” (Liao & Gendler 2016).1
In this squib, we propose that some evaluative propositions, such as in (1), trigger
the accommodation of an (unreliable) narrator. It is well known in semantics that,
depending on various factors, accommodation can be more or less difficult for the
processor. (1) is on the extreme end of the difficulty scale for two reasons. First, right
up until the final statement, the story adheres to the standard conventions of a third
person omniscient narrative, i.e., without a specific narrating character in the story;
narrator accommodation forces us to break out of this frame, and reconceptualize the
story as told from a first person perspective. Second, the accommodation is triggered
rather indirectly, as opposed to a more explicit introduction of a narrating character
through a first person pronoun (cf. ‘Call me Ishmael’).
In what follows we sketch a formal implementation of these ideas. In the next
section, we develop a toy analysis of fiction using a version of the dynamic semantic
framework of Discourse Representation Theory (DRT, Kamp 1981). Crucial to our
analysis will be the idea from Lewis 1978 that in all worlds compatible with a fiction
there must be someone telling the story (“as known fact”). Our DRT/Lewis-based
framework for representing fiction allows us to distinguish first person or, following
Genette’s (1980) now standard terminology, homodiegetic narration, from third
person or heterodiegetic narration: only in the homodiegetic case is the narrator
represented explicitly by a discourse referent, on a par with the rest of the fictional
characters. In this way we try to capture the idea, well known from narratology
1 The notion of imaginative resitance is usually traced back to David Hume. It was revived, in large
part, due to work by Moran (1994) and Walton (1994) and responses to that work by, e.g. Gendler
(2000), Yablo (2002) , Matravers (2003), Weatherson (2004), Stock (2005), and Todd (2009).
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research, that heterodiegetic narration involves an “effaced” narrator that is not part
of the story and never referred to (e.g. by indexicals) in the fiction. Subsequently,
in section 3, we build on our toy analysis to include different update mechanisms
for dealing with both reliable and unreliable information. Combined with the idea
of accommodating a narrator discourse referent, this will allow us to analyze (1).
In section 4, we consider an objection from Byrne (1993) to the Lewisian modal
semantics of fiction underlying our DRS boxes, namely that there are narratorless
fictions. We discuss how to revise our Lewisian assumptions in light of the objection
and what this may mean for analyzing imaginative resistance discourses as instances
of narrator accommodation.
2 Fiction in DRT
2.1 DRT
We take a standard version of Discourse Representation Theory (DRT, Kamp 1981)
as our starting point. That is, in interpreting a discourse spoken or written the
interpreter updates an information state, represented in the formal language of
Discourse Representation Structures (DRS).
We’ll use a standard box notation for DRSs. By way of illustration, the box in
(2b) is meant to represent the information conveyed by the single sentence mini-
discourse in (2a):





The top compartment houses the discourse referents, i.e. variables representing the
entities that the discourse is about. The bottom compartment contains descriptive
conditions, expressing properties of, and relations between, discourse referents.
The syntax of the DRS language is just a notational variant of that of first-order
logic, and the model-theoretic semantics is static as well. The dynamic nature of
DRT resides in the way utterances in a discourse are interpreted as successive updates
on the discourse context. A single utterance doesn’t express a proposition but a
context change potential, i.e. a way to transform an input DRS, representing the
information conveyed by the discourse thus far, into an output DRS, representing
the information increase due to the current contribution.
To illustrate, say the mini-discourse in (1) continues with (3).
(3) He’s feeding it a carrot.
3
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The DRS construction algorithm has to add the information of the new sentence to
the input DRS in (2). One of the key characteristics of the algorithm is its distinct
treatments of indefinites and definites: the indefinite a carrot introduces a new
discourse referent ‘z’ and accompanying condition ‘carrot(z)’ into the input DRS,
while the pronouns (he) and it are treated as anaphoric, meaning they introduce free
variables (u, v) looking for antecedents. Formally, anaphora are resolved by unifying












The result is a new, model-theoretically interpretable DRS, representing the infor-
mation conveyed by the two-sentence discourse. This DRS then can serve as input
for the interpretation of a new sentence.
2.2 Fiction and narrators
To model the interpretation of fiction in DRT we’ll first need to distinguish two
basic kinds of narration. The first kind that we consider is called homodiegetic
narration, in which the narrator is herself one of the protagonists in the story, and
hence does not have full access to what other characters are thinking or doing behind
her back. The second kind of narration that we consider is called heterodiegetic
narration, in which the narrator is a more or less omniscient, unintrusive abstract
entity surveying the events occurring in the story world, including the protagonists’
innermost thoughts and feelings, and presenting them to the reader.3
Applied to DRT, we propose that the distinction between homodiegetic and
heterodiegetic narration comes down to the presence or absence of a discourse
referent representing the narrator. To see how this works, let us first consider the
DRS in (5), which represents a case of homodiegetic narration. Crucially, note the
intensional fiction operator, FICxj , interpreted as “in all worlds compatible with
fiction x, j holds” (Lewis 1978).4
2 Suitable antecedents are salient, accessible, and matching in associated descriptive content and/or
semantic features (van der Sandt 1992).
3 For present purposes, we don’t discuss various forms of second person narration and countless other
narrative experiments.
4 Cf. Semeijn (2017) for an account of how the interpretation of a fictional text leads to an information
update under the fiction operator, or Maier (2017) for an alternative account in terms of imagination
4










The DRS in (5) represents the information that there’s an author, Melville, who
wrote a book, Moby Dick. In this book there is a speaker, the homodiegetic narrator
(henceforth: narrating speaker). There is also a whale, and so on.
Note that representing the narrating speaker in the way proposed makes it
possible to anchor local indexicals (I, here, now, today). For example, if the book
Moby Dick contained the statement I love the whales here, then the first pronoun
would pick out the narrating speaker, Ishmael, while here would pick out Ishmael’s
location.
A difficulty in making sense of (5) concerns spelling out the nature of the
accessibility relation of the fiction operator, i.e. when exactly is a possible world
compatible with a fiction told or written in our world? The first attempt that Lewis
considers is that a world w0 is compatible with a fiction x as told in w iff in w0 story x
is told as known fact and w0 differs less from w than any other world in which story
x is told as known fact.
One of the much discussed features of this approach is that we’re only considering
those fiction worlds that are closest to our own, a feature Lewis borrows from his
account of counterfactuals (Lewis 1973). In other words, all truths about the real
world automatically carry over to the fictional domain, unless contradicted by the text
(what Walton (1990) calls the ‘Reality Principle’). Questioning the adequacy of this
prediction, Lewis formulates another proposal where it’s not the actual world but the
overt beliefs of the author and his community that is the source from which implicit
fictional truths are imported (Walton’s ‘Mutual Belief Principle’). Either will do for
our current purposes. What concerns us is a different feature of Lewis’s approach,
viz. the fact in all worlds compatible with a fiction there must be someone telling
the story (“as known fact”). In standard narratological terminology, every story-
world has a narrator who is moreover distinct from the actual author, as they inhabit
different worlds. This view is controversial and we will come back to consider an
objection to it in section 4. In the remainder of this subsection, we would like to
show how adopting something like Lewis’s fiction operator allows us to represent
updates.
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both homo- and heterodiegetic fictional narratives in DRT. Subsequently, in section
2.3, we show how Lewis’s fiction operator allows us to relate Weatherson’s Death
on the Freeway discussed at the outset to a well known example of accommodation.










The DRS above represents the information that there’s an author, Tolkien, who wrote
a book, The Lord of The Rings, and in this book there are two friends, Frodo and
Sam. Crucially, notice that unlike in (5), there is no narrating speaker represented in
(6). Nevertheless, on account of our Lewisian modal semantics of FIC, there actually
is such a narrating speaker in all worlds compatible with the fiction. This non-
representational but semantically presupposed narrator captures the narratologists’
effaced narrator of a heterodiegetic narrative. The observation that such a narrator
cannot be referred to by an indexical such as I follows from the absence of a
suitable discourse referent for such a pronoun to be anchored to (assuming the more
or less standard anaphoric/presuppositional account of indexicals in DRT, Zeevat
1999; Bittner 2007; Maier 2009; Hunter 2013). Alternatively, the use of I in a
seemingly heterodiegetic context might also trigger a switch between heterodiegetic
and homodiegetic narration, by a process of accommodation, to which we turn next.
2.3 Accommodation
In this subsection, we would like to compare our implementation of the effaced
narrator idea to Barbara Partee’s missing marble:
(7) Nine out of the ten marbles are in the bag. #It is under the sofa.5
The first sentence in (7) entails the existence of a (contextually) unique marble not
in the bag, so why isn’t it possible to refer to this missing marble with a pronoun
like it? DRT’s answer is that a pronoun requires an antecedent discourse referent,
and applying the DRS construction algorithm to (7) does not lead to the introduction
5 Cited by Heim (1982).
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of a discourse referent for the missing marble.
The analogy to heterodiegetic narration, as we have analyzed it, is this: the
omniscient narrator is there in all worlds compatible with the fiction, just like the
marble is there as a matter of logical necessity. Yet it can’t be referred to by a
pronoun, because the DRS lacks a discourse referent representing the intended
antecedent.
As noted in debates about Partee’s marble, some tweaks (pause, extra infor-
mation, more descriptive content in the anaphoric expression) will allow us to
accommodate an antecedent discourse referent, rendering the discourse felicitous
(cf. Roberts 1989).
(8) Nine out of the ten marbles are in the bag.
a. I’ve been looking for hours and . . . hey wait, there it is!
b. {The missing marble/the red one/the bloody thing} is under the sofa.
By analogy, we would expect to find parallel cases of narrator accommodation.
In fact, whenever we pick up a book for the first time and don’t know in advance
whether the narration is homo- or heterodiegetic, we start without a narrator discourse
referent. If the first line we read is, say, ‘Call me Ishmael’, then we then have to
accommodate a discourse referent for the narrating speaker in order to interpret the
first person pronoun. Hence, many homodiegetic narratives require an initial narrator
accommodation.
More interesting are stories that start out showing tell-tale signs of heterodiegetic
narration (third person pronouns referring to protagonists, past tenses, lack of expres-
sives and indexicals, signs of omniscience, free indirect discourse thought reports
etc.), but then seem to switch to a homodiegetic style.
A first example comes from The wild ass’ skin by Honoré de Balzac, in which
the first section of the novel is clearly heterodiegetic, told from the point of view of
an impersonal and omniscient narrator. The story is about a young man, Raphael de
Valentin, who purchases a shagreen that will fulfill any wish of its owner, shrinking
slightly upon the fulfillment of each desire. The second section of the novel, however,
is clearly homodiegetic, told in the first person, from the point of view of the
protagonist Raphael de Valentin himself. This shift can be modeled within our
proposed analysis as involving accommodation, but not yet quite accommodation of
a narrator discourse referent. What we’re accommodating is merely the information
that De Valentin is now the narrating speaker, and hence the anchor for first person
pronouns and other indexicals. Formally, we add a descriptive condition of the form
‘spkr(x)’, where x is the already established discourse referent for De Valentin.
A narrative mode switch due to marble-like accommodation of a new discourse
referent halfway through the story also occurs, for instance in metanarratives, like
7
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the following:6
(9) Once upon a time there was no time. No time and no space. No heroes,
no plot, no drama, no obstacles, no twists, no turns, no hero’s journey, no
redemption, nothing to learn, nowhere to go, and no one needing to be saved.
The sky was blue. The trees were green. People danced for no reason,
sang like the birds, and looked up at the sky and down at the ground with
the same reverence. This was the time before story, before the need to
understand, make meaning, convince, persuade, teach, transmit, entertain,
distract, or make a single point. The point? It was already made. And
everyone already understood. Hmmm. . . I thought about writing THIS story,
but then it dawned on me, how presumptuous that would be, how full of
paradox, contradiction, Facebook Likes, Tweets, lists of things to do, copy
edits, me, cash projections, reviews, complaint, business, and all the other
assorted flora and fauna of life AFTER the story needed to be told. So I took
out the garbage, washed the dishes, and walked the dog. This is not available
on Amazon, nor will it ever be.
In cases like this, the only way to interpret the indexical pronouns (in bold) is by
accommodating a narrator discourse referent.7 This would mean reinterpreting the
whole story as essentially homodiegetic, i.e., told by an apparently not so impersonal
or omniscient narrator as we originally assumed on account of the heterodiegetic
style characteristics.
In the following section we add one final ingredient to our analysis, an account
of unreliable narration, before returning to Death on the Freeway.
3 Unreliable narrators and untrustworthy speakers
Narratologists note that a narrator can (and often does) say something that is false in
the fictional world (Booth 1961; Zipfel 2011). Examples include Huckleberry Finn’s
naive observations about society, or Chief Bromden’s hallucinations about growing
and shrinking protagonists in One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest. The question for
our toy analysis developed thus far, then, is: How do we separate what’s true in
fiction from what the narrator tells us? In order to answer this question, let’s first
consider what happens in regular conversation.
6 www.ideachampions.com/heart/archives/2014/06/index.shtml
7 In fact, interpreting the hesitation marker hmmm. . . already presupposes a person-like, non-omniscient
narrator.
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3.1 Unreliable conversation partners
In an ideal world where communication serves merely to coordinate our joint truth
seeking, any assertion that p should result in the hearer updating their beliefs with p.
But this is clearly an oversimplification of the way actual communication works. We
don’t always believe (or even just accept or commit to) whatever our interlocutors
say. Several paths have been explored for dealing with non-cooperative or otherwise
unreliable conversation partners,8 but for the sake of simplicity, we follow Eckardt’s
(2014) straightforward semantic proposal. Eckardt distinguishes different types of
updates: Trust updates and Cautious updates:
A Trust update is one in which the propositional content of the
utterance is added directly (by intersection) to the addressee’s beliefs
and the common ground. Other assertion situations will only support
Cautious updates. Person a asserts s, but addressee b updates her
beliefs with lw.Beliefa(w,p), where s denotes the proposition p.
Whatever we are told, we’ll always have to decide whether we believe
it or not. (Eckardt 2014:65-66)
As an example of a Cautious update, suppose a republican tells you (10):
(10) Trump has saved the middle class!
Hopefully, you don’t update your beliefs accordingly. Rather, it is suggested that





In sum, in a Trust update we add information directly to the global DRS, as was
illustrated in section 2.1. On the other hand, a Cautious update is one where we add
information under a doxastic operator, as in (11). We interpret BEL-conditions as
modal statements in possible worlds semantics (Hintikka 1969), i.e. BELxj is true
in w iff j is true in all doxastic alternatives of x in w.9
8 Most notably with the help of game theory (e.g. Asher & Lascarides 2013).
9 The distinction between Trust and Cautious updates is not meant to be exhaustive. In other cases we
might want to be even more cautious, as when we suspect that the speaker is deliberately lying to
us (or just bullshitting or trolling) that p. In such cases we might do a Supercautious update with p
resulting in the addition of the information that the speaker says that p.
9
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3.2 Unreliable narrators
If we distinguish Cautious updates and Trust updates in regular conversation, we
could do the same within the context of fiction interpretation. First in homodiegetic
narrative, when the narrator says something that is somehow inconsistent with the
story developed thus far or if we have other reasons not to trust the narrator, we
might not want to perform a ‘fictional Trust update’, i.e. take her words at face value
and adding her content as facts about the story world (as represented in the box
under the fiction operator). Instead, we might want to perform a ‘fictional Cautious
update’, and conclude merely that the narrator apparently fictionally believes this,
but it might not be fictionally true.
For example, in Chapter 3 of The Catcher in Rye, the first person narrator,
Holden, asserts that he is ‘the most terrific liar you ever saw in your life’. Shortly
thereafter, he tells the reader that he lives in a dormitory donated by an alumnus
named Ossenburger, who made all his money with cheap funeral parlors. Upon
hearing this, the reader is likely to perform a Cautious update, which we can represent










Notice that (12) combines our proposal for analyzing homodiegetic narration in DRT
with Eckardt’s proposal about Cautious updates.
The more difficult cases to make sense of are ones that involve Cautious updates
in heterodiegetic narration. At first blush, this may seem like an oxymoron. If there is
no discourse referent representing the narrating speaker in heterodiegetic narration,
as we have proposed, then what would it mean to cautiously update, i.e., which
speaker’s beliefs are we supposed to update? The trick is that, as we’ve already seen
in section 2.3, a heterodiegetic narration can always switch into a homodiegetic one,
by accommodating a discourse referent for the (already implicitly present) narrator.
An accommodated narrator referent x can then serve as the anchor for the Cautious
update’s BELx-condition. Thus, after introducing a first person narrator, we can
always choose not to believe what that narrator tells us. This, we claim, is precisely
10
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what happens in Death on the Freeway.
3.3 Death on the Freeway revisited
Let us now put all the pieces together. Before we get to the original Death on the
Freeway, first consider the following variant. The key manipulation is the use of
the first person pronoun in the final sentence, intended to bring out more clearly the
switch to homodiegetic mode.
(13) [. . . ] When Craig saw that the cause of the bankup had been Jack and Jill, he
took his gun out of the glovebox and shot them. People then started driving
over their bodies, and while the new speed hump caused some people to
slow down a bit, mostly traffic returned to its normal speed. I was there,
I saw it with my own eyes, and, as far as I’m concerned, Craig totally
did the right thing. Jack and Jill should have taken their argument
somewhere else where they wouldn’t get in anyone’s way.
While not as jarring, the final sentence still has shock value. The reader is forced to
lift the omniscience from the third person narrator and conclude that she is just a
character, and an unreliable one at that, as she seems to have a suspiciously immoral
view of the fictional world. On our account, the shock value would be explained by a
combination of two interpretive processes: First, the reader is forced to accommodate
a discourse referent for a first person narrating speaker in a discourse that started off
as a prototypical heterodiegetic narration. Second, the narrator’s claim that Craig did
the right thing clashes with our reconstruction of the story world thus far (based on
the textual evidence and the Lewisian principle(s) of minimal departure from the real
world or the author’s community’s beliefs, cf. section 2.2), so in an effort to maintain
a plausible and coherent interpretation of the whole, the reader will likely opt for a
Cautious update, adding the information that the newly discovered narrating speaker
(incorrectly) believes that Craig did the right thing.10 Skipping over the details, the
end result would look something like this:
10 An alternative interpretation strategy would be to trust the narrator and infer that the story is about a
very distant, immoral world, where killing someone like this really is the right thing to do. Presumably,
a story about such a world could be written, but we don’t think this is a very plausible interpretation
of (13).
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(14)
x y
author(x) weatherson(x) wrote(x,y). . .
FICy
t u v w




With this in mind, we are now ready to revisit Weatherson’s original, repeated
below:
(15) [. . . ] When Craig saw that the cause of the bankup had been Jack and Jill,
he took his gun out of the glovebox and shot them. People then started
driving over their bodies, and while the new speed hump caused some
people to slow down a bit, mostly traffic returned to its normal speed.
So Craig did the right thing, because Jack and Jill should have taken
their argument somewhere else where they wouldn’t get in anyone’s
way.
Without the first person pronoun that overtly signalled the narrative mode switch in
(13), it will be much harder for the reader to accommodate a narrator in (15). The
discourse preceding the last sentence doesn’t help since none of the characters can
possibly be the ones responsible for the immoral thought. All we have to go on is a
clash between our reconstruction of the story world, presumably somewhat similar
to our own in moral and other respects, and the information, from a supposedly
omniscient narrator, that Craig did the right thing in killing Jack and Jill. On our
analysis, this clash can be overcome, but there’s a high processing cost involved. We
need to first give up the assumption that we’re dealing with an omniscient narrator,
i.e. switch to homodiegetic by introducing an as yet unknown narrator referent. We
then furthermore have to decide that this narrator is unreliable, merely giving his
own, deviant opinion on what’s happening, as modeled by a Cautious update.
4 Concluding remarks
This squib proposed that the evaluative proposition in Weatherson’s Death on the
Freeway triggers the accommodation of an (unreliable) narrator. Given the lack of
descriptive content supporting such an accommodation, it is extremely difficult for
the processor. We note that we have not said anything about what accommodation
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really amounts to in terms of processing. We also note that there are various kinds
of accommodation processes. We have focused on the kind of accommodation that
arises in Partee’s missing marble example. This, we think, is sufficient to make
our proposed analogy with the imaginative resistance case under consideration.
However, ultimately, one would need to say more about accommodation11 and the
plethora of other examples which have been argued to be instances of imaginative
resistance.12
In drawing the parallel with marble accommodation, our analysis crucially relied
on the corollary of Lewis’s proposal that in all worlds compatible with a fiction there
must be someone telling the story. Byrne (1993) has provided some compelling
objections to Lewis’s proposal, arguing (among other things) that in many fictions it
is not true in the fictional world that there is someone sufficiently knowledgeable
to tell the story. And in these fictions, we have a story without a storyteller. For
example, there are possible stories about the universe ending or about uninhabited
empty spaces, where there couldn’t be a narrator.
While we do not have a knock down argument against this objection, several
comments are in order. First is the question of whether narratorless stories, if they
exist, could ever lead to imaginative resistance effects of the kind considered here.
Interestingly, Weatherson claims that Death on the Freeway is a narratorless story
and would thus provide an affirmative answer to this question. But is Death on
the Freeway really a narratorless story? Following Genette, narratologists typically
maintain that every story, by definition, requires a teller, who is committed to the
assertions in the text (cf. Ryan 1981; Margolin 2012). In the case of fiction, the
narrator can’t be the author, as that would entail that, e.g. Tolkien is committed to
the existence of hobbits, but must be somehow residing in the fictional universe,
overseeing things happening there. On this narratological assumption, Death on the
Freeway would certainly have a narrator, implicit at first and, as we have proposed,
explicitly represented as a character in the end.13
Still, let’s suppose that, contrary to Lewisian and contemporary narratological
assumptions, Death on the Freeway is, in fact, a story without a narrator. To
preserve our chief insight, that imaginative resistance can be explained in terms of
unreliable narrator accommodation, we only need to weaken the Lewisian semantics
by removing the ‘told as known fact’ restriction, i.e., we define the accessibility
11 For instance, it may be that Weatherson’s own analysis (involving Fodorian lower and higher concepts)
will shed light on the accommodation effects that we proposed.
12 See Liao & Gendler 2016 for a recent overview and Altshuler & Haug 2017 for a discussion of
examples that are directly relevant, involving discourse reanalysis.
13 If we assume that Death on the Freeway is a story with a narrator, then it remains an open question
whether narratorless stories, if they exist, could ever lead to imaginative resistance effects of the kind
considered here.
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relation of the fiction operator as: w0 is compatible with fictional discourse x in w iff
the fictional discourse x is true in w0 (and w0 is maximally close to w etc.). The rest
of our analysis will go through: Death on the Freeway still involves accommodation
of an unreliable narrator. What we lose is the analogy with Partee’s marble. In a
way, the accommodation involved in this version of the theory is even harder, as we
have to conjure up a narrator out of thin air, rather than just introduce a discourse
referent that was implicitly already available. Unfortunately, a proper understanding
of the varieties of accommodation strategies and their limits is still missing. We
hope that future progress on these general semantic/pragmatic matters will help us
decide whether this route is viable. For now, we hope that our squib at least shows
that it can be rewarding to try and apply our familiar semantic tools to topics from
neighboring fields, like aesthetics and narratology.
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A comparative note on the Bangla particle to 
and the German particle doch* 
Josef Bayer 
University of Konstanz 
Abstract  The Bangla discourse particle –to and the German discourse particle doch share 
a number of syntactic and semantic properties. Their phonetic similarity suggests a remote 
historical relation. While the latter part will only be mentioned and must remain for the 
specialists in Indo-European reconstruction, the present short study will highlight points of 
convergence between the two languages with respect to these particles along a series of 
concrete tests. The convergence appears to be more than accidental.    
1 Introduction 
In this note, I would like to draw the attention to a number of parallels that can be 
found between the Bangla particle to and the German particle doch. Although ap-
pearing in very distant Indo-European languages, the parallels are surprising. Both 
elements have their roots in Indo-European (IE). Perhaps they have a common an-
cestor, perhaps not. But even if not, the comparison could still prove to be interest-
ing for reasons of their function in grammar and discourse.  After a note on their 
respective etymologies in 1. I will begin in 2. with a common dichotomy of auton-
omy and boundedness, move to their semantic core in 3., then in 4. to common 
properties with regard to information structure, in 5. to their common restrictions 
in sentence mood, and in 6. to a common core in their distribution in complex 
clauses. Conclusions appear in 7.   
*Thanks to Jogamaya Bayer for sharing her intuitions about Bangla, to Heinrich Hettrich, Rose-
marie Lühr and Paul Kiparsky for useful historical information and especially to Probal Dasgupta
for joint research and discussions of Bangla grammar, as well as to Sibansu Mukhopadhyay for
compiling a corpus of Bangla sentences with –to. This article will also be published in: Dan, Mina
& Aditi Ghosh (eds.) Essays in Honour of Suniti Kumar Chatterji. Orient Black Swan. Hyderabad.





The immediate history of German doch is well documented. The modern conjunc-
tive adverb doch relates immediately to Old High German thoh, thō, Middle High 
German doch, Old Saxon thō̌h, Dutch toch, Old English þēah, English though, Old 
Norse þō, and Gothic þauh. Its first part is said to be related to Old Indic tú, tū́ 
which had an adversative meaning and has according to certain researchers devel-
oped out of the IE 2nd person singular *tū̌-; alternatively, a development out of the 
pronominal stem *te-, *to-  is considered, see Kluge (2011: 208) and Lühr (1976: 
77-79). The second part relates to the Gothic strengthening particle -uh, -h ("and"), 
see also Latin que, from Indo-European *ku̯e-.   
It is less clear where exactly to in modern Indo-Aryan (e.g. in Bangla and Hindi) 
comes from. According to Sen (1971), it comes from tad-u, which is a ‘tadbhava’ 
and originates from the Sanskrit tad followed by u, tad being the third person neuter 
pronoun while u is a widely used particle. Montaut (2016) locates the etymology 
of Hindi to in an ancient pronominal basis (Sanskrit ta-) referring to third person 
(“that”, “he”), which is still used as such in certain Indo-Aryan languages such as 
Marathi (to “he”). According to Dunkel (2014: vol II, 776f.), the oldest function 
of IE *tó was prosecutive, sequential, continuative; the adversative form *tú should 
be considered to be an ancient Aryan innovation.  
 
 
3 Free versus clitic usage 
 
Whatever the etymological status of Bangla to is, it is interesting to see that both 
interpretations that Dunkel refers to can be found in the modern language. The non-
adversative, sequential interpretation can be found in Bangla examples in which to 
starts the sentence. 
 
(1)       to   tumi dilli   jabe       na  bole      Thik korecho! 
 TO you  Delhi go.fut.2 not COMP  right  make.pst.2 
 “Then you have decided that you will not be going Delhi!” 
 
A related usage appears also in final position as in (2) or as a stand-alone in B’s 
response in (3). 
 
(2)       ritar        dilipke    bhalo lage na,  to? 
 Rita.gen Dilip.obj like.3         not TO? 
 “Rita doesn’t like Dilip, so what?” 
 
1 I will throughout represent the examples in the transcription found in the source texts. 
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(3)  A: baire    khub   briSTi hocche 
 outside much rain      occur.3 
 “It’s heavily raining outside” 
      B:  to?                                             
  TO 
 “So what?” 
 
The same holds for Hindi, as the following examples from Montaut (2016) show: 
 
(4) a. to kyâ  huâ?     
    TO what be.aor 
    "And then, what happened?"     
        b. to? 
                TO 
             "And then?" 
 
In these cases, to should not be confused with an interrogative element as the trans-
lation may suggest. It simply means "(and) then". The interrogative impact follows 
only in a second step, namely by rising intonation and the challenge of the preced-
ing proposition. “Rita doesn’t like Dilip, so what?” The conversational implicature 
of this sequencing is question-like ("So what?", "Who cares?" etc.) but to as such 
has no interrogative impact. In all these cases, to is a free standing temporal adverb. 
Things change when we consider the usage of to as an enclitic element, or what 
Dasgupta (1984; 1987) calls an "anchor".2  
 
(5) a. dilip  to    kal            aSbe 
      Dilip TO tomorrow come.fut.3 
      "Dilip will come tomorrow, won't he?"  
  b. Dilip kal to aSbe 
  c. Dilip kal aSbe to 
 
We see a variety of options. The common denominator is that to as a weak clitic-
like anchor needs a phonological host to its immediate left which it can lean on. As 
Dasgupta (1987) argues, to in its incarnation as an anchor can never occur in initial 
position. There is good evidence that the material to the left of to must be a major 
syntactic constituent. In (5a) it is the subject, in (5b) the adverb, and in (5c) the 
entire clause.  
The clause linker to and the clitic to can obviously not be identified semanti-
cally. In its free appearance, to is simply a temporal adverb meaning "then". As a 
 
2 The difference between a free form of to and an enclitic form of to has also been described for 
Hindi in Lakshmi Bai (1977). 
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clitic, it communicates that the speaker takes the hearer to believe that p is true and 
conveys the additional expectation that the hearer should acknowledge that p is 
true.3 Thus, -to triggers a reading according to which the addressee is reminded that 
p holds. Almost certainly, the clitic to lacks interrogativity in the same way that the 
clause linker to does. Emphasis of the truth of p gives rise to potential adversativity. 
Adversativity plays a role in German doch. Maybe the clearest case is its use as 
an answering particle. A negative statement like (6) is not corrected with nein ("no") 
but with doch.  
 
(6) A: Du bist heute nicht in die Uni gegangen.  
 you are today not    in the university gone 
 "You didn't go to university today" 
B: Doch / *Nein 
 DOCH  NO 
 "No, I DID (go to university)" 
 
Doch signals rejection of the previous proposition. It comes across as adversative 
because it is in fact the focalization of the truth of the proposition that has been 
denied in a previous speech act.4 Something similar is found when doch appears as 
a clause linker. 
 
(7) Klaus ist intelligent, doch er ist unmotiviert 
Klaus is intelligent DOCH he is unmotivated 
"Klaus is intelligent {but/however} he is unmotivated" 
 
The second clause does not challenge the truth of the former as such but challenges 
one aspect of it, here the positive properties of Klaus. One can be both intelligent 
and unmotivated, but the latter property may hamper one's general success. Various 
authors have suggested that doch p corrects a salient q that entails ¬ p; see Abraham 
(1991), Doherty (1985), Grosz (2010), Karagjosova (2004), Ormelius-Sandblom 
(1997) and others. 
Interestingly, we find in German doch also in a role that resembles –to in its 
function as an anchor. It is a central property of German discourse particles that 
they have a clause-medial fixed position from which they cannot be moved to the 
 
3 Working on to in Hindi, Lakshmi Bai (1977) came to a similar conclusion. According to her, the 
conjunctive to in Hindi must be distinguished from what she calls the "emphatic" to. The former is 
a clause linker, while the second is a clitic element that attaches to major sub-constituents of the 
clause.  
4 Thus, it would be worthwhile to explore to what extent there is a use of doch that relates it to the 
familiar notion of "verum" focus, i.e. focusing the truth value.  
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front or to the right of the clause.5 Doch is such a particle. Imagine the following 
discourse: 
 
(8) A: Ich fahre morgen ans Meer.  
 I     go     tomorrow to.the sea  
 "I'll go to the sea tomorrow"  
B: Aber du musst doch árbeiten!  
 but you must DOCH work 
 "But you must go to work!" 
 
Here B reminds A of something that A is supposed to know, namely that he has to 
go to work and therefore can most likely not take a day off at the sea. One can see 
that an adversative clause linker, namely aber ("but") introduces B's utterance. 
Thus, doch cannot be identified with aber. It must by all means make an additional 
semantic contribution. It functions as a reminder that p (=B must go to work) is true 
and should be known to B. This is compatible with adversativity as already ex-
pressed by aber, but it adds a presupposition about the assumed mental state of the 
addressee. Interestingly, in this function, doch must remain in a fixed pre-VP posi-
tion, and it must find a focused element in its scope, which in (8) is arbeiten. The 
alternative in (9a) lacks the "reminder"-meaning of the discourse particle, and (9b) 
is downright ungrammatical. 
 
(9) a. Doch du musst árbeiten! 
b. *Aber du musst árbeiten doch! 
 
In its role as a discourse particle, doch is a functional element on a par with negation 
and other grammatical elements. Although it is not a clitic like Bangla -to, it is not 






As already indicated in section 2, -to and doch are semantically similar. We can 
distinguish the use as a clause linker and the use as a discourse particle. Obviously 





5 See Thurmair (1989) among various others. 
6 See Bayer (2018) and works mentioned there. 
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3.1 Clause linker 
 
As a clause linker, the function of doch is like the logical connective Ù, enriched 
with the property that the simultaneous truth of the propositions p and q which are 
linked with Ù is unexpected, unusual etc.7 This is the source of their adversative 
semantics. In Bangla, one would use the connective kintu but not to.  
 
(10) dilip iSkule        jay {kintu/*to} Sipra baRite      thake 
  Dilip school.loc go.3 but/then    Sipra home.loc stay.3 
 "Dilip goes to school but Sipra stays at home" 
 
 
3.2 Discourse particle 
 
In their usage as discourse particles, doch and -to are quite similar. The clause linker 
meaning of doch reappears in its use as a discourse particle. Karagjosova 
(2004:183) suggests that in doch(p) the speaker's belief is that p is explicit but in-
active common knowledge. To the extent that p is situationally relevant, this 
amounts to the implicature that the speaker has reason to believe that the hearer has 
'forgotten' p and needs to be 'reminded' of it.  
The Bangla clitic particle -to has much in common with this characterization. 
Again, the speaker assumes that p is known to the hearer, and that there is reason 
to believe that p is not in the hearer's focus of attention; -to is then actually a signal 
to the hearer to acknowledge p and react in a way that is consistent with subscribing 
to the truth of p. This must be the reason why sentences with -to are often inter-
preted as quasi interrogatives. The addressee is expected to show that he or she 
acknowledges the truth of p. (5c) - dilip kal aSbe to – is then interpreted in such a 
way that the speaker claims that p holds (p = Dilip will come tomorrow), that he 
assumes that the hearer already knows that p but that it is worthwhile to ask him to 
acknowledge that the truth of p should still be assumed. Of course, this brings the 
speech act quite close to the interrogative speech act that involves the enclitic in-
terrogative particle ki. (11a) shows an explicit polar question; (11b) shows that the 
particle ki may be missing. The latter is possible if the question is a main clause 
with rising intonation.8  
 
7 This is the reason why weakly contrastable properties give rise to awkward interpretations as seen 
in ??Mary is tall but intelligent, ??2+2=4 but 4-1=3. 
8 Some researchers may assume that (11b) is equipped with a zero interrogative particle. I would be 
hesitant to accept such a conclusion. One could in the same way argue that dilip kal aSbe is a -to 
sentence with a zero particle corresponding to -to. In my view it is more reasonable to assume that 
(11b) is syntactically a declarative clause which is pronounced with interrogative intonation as in 
English You are married?  
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(11)  a. dilip kal             aSbe   ki? 
          dilip tomorrow come.fut.3         Q 
        "Will Dilip come tomorrow?" 
 b. dilip kal aSbe? [with rising intonation] 
 
 
4 Information structure  
 
When -to is used as a discourse particle, it can be found in different places as has 
been shown in (5). In (5a), dilip to kal aSbe, the speaker wants the hearer to confirm 
that it is Dilip who will come tomorrow. In (5b), dilip kal to aSbe, the speaker wants 
the hearer to confirm that it is tomorrow that Dilip will come. The most straightfor-
ward syntactic solution says that -to is a functional head. Functional heads do not 
float around in the clause. They hold a fixed position in the grid of other such po-
sitions in clause structure. Functional heads may give rise to a specifier position. 
Constituents which match the respective head in feature structure can move to its 
specifier position; –to can attract elements if they qualify a) as constituents in 
Bangla, and b) are drawn from a set of semantic competitors, say, Dilip in compar-
ison with Hiren or Projit or Mukul, or tomorrow in comparison with next week or 
next month or next year. (5c) would then be the neutral form in which the entire 
proposition has been moved to the specifier of -to. In this case, the speaker assumes 
that p is common ground between himself and the hearer, and that it is worth re-
minding the hearer of p.9 We see that, due to its clitic nature, -to is able to express 
different pragmatically relevant focalizations. 
The German particle doch seems to be a functional head, but it is clearly not a 
clitic; following Diesing (1992) and following work, our assumptions is that doch 
is merged in a pre-VP position, and that VP-internal constituents may move out of 
the scope of doch.10   
 
(12)    a. Damals hat  doch    [dein Bruder]        [dem Professor]  
               then      has DOCH your brother.nom  the professor.dat 
               [seine Dissertation] gezeigt. 
               [his dissertation.acc] shown 
 
 
9 This is - in a much abbreviated form - what Bayer, Dasgupta, Mukhopadhyay & Ghosh (2014) 
have suggested.  
10 Diesing often uses the combination ja doch. Discourse particles can be stacked. But stacking 
makes no difference. Her main intention is to make the semantic difference between indefinites 
visible. In the present examples, definite DPs are being used. In this case, a semantic difference is 
only noticeable in terms of information structure. In general, topical DPs are to the left of the parti-
cle, rhematic ones stay in VP.    
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"In those days your brother has shown his dissertation to the professor, did-
n't he?" 
b. Damals hat [dein Bruder] doch __ dem Professor seine Dissertation     ge-
zeigt. 
c. Damals hat [dein Bruder] [dem Professor] doch __ __ seine Dissertation 
gezeigt. 
d. Damals hat [dein Bruder] [dem Professor] [seine Dissertation] doch __ __ 
__ gezeigt. 
 
Given that VP is the natural place for focal information, and that German allows 
reordering of arguments ("scrambling"), different options emerge as to which con-
stituent is highlighted by doch. In (12a) it is the entire proposition SHOW(x,y,z). 
Here the speaker asks the hearer for confirmation that this proposition is true. Once 
the subject has been scrambled out of VP, as in (12b), the proposition remains what 
it is but confirmation is asked for showing the professor his dissertation; the subject 
is outside the focus domain. In (12d) we see that doch can scope over a VP all of 
whose arguments have been evacuated; only the verb remains. Here the speaker 
asks for confirmation about the predicate "show" in comparison with competitors 
such as "send" or "take-away" etc. We see that despite their syntactic differences, -
to and doch achieve very similar pragmatic effects. While -to attracts focal elements 
to its left, doch uses scrambling in order to narrow down the domain in which it 





Given what we have seen so far, it may not be too surprising to see that Bangla -to 
and German doch attend to the same core restrictions on sentence mood. Both ap-
pear in declarative and imperative clauses, and they are strictly impossible in ques-
tions. Consider imperatives. 
 
(13) a. edike   eSo   to 
      this.direction  come.2 TO 
       “Please come here!” 
  b. Komm doch    her!  
    come.2 DOCH toward.the.speaker 
     “Please come to me!" 
 
In both cases, the use of the particle turns the imperative into a friendly invitation. 
The semantics is not as straightforward as in declaratives. Nevertheless, it may be 
possible to argue that the particle's adversative potential adds to the speech act in 
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such a way that the speaker invites the hearer to make the underlying proposition 
true, and that he/she should do so in spite of reasons that may suggest otherwise.   
Karagjosova (2004:169), who offers a formal speech-act theoretic account of 
doch, speaks of a "contrast between desire and reality". The speaker's positive atti-
tude seems to be the result of an enhanced effort to invite the addressee to act in the 
sense of making the underlying proposition true.  
To the extent that non-finite fragments of speech exist and are interpreted as 
imperatives, both Bangla and German show that their respective particle cannot be 
used in such constructions.11 For German see Gärtner (2017) 
 
(14) a. matha uMcu! 
     head    up 
     "Keep your head up!" 
  b. *matha-to uMcu! 
  c. *matha uMcu-to! 
 
(15) a. Kopf hoch!  
     head    up 
    "Keep your head up!" 
  b.*Kopf doch hoch! 
 
(16) a. Alles aussteigen! 
     all     out.step 
    "Get off (the vehicle)!" 
  b. *Alles doch aussteigen! 
 
Obviously, fragmentary imperatives of this sort lack functional vocabulary; if in 
their usage as discourse particle both Bangla -to and German doch are proper part 
of the respective language's functional vocabulary, these facts follow straightfor-
wardly. 
Interrogative sentences exclude -to/doch in both languages.  
 
(17) Polar question 
 a. tui   ki aSbi?      / tui   aSbi      ki?  
     you Q come.2  / you come.2  Q 
  "Will you come?"   
b. *tui ki aSbi to?   /  *tui aSbi to ki?  / *tui aSbi ki to? 
    
 
11 As Jogamaya Bayer points out to me (p.c.), since Bangla is a zero copula language, (14a,b) can, 




(18) Constituent question 
 a. tui   kObe aSbi? 
     you when come.2       
    "When will you come?" 
b. *tui-to   kObe aSbi? / *tui kObe aSbi-to?  
   
(19) Polar question 
 a. Wirst du kommen? 
      will.2 you come  
     "Will you come?" 
b. *Wirst du doch kommen? 
    
(20) Constituent question 
 a. Wann kommst du? 
      when come.2 you 
     "When will you come?" 
b. *Wann kommst du doch? 
 
Given that both particles have roughly the same semantic function, the ban in in-
terrogatives is expected. Since the speaker desires information from the hearer, the 
true answer cannot be common ground between the interlocutors. As a conse-
quence, the speaker cannot ask the hearer for confirmation of the underlying prop-
osition.12  
Let me finally return to the question whether the Bangla discourse particle -to, 
which we have seen is incompatible with interrogative mood, may itself be a ques-
tion particle. As such –to would be a competitor of –ki. Intuitions appear to be a bit 
unreliable. As I said before, –to sentences are often pronounced with the rising in-
tonation that is typical for questions. Without doubt, -to sentences can also be "an-
swered" by acknowledging or denying that p holds. Therefore, it is advisable to 
 
12 Notice that not all wh-clauses are alike. There are for example wh-exclamatives of the style What 
a shame!, How beautiful! or How good your son can already swim! Here the proposition p = P(x), 
e.g. x can swim, is presupposed, and the new contribution is roughly that the speaker exclaims that 
property P holds to a surprising degree. German exclamatives of that kind permit doch. 
(i) Wie gut    dein  Sohn doch     schon    schwimmen  kann! 
how good your son    DOCH  already swim             can 
 
With doch the speaker reminds the hearer of the fact that his son is for his young age a very good 
swimmer. Interestingly, corresponding wh-exclamatives in Bangla like tomar meye ki Sundor nac-
che! ("How beautifully your daughter is dancing!") do not permit -to, as pointed out to me by Probal 
Dasgupta and Jogamaya Bayer. I have no explanation for this discrepancy. 
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employ more formal testing. Such formal testing is provided by the use of negative 
polarity items (NPIs). We know that some NPIs are not only licensed by negation 
but also by interrogativity. As seen in (21), one such NPI is Bangla ekTu-o (little-
even). 
 
(21) dilip ki   ekTu-o    Sahajjo koreche?  
 Dilip KI little-even help     do.past.3 
 “Did Dilip help at all?” 
             
The question is whether the use of –to provides a relevant licenser as well. If –to is 
equivalent to –ki, it should. The result of my little research revealed that examples 
such as (22) are deviant.13 
 
(22) *dilip  to   ekTu-o     Sahajjo koreche?  
                Dilip TO little-even help      do.past.3 
 
In German questions, one can use the NPI überhaupt ("at all") among others as seen 
in (23a); non-inversion (alias failure of movement to C) as in (23b) leaves the NPI 
in limbo.  
 
(23) a. Hast du   überhaupt das Licht ausgeschaltet? 
   have you at.all           the light  off.switched 
 "Have you switched off the light at all?" 
 
b. *Du hast  überhaupt das Licht ausgeschaltet 
     you  have at.all          the light  off.switched 
 
 
13 Probal Dasgupta (p.c.) informs me that in Bangla NPIs may also be licensed by bare interrogative 
intonation. Unlike in various languages in which the NPI must be licensed by an overt lexeme or by 
a change in word order as is the case in inversion, (i) is an option in Bangla.  
 
(i) dilip ekTu-o Sahajjo koreche? 
 
If so, -to may be added to such an interrogative clause in the sense of a tag. (ii), in fact, is possible 
if intoned with dripping sarcasm and 'not p' is strongly implicated. 
 
(ii) ora rakar      almari    theke EkTa-o     gOena      curi  korte parbe         to? 
    they Raka's cupboard from one-even. ornament steal  will   be.able.FUT3  TO 
 'I bet they won't be able to steal a single ornament from Raka's cupboard!' 
 
This analysis would not be available if -to appears in clause-medial position. Importantly, the des-
ignated interrogative marker –ki gives a license to the NPI from a clause medial position as well. 
Thus, the difference between -ki and -to remains.  
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When we consider the particle doch, one could argue that it turns a declarative sen-
tence into a request which would make it indistinguishably similar to an interroga-
tive. (24) would be a typical check-question for which an affirmative answer is 
strongly expected.14 
 
(24) Du  hast  doch     das Licht ausgeschaltet?   
 you have DOCH the  light off.switched 
 "Have you switched off the light? I hope you have." 
 
In spite of this pragmatic nearness to real questions, such speech acts must not be 
confused with real questions. They can never license an NPI. (25) is as deviant as 
a pure declarative such as (23b). 
 
(25) *Du  hast  doch     überhaupt das Licht ausgeschaltet?   
 you  have DOCH at.all            the light  off.switched 
 
Thus, to the extent that our comparison between Bangla -to and German doch looks 
promising so far, the failure of NPI-licensing by -to seems to converge with this 
result from German. 
 
 
6 Islandhood  
 
Particles like Bangla -to and German doch are classical root clause phenomena. The 
reason must be that they tap into the epistemic system of the speaker and his/her 
evaluation of the common ground with the addressee. Thus, it is not sufficient for 
them to be hosted in a proposition; they must be hosted in a speech act which is 
formally typed according to the mood system of the language. Bangla is a good 
example for this generalization. According to my joint research with Probal Das-
gupta, the discourse particles of Bangla can hardly ever be found in embedded 
clauses (clausal complements, relative clauses, adjunct clauses). Normally, if a par-
ticle like -to is in such an "island", it cannot reach the domain of the root clause, 
which is according to standard assumptions the grammatical layer in which illocu-
tionary force is implemented.  
The situation in German is less clear. There are various particle which can arise 
in bona fide islands; ja (lit. "yes") is a notorious example.15 The situation with doch 
is somewhat clearer. It can arise in attributive but not in restrictive relative clauses, 
see (26a). The former are something like separate ("parenthetical") speech acts; the 
 
14 See Karagjosova (2004: 175ff) 
15 See Kratzer (1999). Extensive work by Yvonne Viesel has explored the use of ja. See Viesel 
(2017) and ongoing dissertation work.  
28
A comparative note on the Bangla particle to and the German particle doch 
latter are not. Doch cannot arise in clausal complements unless they are in the scope 
of verbs of speaking and thus count as reported speech; this is seen in (26b).    
 
(26) a. Klaus/*jeder,  [der   doch      gerade      in Indien ist], hat  angerufen 
 Klaus / every  who   DOCH  right.now in India   is     has  called  
 "Klaus/everyone who is right now in India has called" 
 
       b. Jeder sagt/??glaubt,   [dass die Regierung    doch    versagt hat]. 
 every says/ believes   that  the government DOCH failed   has  
 "Everyone says/belives that the government has failed" 
 
Islandhood holds for most adjunct sentences. There is, however, an exception: rea-
son clauses. Reason clauses which are initiated with weil in German and with karon 
in Bangla are certainly embedded clauses. But both of them can host the respective 
particles under discussion. 
 
(27)  Max geht  jetzt ins Bett,   
 Max goes now in.the bed 
 [weil      er doch      morgen einen anstrengenden Tag hat] 
because he DOCH tomorrow a         strenuous    day has 
"Max goes to bed now because he will have a strenuous day tomorrow." 
 
(28) a.   dilip  aj       khub SOkale uTheche   
              dilip  today very  early     rise.past.3 
 [karon    o    to   aj      SOhor-e EkTa   mEla dekhte  jabe] 
              because he TO today city-loc  one.cl   fair    see       go.fut.3 
 “Dilip got up early today because he will go to see a fair in the city.” 
         b. dilip aj khub SOkale utheche [karon o aj SOhore EkTa mEla dekhte jabe 
to] 
 
According to Frey (2012), reason clauses belong to a class of what he calls Periph-
eral Adverbial Clauses (PACs). These clauses show signs of non-integration. Un-
like integrated adverbial clauses, PACs have their own illocutionary force. Since 
they are nevertheless dependent clauses, their force relies on the speaker who utters 
the root clause. For detailed discussion see Haegeman (2012). It would be worth 
exploring to what extent Bangla -to is licit in other clause types that have been 
subsumed under the PAC-generalization, and to what extent other tests concerning 








The comparative exploration of the particles –to and doch in Bangla and German re-
spectively reveals a surprising convergence in terms of their syntactic and seman-
tic/pragmatic properties. This convergence may be due to linguistic universality or to 
large-scale parametric properties. If so, we would expect to find more languages, and 
in particular also genetically unrelated languages, with similar lexical elements in the 
service of similar functions and distributions. Given that little attention has so far been 
paid to "little words" with "fuzzy meaning", such findings could indeed be possible. 
The other expectation could be that the two elements under discussion emerge from a 
common Indo-European ancestral language. Their phonetic similarity and the few his-
torical records we have access to suggest that this possibility exists. If so, it would be 
highly interesting to see that the features that are shared by Bangla -to and German 
doch have survived 2000 years or so.  
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The child in semantics* 
Valentine Hacquard 
University of Maryland 
Abstract This paper discusses the challenges that children face in acquiring 
natural language meaning, and the kinds of linguistic and nonlinguistic capacities 
that they may draw from to face these challenges.  
1    Introduction 
Linguistic theory aims at what makes language possible, and part of this is 
figuring out what the human child brings to the acquisition of linguistic 
competence. For the most part, however, the semantic aspect of this capacity has 
not been the object of work in semantics, which has concentrated on the 
specification of truth and reference, and viewed with little urgency (less than has 
work in syntax), the question of how children naturally acquire the languages we 
use to assert and refer. But semantics has become increasingly integrated into 
linguistic theory, thanks in large part to Angelika Kratzer, whose work connects 
semantics to our understanding of both syntax and cognition more broadly. Now 
the child is playing a more prominent role. In this paper, I would like to discuss 
what we know about the challenges of acquiring meaning, and about the linguistic 
and nonlinguistic capacities that equip children to face them, drawing on what 
I’ve learned in recent years from working with acquisitionists. 
Like all of language, word meanings are acquired from limited input, without 
much negative evidence or explicit teaching. What a word means is constrained 
only weakly by the physical environment of its use, which changes little as one 
word follows another. But neither could it always be decided by perfect insight 
into what the speaker means to convey, on any one occasion, since this will 
generally go beyond what is encoded in words. The child will still need to abstract 
the meaning of a phrase from what a speaker means in using it, and then divide 
this up among its constituent words. Yet despite these challenges, children 
* For insightful discussions on the topics discussed in this paper, I would like to thank Jeff Lidz,
Alexander Williams, Rachel Dudley, Aaron White, Shevaun Lewis, Kate Harrigan, Ailis
Cournane, Nick Huang, Annemarie van Dooren, Anouk Dieuleveut, Mina Hirzel, and Laurel
Perkins. And I would like to thank Angelika Kratzer for her steady encouragement and support




somehow succeed, by exploiting multiple cues in concert. Included among these 
are some, perhaps less obvious, that come from the structure of sentences and 
conversations in which the word is used. What other words are its regular 
companions? What is its syntactic category? What sorts of arguments does it 
take? What is the immediate topic of conversation? What has already been 
discussed? What is the speaker paying attention to? And what is she trying to 
achieve? These are among the sources of information, less direct than a finger 
pointing to a ball while the speaker says “ball”, that might help the child—or also 
sometimes confuse her, when she sees them in a non-adult way. 
Whether and when children can make use of these cues depends on the 
linguistic, conceptual and pragmatic abilities and biases they have at 
different stages of development. Right at the start, a few conceptual pre-requisites 
need to be in place for word learning to get off the ground. Children need to 
be attuned to communicative intentions and goals; they need to parse the world in 
roughly the same chunks as the speakers around them; and they need to have 
access to the underlying concepts that the words express. If children can’t see the 
rabbit for its body parts, and grasp the intention to refer to it as such, they won’t 
be able to resolve classic problems of indeterminacy that arise even for a simple 
word like rabbit. Likewise without a concept of possibility, and an expectation 
that people might talk about what is non-actual, children will be hard-pressed to 
acquire modal words such as must or can. 
The last three decades of research in cognitive development have shown that 
young children’s conceptual abilities are much more in line with that of their 
parents than was originally thought. Children tend to parse the world into the 
same pieces as adults do, and view those pieces under the same concepts 
(Gleitman 1990, Spelke 1990, Markman 1990, Waxman & Lidz 2006, Carey 
2010). Furthermore, they can track the goals and intentions of their interlocutors 
(Baldwin 1991, Bloom 2001, Clark & Amaral 2010), and see people’s actions in 
terms of their beliefs, desires, goals and intentions (Gergely et al. 1995, 
Woodward 1998, Onishi & Baillargeon 2005, Southgate et al. 2007). This helps 
resolves one side of the word learning problem: if children parse the world in the 
right chunks, their task is just to figure out what word corresponds to what 
concept or chunk of the world. And for some words, like ball or rabbit, they 
might succeed solely on the basis of cues from the extra-linguistic context, by 
paying attention to what objects speakers are directing their attention to, and 
seeing these objects in the same light.  
However, this strategy will be less useful for more abstract words, with no 
obvious referents in the physical context of speech. In these cases, children may 
need to depend more on cues from the linguistic context, grammatical and 
conversational. And just as seeing the world through the same eyes as their 
parents can narrow the space of candidate meanings for the child, sharing certain 
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linguistic biases may narrow it further. These biases might include expectations 
about what concepts are likely and unlikely word meanings, or about how the 
meaning of a word might correlate with its distribution in syntax, for example.  
More than in the past, it is plausible that we might discern what is properly 
linguistic in the acquisition of semantics, owing to breakthroughs on the 
conceptual end of the word learning problem. And this makes it an exciting time 
for semanticists to collaborate with acquisitionists. This paper provides a brief 
survey of how these issues are currently being addressed. My goal here is not to 
provide a comprehensive overview, but to simply highlight the kinds of methods 
that have been developed to probe different aspects of the word learning problem. 
Section 2 outlines the kinds of cues that children could in principle exploit when 
word learning, and the kinds of linguistic, conceptual, and pragmatic abilities and 
biases that would allow them to do so. Section 3 reports on methods that have 
been developed to probe which of these cues and biases children actually make 
use of when word learning.  
2    Word learning from limited evidence: potential cues & biases 
Ordinarily children learn words not from verbal or ostensive definitions, but from 
hearing them in conversation. This seems incredible at first, since the space of 
possible meanings for a given word in any given situation is vast. But there are 
various sources of information that children can in principle make use of. Here I 
review a few of these, and consider what abilities would allow a child to exploit 
them.  
2.1    Potential cues from the linguistic and extra linguistic context 
The physical context can provide cues, if learners are able to associate a word 
with an object that keeps on reoccurring whenever the word is used, especially if 
speakers draw attention to that object by directing their eye gaze or through 
pointing gestures. To exploit cues from the physical context, children need to be 
able to keep track of co-occurrence patterns. They also need to view the world in 
roughly the same chunks as the speakers around them. They may need further 
mindreading abilities, to infer speakers’ referential intentions, by tracking what 
part of the world they are attending to. Once children figure out the meanings of a 
few words this way, these words can then be used to exploit cues from the 
linguistic context to figure out the meaning of more abstract words (Gleitman et 
al. 2005). 
Various aspects of the linguistic context can provide valuable cues as to a 
word’s meaning. The lexical context (the set of words that occur in the same 
sentence), for instance, could be quite useful in learning the meaning of verbs like 
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eat or drink, which co-occur with noun phrases from a very narrow semantic 
range (edibles and drinkables; see discussion in Resnik 1996, White 2015). The 
syntactic context could be useful if the syntactic distribution of a word correlates 
with aspects of its meaning (Landau & Gleitman 1985; Gleitman 1990 a.o.). 
Gleitman and colleagues propose that syntactic cues play a critical role in 
children’s acquisition of “hard words”, such as attitude verbs like think or want, 
which express abstract notions for which the physical context provides few cues. 
One aspect of the syntactic signal is syntactic category: knowing that a word is a 
noun, for instance, will narrow the range of possible meanings. Another is 
syntactic selection: knowing the kinds of arguments a word takes can further 
narrow the range of its possible meanings. 
For such “syntactic bootstrapping” to work, there need to be robust 
correlations between the meaning of a word and its syntactic distribution, and 
children need to recognize them. What the correlations might be appears in the 
formal literature as the question of how well syntactic selection can be 
semantically motivated. In the case of attitude predicates, for instance, there is a 
rich literature about whether various selectional requirements track fundamental 
semantic distinctions, such as mood selection (Bolinger 1968, Farkas 1985, 
Giannakidou 1997, Villalta 2008, a.o.), or the ability to take both interrogative 
and declarative complements (Lahiri 2002, Egre 2007, a.o.). We then have the 
further question of whether, at a given age, children are able to use these 
correlations in learning. This requires both the ability to perceive the correlated 
categories, syntactic and conceptual, and the ability to observe the correlation. 
These abilities will not emerge instantaneously; even if they draw on some innate 
expectations, they will develop through infancy and early childhood. 
The conversational context can also provide very valuable cues. The topic of 
conversation can constrain the lexical field of content words. Other more indirect 
cues might come from the speakers’ conversational goals. For instance, figuring 
out that a verb like want is systematically used to make indirect requests might 
give away the fact that it expresses a kind of preference. Other cues might come 
from the state of the common ground, and what assumptions are shared over the 
course of a conversation. For instance, tracking what speakers presuppose might 
help learners figure out whether a given word is a presupposition trigger. To 
exploit cues from the conversational context, learners will need a combination of 
pragmatic and linguistic abilities.  
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2.2    Linguistic, conceptual and pragmatic biases 
There are various sources of cues about word meanings that learners can in 
principle draw from. But whether children can actually exploit these cues will 
depend on the conceptual, pragmatic and linguistic abilities and biases they have 
at different stages of development.  
2.2.1    Conceptual and pragmatic abilities and biases 
To exploit cues from both the physical and the conversational contexts, children 
need a certain amount of conceptual and pragmatic competence. First, they need 
to carve the world in roughly the same chunks as the speakers around them, 
viewed under roughly the same concepts. And as we saw, the cognitive 
development literature suggests that they do from infancy. Children also need 
some mindreading abilities, to see what part of the world speakers are attending 
to, in order to figure out their referential intentions. And here again, many infant 
studies have shown that such abilities are in place very early on (Gleitman 1990, 
Spelke 1990, Markman 1990, Baldwin 1991, Bloom 2001, Waxman & Lidz 2006, 
Carey 2010, a.o.). Other studies show that young children further pick up on the 
intended illocutionary force of speakers’ direct and indirect speech acts (Shatz 
1978, Spekman & Roth 1985, Grosse et al. 2010, Grosse & Tomasello 2012, 
a.o.).
One tricky aspect of word learning is that children are not exposed to literal
meanings in isolation: just like objects are embedded in scenes, word meanings 
are embedded in conversational contexts. What children are exposed to are 
speaker meanings, and from these they have to distill the contributions made just 
by the words alone. This may be tricky, if a word is regularly used to express a 
pragmatically enriched meaning. For instance, if children were to hear some only 
when the speaker means some and not all, might they not lexicalize this stronger 
meaning? This doesn’t seem to happen. If anything, children have been reported 
to be hyper-literal, and unable to compute scalar implicatures with some (Noveck 
2001). If pragmatic enrichments are routine with scalar terms like some, 
children’s hyper-literality is puzzling. It suggests that something either in their 
experience, or in the expectations they have about word meanings points them to 
the literal meaning of some: perhaps there is enough data in children’s experience 
to show that the meaning of some is not some and not all; perhaps learners do not 
expect meanings like some and not all to be lexicalized into a single morpheme 
(see Horn 1972).   
The hyper-literality of children with scalar implicatures seems to go against 
the pragmatic sophistication they display early on, which helps them pick up on 
speakers’ referential and conversational goals. There is now a growing consensus 
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that children’s pragmatic abilities are much more sophisticated than was initially 
assumed, and that the difficulty they seem to have with scalar implicatures is not 
with reasoning about speakers’ choice of words or computing the implicature 
itself, but with figuring out what alternatives are relevant in a given context; when 
the alternatives are made explicit, children have no problem deriving the relevant 
implicatures (see Pouscoulous 2012, Lewis 2013, Papafragou & Skordos 2016 
and references therein).  
While it seems clear that children can track and reason about speakers’ 
referential and conversational goals, less is known about their ability to track what 
speakers presuppose, though there is evidence that young children keep track of 
the knowledge and shared experience of the people around them (Liebal et al. 
2009, O’Neill 1996, Moll et al. 2008, a.o.). Children seem to have some amount 
of difficulty with different presupposition triggers like definites (Karmiloff-Smith 
1979, Schaeffer & Matthewson 2005, van Hout et al. 2010, a.o.) or factives 
(Schulz 2003; Dudley 2017), but it is not always clear whether the difficulty 
stems from problems with understanding what is common ground, or instead with 
noticing that use of a certain word triggers a presupposition.  
To sum up, children seem to have rich conceptual and mindreading abilities 
that could support their exploitation of cues stemming from speakers’ referential 
and conversational goals, when word learning. There are, of course, limits on 
what children can do, which makes them different from adults. But these limits 
seem to be more quantitative than qualitative in nature, and based on having less 
experience of the world and of language, along with processing limitations due to 
a linguistic parser, which is also developing (see Omaki & Lidz 2015).  
2.2.2    Linguistic abilities and biases 
When word learning, children will only be exploit linguistic cues once they have 
the necessary grammatical knowledge and linguistic parsing abilities to identify 
these cues. As children’s vocabulary and grammatical knowledge grows, so does 
their ability to exploit various syntactic cues (Valian 1990, Fodor 1998, Perkins et 
al. 2017, a.o.) To make fruitful use of syntactic cues, children may need certain 
linguistic expectations about what are possible meanings and how these meanings 
relate to syntactic distribution. This is where language acquisition can truly 
benefit from theory of linguistic meaning.     
Expectations about possible and impossible or unlikely word meanings could 
help children narrow their hypotheses space. Are there concepts that are not 
expressible in natural language, or perhaps more realistically, not likely to be 
expressed by a single word? Are there constraints on how notions like time or 
possibility are expressed in natural language? Do children come with such 
expectations build in? Here again, questions of acquisition and cross-linguistic 
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variation overlap. And while there may not be many robust semantic universals as 
far as content words are concerned, there may be more promising constraints for 
function words (see Fintel & Matthewson 2007). Most famously, there may be 
constraints on determiner meanings, for instance, whether they may all obey 
conservativity (Barwise & Cooper 1981).  
Expectations about links between a word’s meaning and its syntactic 
distribution could also help the child, provided that these links are principled, in 
ways that are accessible to the child. And here again, cross-linguistic variation 
needs to be taken into consideration. To illustrate, consider how children might 
acquire attitude meanings. The acquisition literature shows that there is an 
asymmetry in the apparent mastery of belief verbs like think and desire verbs like 
want. Putting aside the cause of the asymmetry, its mere existence suggests that 
children systematically distinguish the two verbs early, even before they have 
fully mastered one of them. What might help them distinguish the two verbs early 
could be syntax. For instance, mood selection in Romance has been argued to 
correlate with a split in attitude meanings between belief (indicative) and desire 
verbs (subjunctive). Perhaps mood helps Romance learners differentiate think and 
want early. One important caveat for such syntactic bootstrapping is that mood is 
not a universal way of distinguishing the two verb classes: English doesn’t have a 
productive mood distinction, though it does distinguish the two classes 
syntactically through other means, for instance, via the finiteness of the 
complement (finite for belief verbs, nonfinite for desire verbs); German uses 
mood productively, but not to track the belief vs. desire split, though it does 
distinguish the two classes via word order (belief—but not desire—verbs, allow 
V2 word order in their complement). Children do not know what language they 
are learning, so for syntax to be informative about meaning in a way that supports 
syntactic bootstrapping, it has to do so in a way that leads to language specific 
mappings. In Hacquard & Lidz (2018), we propose that the way children might 
use syntax to distinguish belief vs. desire verbs is by tracking whether a given 
attitude verb takes complements with syntactic hallmarks of declarative main 
clauses in their respective language (e.g., indicative mood in Romance, V2 word 
order in German, finiteness in English).  
3    Figuring out how children figure out word meanings 
We have seen that there are various cues that children could in principle exploit in 
word learning, coming from both the linguistic and the extra linguistic context. 
Whether children can make use of these cues depends on whether they have and 
can deploy various linguistic and cognitive abilities and biases about word 
meanings and their distribution. In this section, I discuss steps that have been 
taken to probe which cues and biases learners exploit in practice, drawing mostly 
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from research done by students and colleagues at the University of Maryland as 
an illustration.  
3.1    Figuring out what’s in the input and what cues are useful in principle 
The first step to figure out what cues children make use of is to see what cues are 
actually present in the input to children. To do so, language acquisitionists have 
used corpora of naturalistic interactions between children and their parents, to 
track how parents use various words. Corpus studies investigating questions of 
meaning are much trickier than those investigating questions of syntax or 
morphology. For questions of meaning, one must not only look at the kinds of 
sentences a given word occurs in, but also at how the word is used in context, to 
figure out what meanings get conveyed in the conversational context, and what 
speakers presuppose. These kinds of studies are time consuming, but crucial to 
address questions of how children acquire various word meanings, and 
sometimes, they reveal new learnability problems. Dudley (2017), for instance, 
shows that speakers often use the factive verb know in contexts where the 
proposition expressed by its complement is not in the common ground, in ways 
that doesn’t really distinguish it from non factive think. This suggests that the way 
children pick up on the factivity contrast between think and know is unlikely to 
come from tracking what speakers are presupposing. Van Dooren et al. (2017) 
show that the way speakers use modal auxiliaries in English makes it challenging 
to see that they can express different flavors of modality: modals that are in 
principle polysemous are in practice mostly used monosemously.  
Corpus studies can thus reveal the kinds of cues to word meanings that are 
available in the input: what syntactic environments do the words appear in? What 
discourse cues correlate with the use of the words? Once the cues have been 
identified, one can ask which of them are reliably predictive of semantic 
distinctions. To do so, language acquisitionists have turned to computational 
modeling, to see whether a virtual learner could learn the right semantic 
distinctions by tracking various clues. White et al. (2018b), for instance, test 
whether a virtual learner could distinguish belief from desire verbs by tracking 
whether the complements of the verbs share syntactic features with declarative 
main clauses, and find that it can, at least for English.  
3.2    Figuring out what cues are useful in practice 
Once we know which cues are available and reliable in the input, and which 
aren’t, we can ask which children actually make use of. There could be very 
obvious cues that children simply ignore, or much more subtle ones that they still 
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make use of. This can help us get at the underlying conceptual, pragmatic and 
linguistic competence that enables the child’s exploitation of such cues.  
There are various ways to address this question. The first is to look at 
correlations between input and output: does the robustness of cue X for word w in 
the input lead to earlier production of w? A limitation of this method is that there 
could be all kinds of reasons why children fail to produce w: they do not like to 
talk about whatever w refers to; they prefer to use some other means of expressing 
what w expresses… Conversely, production of w does not necessarily mean full 
grasp of what w means for adult speakers.  
Another possibility is to “train” children on the relevant cue, by artificially 
exposing them to sentences that exhibit the cue, and comparing their performance 
on w post training to the performance of children trained on different sentences. 
Hale & Tager-Flusberg (2003) for instance developed such a methodology to test 
whether exposure to (speech) verbs with a sentential complement would help 
children not just with sentential complements, but with their performance on a 
standard false belief task: they had groups of children trained on false belief, 
sentential complements, and relative clauses, and found that the performance of 
children trained on sentential complements not only improved for sentential 
complements, but false belief tasks as well, whereas the other types of training 
only improved performance on the condition that they were trained on.  
Another way of getting at the relationship between input and output was 
pioneered by Rachel Dudley in her recent dissertation investigating children’s 
acquisition of know and think. Through an initial corpus study, Dudley identified 
various cues to the factivity contrast in speech to children: cues from the 
discourse context (what information is discourse old or new), cues from the 
syntax (what types of complements the verbs take), and cues from the discourse 
function of utterances of these verbs (what indirect speech acts they are used for). 
Dudley then set up a behavioral task testing children’s grasp of the factivity of 
know and non-factivity of think. In this task, children had to figure out where out 
of two boxes a toy is hidden, using cues like “Chris thinks/knows that it’s in the 
blue box” or “Chris doesn’t know/think that it’s in the blue box”. She found that 
some three-year-olds treated know as factive but that others did not, and that none 
took think to be factive. To see whether this gap in performance was due to 
differences in their linguistic experience with the verbs, and what aspect of the 
input lead to earlier mastery of factivity, Dudley designed a final task testing the 
relation between children’s linguistic experience with think and know and their 
understanding of factivity. She had the parents of a group of children record 
various conversations with their children, to get a measure of children’s input, and 
then tested these children on the toy finding task. She then looked for input 
factors that best predicted children’s performance. While her results are not yet 
conclusive, the methods she introduces provide a good model for how to 
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investigate the relationship between input and output for words with subtle 
meaning properties, like presupposition triggers.  
3.3    Figuring out what linguistic biases children have 
Once we know more about children’s linguistic experience with the various words 
they learn, and what cues from this input seem to matter for their acquisition, we 
can ask what linguistic biases help children make use of the cues. To get at this, 
language acquisitionists have devised various tasks, which typically involve novel 
or unfamiliar words, to control for children’s experience with the words.  
Turning first to expectations about possible and impossible word meanings, 
Hunter & Lidz (2012) for instance tested whether children expect determiner 
meanings to be conservative. To do so, they used a variant of the “picky puppet 
task” (Waxman & Gelman 1986) to teach children novel determiners, by showing 
them cards with different configurations of boys and girls on the beach or on the 
grass. The picky puppet liked some of the cards (the ones that supported a certain 
determiner meaning) “because gleeb girls are on the beach”, but didn’t care for 
others (the ones that did not support that determiner meaning), “because it’s not 
true that gleeb girls are on the beach”. Their results show that while children 
could easily learn a conservative determiner, they failed to learn a non-
conservative one.   
As for expectations about word meanings and their syntactic distribution, 
various studies have shown that children use syntactic information when word 
learning, both in terms of syntactic category (Waxman & Booth 2001; He & Lidz 
2017, a.o.), or argument structure (Landau & Gleitman 1985; Pinker 1989; 
Naigles 1990, 1996; Naigles & Kako 1993; Lidz et al. 2003; Yuan & Fisher 2009, 
a.o.; for an overview, see Williams 2015). Here I will briefly describe two studies
as illustration. Using the picky puppet task again, Wellwood et al. (2016) found
that children were sensitive to syntactic position when they heard novel
superlatives: when the novel word appeared in the syntactic position of a
determiner (gleebest of the cows are in the barn), children preferred quantity-
based interpretations, but when it appeared in the position of an adjective (the
gleebest cows are in the barn), they preferred quality-based interpretations
(tracking the cows’ spottiness vs. their distribution in and out of the barn). Finally,
to test children’s sensitivity to syntactic distribution when learning attitude
meanings, Harrigan et al. (2016) presented children with a low frequency attitude
verb (hope), in contexts that made salient both the beliefs and desires of a puppet.
Children’s interpretations of hope sentences depended on whether it appeared
with a finite (“Froggy hopes that it’s a heart”) or a nonfinite complement
(“Froggy hopes to get a heart”): with the former, children tended to interpret hope
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sentences as reporting on Froggy’s beliefs; with the latter, they tended to interpret 
them as reporting on his desires.  
4    Looking forward 
How do children figure out meaning from very limited evidence? We can now 
pursue this question in earnest, due to headway made on many fronts. From our 
analyses of the syntax, semantics, and pragmatics of languages, we now have a 
better understanding of the target knowledge for various morphemes and 
constructions. Our expanding knowledge of cross-linguistic diversity for semantic 
matters gives us a better sense of what is linguistically attested and attestable. 
From cognitive development, we have more and more evidence that children see 
the world through similar eyes, and make sense of it with the same conceptual 
toolkit as the adults around them. From language acquisition, tasks testing 
children’s pragmatic and semantic competence have become more and more 
savvy, and more often than not, they reveal that when the pragmatics of the task 
are natural, children tend to know more than we originally thought. Moreover, 
sophisticated corpus analyses and computational modeling give us a better sense 
of children’s linguistic experience: what evidence children get or fail to get for 
various word meanings. All of this can help us figure out what it is that children 
bring to the learning problem, what linguistic biases and expectations they have 
about natural language meaning and its connection to syntax. The various 
linguistic, conceptual and methodological breakthroughs have made it possible to 
start addressing not just when, but how children learn from their limited 
experience, making it a particularly fruitful time for language acquisitionists and 
semanticists to collaborate.  
The hope from language acquisition is that it can illuminate linguistic theory. 
In particular, we expect that language acquisition should help arbitrate between 
competing theories about the target grammar. But this expectation often leads to 
frustration, as the grain size of the questions that can be addressed in language 
acquisition cannot always match that of semantic theorization: Until we know 
everything about children’s linguistic experience and about their conceptual, 
pragmatic, linguistic and processing abilities at various stages of development, we 
won’t be able to tell how well their semantic representations line up with those of 
the adults around them. But while language acquisition research may not yet be in 
a position to arbitrate between theory A and theory B for any given semantic 
phenomenon X, it can address the prior and fascinating question of what 
linguistic, conceptual, pragmatic abilities and biases would be required for 
children to acquire X, were it to be analyzed as A vs. B, given the evidence they 
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Abstract  Studies on relative clauses have highlighted two opposing views on the 
nature of relativizing elements. On the one hand, Kayne (2010) has challenged the 
long held view, dating back to Klima (1964), that relative that in English is a 
complementizer, arguing instead that it is a relative pronoun. In contrast, Pesetsky 
and Torrego (2006) argue that even (simplex) wh-relativizers, like who and which in 
English, are agreeing complementizers (see also Thornton and Crain 1994, Thornton 
1995, Crain and Thornton 1998). Similarly, Bayer (2014:23) argues for Bavarian 
that “word-size wh-operators have syntactic as well as phonological properties of 
functional heads rather than genuine phrases”, and that “wh-words embrace the role 
of the complementizer”. Starting from some basic, though not much discussed, 
asymmetries between two sets of so-called relative pronouns in German, the novel 
claim I put forward is that the relativizer welch-, commonly rendered as who or 
which in English, is in fact a (agreeing) complementizer and not a relative pronoun, 
on a par with other simplex wh-elements, most notably was/wo, in (varieties of) 
German (Bayer 1984, 2002a,b, van Riemsdijk 1989, and references therein), and 
who and which in English (Pesetsky and Torrego 2006). Consequently, I argue for 
the fluidity of syntactic categories within a functional domain (specifically, the C-
domain). Crucially, the analysis I put forth is only compatible with a non-head-
raising analysis of relative clauses, whether in its external head variety, as assumed 
in Heim and Kratzer (1998) among others, or the matching analysis.  
* It is with much gratitude that I dedicate this paper on German welch-relatives to Angelika, who I
first met at WCCFL XVII in 1998 (can anyone be happier, or prouder of their student self after
Kratzer comes over and praises your talk?) and really got to know during a wonderful research
stay at UMass in February 2006. Not only did Angelika take time to listen to my ideas on all
things linguistic and beyond, she also was the most amazing of hosts, making sure I was never
lonely while away from my young son for that first longer spell. Happy birthday, and to many
more future encounters, liebe Angelika! For the analysis developed in this paper, I owe special
thanks to Gereon Müller and to Sabine Laszakovits.
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1 Basic observations 
German has two (sets of) so-called relative pronouns differing primarily in terms 
of the morphology they bear, namely d-morphology (der, die, das and their 
cognates, identical in form with definite determiners and demonstratives) vs. w-
morphology (welch-er/-e/-es). Only the latter are also bona fide wh-elements (i.e. 
question words), just like their (non-partitive) w-cognates wer (who) and was 
(what). Unlike wer/was though, but like der/die/das, welch- is barred in free 
relatives.1 These facts are illustrated in (1) to (3). 
(1) Der Soldat, { der  / welcher / *wer } im Irak war, ist wieder zu Hause.
the   soldier    d-RELNOM whichNOM whoNOM in  Iraq was,  is   again  at  home
‘The soldier who served in Iraq is back home.’
(2) a. Welche (Frage)  hast du  beantwortet?
which (question) have you answered 
‘Which (question) did you answer?’ 
b. Wen   /  was hast du  gesehen?
whoACC / what have you seen
‘Who/what did you see?’
(3) {Wer  /*der /*welcher (Student)} zu meiner Party kommt, muss 
   whoNOM  d-RELNOM   whichNOM (student)  to  my party comes must 
  etwas mitbringen. 
           something bring 
 ‘Whoever/whichever student comes to my party must bring something.’ 
However, as possessor of a DP, welch- does not pattern with der (the genitive 
form of which is dessen), but with wer (the genitive form of which is wessen), as 
shown in (4). 
(4) Der Mann,  [{ dessen / *wessen / *welches } Hund ] gestorben ist, war
the  man   d-RELGEN whichGEN whoGEN  dog  died   AUX was
verzweifelt.
desperate
‘The man whose dog died was desperate.’
1 The ungrammaticality of welch- in free relatives has nothing to do with the fact that it is a 
complex wh-phrase, since as Grosu (2003) notes, these are not disallowed in free relatives. In 
other words, the impossibility of welch- in free relatives cannot be some subjacency-like effect. 
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There is a variation of expressing the possessor of a DP with dative + possessive 
pronoun (instead of GEN and no pronoun). In these cases, parallel to (4), welch- is 
out, but d- isn’t: 
(5) Der Mann, [{ dem / *welchem } sein Hund] tot  ist, war verzweifelt.
the man     d-RELDAT whichDAT his   dog  dead AUX, was desperate
Importantly, the ungrammaticality of welch- in (4) and (5) is not readily derivable 
from Keenan and Comrie’s (1977) Accessibility Hierarchy (namely: SU > DO > LO 
> OBL > GEN > OCOMP), since welch- may bear both genitive and dative case, as
with genitive and dative case assigning verbs; this is shown in (6a) and (6b),
respectively.
(6) a. Die Soldatin, { derer / deren / welcher } wir uns heute erinnern,
the soldierFEM d-RELGEN d-RELGEN whichGEN we us today commemorate  
stammte    aus   Irland.2 
came       from  Ireland 
‘The soldier we commemorate today came from Ireland.’ 
b. Der Mann, { dem  / welchem } wir halfen, ist gegangen. 
     the man     d-RELDAT   whichDAT  we helped is gone 
‘The guy we helped is gone.’ 
Finally, as Heck (2005) observes, under the head-raising analysis (Kayne 1994 et 
seq.), the occurrence of welch- should also be possible when it is associated with a 
head noun bearing genitive case (see the examples in (7)), but in these cases there 
is necessarily a switch to dessen/dem sein, as was already illustrated in (4) and (5) 
and as is shown again in (9).3 Note that the fact that (8a) is slightly marked (the 
2 There is a variation for the genitive of the feminine d-form: both derer and deren are used. 
3 There is a complication relating to genitive marking of welch- with genitive case assigning verbs, 
namely that if the head noun is masculine or neuter, welch- is not entirely happy bearing genitive 
case marking, as shown in the examples (i) through (iii), which thus contrast with the grammatical 
(6a): 
(i) *Der Mann, welches wir hier gedenken, war einsam. 
  the man whichGEN we here commemorate was lonesome 
(ii) *Das Kind, welches wir hier gedenken, war glücklich. 
  the child whichGEN we here commemorate was happy 
(iii) *ein Buch, welches wir nicht bedürfen
a book  whichGEN we not need
‘a book that we do not need’
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post-nominal genitive (8b) is better) does not explain the strong ungrammaticality 
of (7a), and that the post-nominal variant is excluded in relative clauses, as shown 
in (7b). 
(7) a. *Die Frau, [ welcher Hund ] gestorben ist, ist einsam.
  the woman  whichGEN dog died is, is lonesome 
 [Intended] ‘The woman whose dog died is lonesome.’ 
b. *Die Frau, [ (der) Hund welcher ] gestorben ist, ist einsam
  the woman  (theNOM) dog  whichGEN died is,  is lonesome 
 [Intended] ‘The woman the dog of whom died is lonesome.’ 
(8) a. ? [ Welcher Frau Hund ] ist gestorben?
whichGEN woman dog is died 
  ‘Which woman’s dog died?’ 
b. [ Der  Hund welcher Frau ] ist gestorben?
theNOM dog whichGEN woman is  died
‘The dog of which woman died?’
(9) a. die Frau, [ deren Hund ] wir gut kennen, ist einsam.
the woman   whoGEN dog we well know  is lonesome 
‘The woman whose dog we know well is lonesome.’ 
b. die Frau,    [ der  ihren Hund ] wir gut kennen, ist einsam.
the woman whoDAT herACC dog  we well know   is lonesome
‘The woman whose dog we know well is lonesome.’
2 Proposal 
I contend that all the data presented in section 1, and further data to be presented 
below, can be formally and uniformly derived under the proposal that welch- is 
not a relative pronoun, but an agreeing complementizer in C0, specifically 
agreeing with an empty operator in Spec of CP, as given in (10); note that the 
non-head-raising structure in (10) evades Heck’s objection detailed in section 1, 
irrespective of whether one opts for a head-external, or a matching analysis. 
Crucially however, as the examples in (7) show, the ungrammaticality of welch- in possessor 
contexts persists even with feminine head nouns (note again the contrast between the grammatical 
(6a) and the ungrammatical (7a)), a fact that has thus far remained unaccounted for, and which 
constitutes a central motivation for the present undertaking. And while one may speculate on the 
reason for the gaps in (i) through (iii), the fact that speakers’ judgments vary in that not all find 
these examples equally bad is noteworthy. 
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(10) [DP [NP [CP [Spec,CP Op[case, φ]i ] [C0 welch-[case, φ] ] [TP … ti … ] ] ]
Crucial evidence for this analysis involves the following facts. In German 
restrictive relatives, in addition to the ‘canonical’ verb final (V-final) order, there 
is a verb second (V2) variation (Gärntner 2000), which is however restricted to 
indefinite heads, as shown in (11). 
(11) a. Das Blatt hat eine Seite, die ganz schwarz ist. [V-final] 
the sheet has a side that whole black is 
b. Das Blatt hat eine Seite, die ist  ganz  schwarz. [V2] 
the sheet has a side that is whole black 
‘The sheet has a side that is completely black.’ 
c. Ich kenne die Theorie, die du   präferierst. [V-final] 
 I know  the  theory that you prefer 
‘I know the theory that you prefer’ 
d. *Ich kenne die Theorie, die präferierst du. [V2] 
 I know the theory that prefer you 
The V2 pattern illustrated in (11b) is, however, impossible with the relativizer 
was. This follows, as was is a complementizer in C0, hence the verb cannot raise 
to this position: 
(12) a. Das Buch hat ein Blatt, was ganz schwarz ist. [V-final] 
the book has a sheet WAS whole black is 
‘The book has a sheet that is all black.’ 
b. *Das Buch hat ein Blatt, was ist ganz schwarz. [V2] 
 the book has a sheet  WAS is whole black 
‘The book has a sheet that is all black.’ 
Interestingly, V2 relatives are also impossible with the welch- relativizer; see 
(13). This is predicted under my analysis, since welch- and the verb compete for 
the same position. 
(13) a. Das Buch hat ein Blatt, welches ganz schwarz ist. [V-final]  
the book has a sheet which whole black is 
‘The book has a sheet that is all black.’ 
b. *Das Buch hat ein Blatt, welches ist  ganz  schwarz. [V2] 
  the book has a sheet  which is whole black 
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Furthermore, the possessor facts illustrated earlier in (7) find a natural explanation 
under my proposal, since in the case of (7a), a parse where welch- is a C-head 
would require an analysis where an empty operator has been extracted from a left 
branch, as given in (14), which can however be dismissed since German obeys the 
Left Branch Condition. 
(14) *Die Frau, OPi [C welcheri ] [ ti Hund ] gestorben ist, ist einsam.
  the woman  whichGEN dog  died is is lonesome  
Turning to (7b), again assuming the presence of an empty operator, the analysis 
would look as in (15): 
(15) *Die Frau, [DP OPi (der) Hund ] [C welcheri ] gestorben ist,  ist einsam.
  the woman the   dog    whichGEN   died  is,   is lonesome  
To explain the ungrammaticality of (15) (i.e. (7b)), one could say that the OP 
must establish agreement with respect to gender, number and case with the C-
head, which is however blocked in (15) because the φ-features of (der) Hund 
serve as a closer goal for the agreement probe on C. Corroboration for this view 
comes from the fact that in (16), an instance of pied-piping, there are no 
intervening φ-features and the result is well-formed:  
(16) a. Der Mann, mit   welchem wir verhandelt haben, wollte mehr  Geld.
The  man   with  whichDAT we negotiated  have,  wanted more money 
 ‘The man we negotiated with wanted more money.’ 
b. Der Mann, [PP mit OPi ] [C welchemi ] wir verhandelt haben, . . .
In contrast, the traditional analysis according to which welch- is a relative 
pronoun offers no straightforward explanation for the ungrammaticality of the 
examples in (7), especially since such an analysis would also have to account for 
the well-formedness of the variant that replaces welcher by deren, as was shown 
in (9a), or that of expressing the possessor of a DP with DAT and a possessive 
pronoun instead of GEN and no pronoun, i.e. (9b). One could resort to the idea that 
in (9a) the possessor relative pronoun need not agree with the null C-head simply 
because this type of relative complementizer does not require agreement with 
respect to φ-features. A reasoning along similar lines would also apply to the 
variation of expressing the possessor of a DP with dative and possessive pronoun, 
instead of GEN and no pronoun, i.e. (9b). 
A potential problem for the idea that welch- is a C-head is the claim that empty 
operators are unable to induce pied-piping (Browning 1987, Grosu 1994), as 
supported by the observation that even languages with an invariant element 
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(arguably a complementizer) in relativization contexts, such as wo or was in 
varieties of German, use a different element when pied-piping is involved, which 
typically inflects for φ- features, as shown in (17). Note that (17b) contrasts with 
(16a). 
(17) a. Es gibt Leute, wo immer recht haben.
it gives people WO always right have 
‘There are people who are always right.’ 
b. *Es gibt Leute, mit wo man nichts zu tun haben will.
  it gives people with where one nothing to do  have want 
‘There are people one does not want to have anything to do with.’ 
c. Es gibt Leute, mit denen  man nichts zu tun haben will. 
it gives people with thoseDAT one nothing to do have want 
‘There are people with whom one does not want to have anything to do.’ 
One may think that the problem with (17b) is not due to pied-piping by a null 
operator, but rather to the fact that the null operator bears an oblique 
(prepositional dative) case. Note also that as shown in (18), the grammatical (17c) 
becomes bad in the presence of the complementizer wo. 
(18) *Es gibt Leute, mit denen  wo man nichts zu tun haben will.
it gives people with thoseDAT WO one nothing to do have want
‘There are people with whom one does not want to have anything to do.’
This fact is important also because it relates to the question of why it is not 
possible to have both, an overt relative pronoun and the C-head welch-,4 unlike 
for instance in Bavarian dialects, where der is followed by the relative 
complementizer was or wo (Bayer 2002). However, while the combination der 
welcher is indeed not attested in spontaneous data (which might be due to welch- 
not existing in dialects), speakers show a preference for this combination as 
compared to welcher wo, which they reject; see (19).5 
4 I assume that this lack of co-occurrence relates to some filter violation of sorts, specifically to a 
stylistic breach, i.e. the fact that welch- belongs to a register that is at odds with dialectal forms. 
5 In contrast, for those speakers of German varieties where the DFC-filter is not active, there is no 
restriction for non-relative welch- co-occurring with a C-element, as shown in (i) below: 
(i) (Hier sind drei Bücher.) Ich  weiss nicht welches dass  du lesen wirst.
Here  are      three books  I know not  which    that you read will
‘(Here are three books.) I don’t know which (one) you want to read.’
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(19) Der Herr, {??der welcher / *welcher wo} nebenan wohnt, klopft
the gentleman  d-RELNOM whichNOM whichNOM WO  next-door lives,  knocks
immer an die Wand.
always on the wall
‘The gentleman who lives next door always knocks against the wall.’
I thus submit that the complementizer welch- is an instance of syntactic reanalysis 
from a relative pronoun, an idea that is corroborated by the fact that in older 
stages of the language, namely Early New High German and immediately after, 
but crucially not in present-day German, occurrences of V2 welch-relatives are 
attested (See Catasso and Hinterhölzl 2016).6 
In the next section, I build an additional argument on the syntactic fluidity of 
welch- on the basis of strong analogies with another element in the C-domain, 
namely was. 
3  Fluidity within the C-system 
3.1 Was as a “radically” underspecified element 
As mentioned earlier, in many varieties of German was is a complementizer in 
relative clauses (Bayer 1984, 2002a,b, van Riemsdijk 1989). 7  But, as Bayer 
(2002a,b) notes and as the examples in (20) illustrate, was is “extremely”, 
“radically”, or “maximally” underspecified also in its non-complementizer guises. 
(20) a. [+argument, –human] Was hast du gegessen?
what have you eaten 
‘What did you eat?’ 
b. [+argument, +human] Was dort so alles herumhängt!
what there so all hangs.around 
‘The lot that hangs around there!’ 
c. [–argument, +amount] Was der Vater heute mal wieder schnarcht!
what the father today once again snores 
‘How much father is snoring again today!’ 
d. [–argument, +reason] Was stehst du hier herum?
what stand you here around 
6  This fact is particularly interesting also because it speaks against a syntactic coordination 
analysis of V2 relatives à la Gärtner’s (2000), since unlike the d-form relativizers, welch- cannot 
possibly be said to be a demonstrative pronoun. 
7 See also Lowenstamm (1977) for vos in Yiddish. 
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‘Why are you standing here?’   
e. [indefinite pronoun]  Hier stimmt was nicht.
here attunes WAS not 
‘Something is not right here.’  
f. [wh-scope marker] Was findest du, wie sie ausschaut? 
what find you how she looks 
‘How do you think she looks?’ 
Furthermore, as Bayer (2002b) states for a paradigm like the one in (21), “[t]he 
assumption that we are dealing with a case of homophony is problematic in view 
of the cross-linguistic evidence for one and the same element appearing as both 
argument/operator and head”. 
(21) a. French: que 
b. Italian: che 
c. Russian: что 
d. Polish: co 
e. Greek: oti (ti ‘was’) 
f. Albanian: që (ç ‘what’) 
g. Persian: ke (che ‘what’) 
h. Hindi/Urdu:  ki (kyaa ‘what’)
i. English: that (the book that he bought vs. Did you see that?) 
Bayer’s (2002a:11) core claim is that “[i]f German was and Bavarian wos (both 
meaning ‘what’) are radically underspecified, they may not only comprise the 
feature C but count as a morphological instantiation of C”, which, as he points 
out, also explains why Bavarian wos cannot co-occur with daß although Bavarian 
is generally a DFC-dialect: 
(22) a. I woaß, wos-a     gern         trinkt. 
I know what-he preferably drinks  
‘I know what he likes to drink.’ 
b. ?*I woaß, wos   daß-a      gern         trinkt. 
    I know  what that-he  preferably  drinks  
c. I woaß, wos  fiar-a-Bier daß-a    gern         trinkt.
I know what for-a-beer  that-he preferably drinks
‘I know what kind of beer he likes to drink.’
Finally, as Bayer and Brandner (2008:87) argue, the ban on the doubly filled 
complementizer in the presence of simplex wh-words (also mirrored in those 
English varieties where the doubly filled complementizer filter is violated, cf. 
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Zwicky 2002), “can be explained if these wh-words occupy the C0 position 
themselves, and thus act as complementizers – in addition to their clause typing 
function which they fulfill due to their status as wh-elements.”  
3.2 Welch- as an underspecified element 
Recall that, on top of being a complementizer, welch- is a bona fide wh-element, 
(2a). In addition, welch- is an exclamative preceding the determiner (on a par with 
was für), as in (23). Note that welch- here is uninflected, i.e. it does not (and 
cannot) agree with the DP. 
(23) Welch(*-e)  eine Überraschung!
which(*FEM) aFEM surprise
‘What a surprise!’
Furthermore, welch- also occurs as a quantificational element, as in (24). 
(24) Pflanzen  hat sie  welche.
plants  has she which
‘As for plants, she has some.’
Finally, just like which in English, welch- can be used in what – for lack of a 
better term – I will refer to as ‘appositive conditionals’, illustrated in (25).8 
(25) Ich kann  vielleicht nicht kommen, in welchem  Fall ich anrufen würde.
I  can probably  not   come,  in which case I  call  would
‘I might not be able to come, in which case I would call (you).’
4 Conclusion 
In this paper, I have discussed some striking morphosyntactic properties of the 
relativizing element welch- in German, and I have proposed that it should be 
analyzed as an agreeing complementizer. The issue is theoretically important on 
at least three counts. First, it is further evidence that some traditionally called 
‘relative pronouns’ are in fact agreeing complementizers (Pesetsky and Torrego 
8 Note that welchem in (25) cannot alternate with anything else, i.e. dem, diesem, was are all out. 
Similarly, the fact that in English the sequences if which or which if are ungrammatical in this 
construction is not obvious to account for under analyses of which as a relative pronoun, 
especially given the existence of the anaphoric expression if so. So this might turn out to be 
additional evidence for the C0-status of which. 
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2006 contra Kayne 2010). Secondly, it makes a further case for syntactic fluidity 
and syntactic reanalysis in the C-domain (see in particular Bayer 2002a,b for 
German and Walkden 2013 for English). Thirdly, it provides a strong argument 
against the raising analysis of relative clauses, which Heck (2005) 
notwithstanding has gone largely unnoticed, thus speaking for a non-raising 
analysis, such as the external-head analysis also assumed in Heim and Kratzer 
(1998) among others. 
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Abstract We discuss some new observations involving attitude predicates in Amer-
ican Sign Language (ASL). We offer more evidence against the uniform treatment
of attitudes by revealing new structural and interpretive differences in ASL be-
tween two classes of predicates, which we suggest may be due to their status as
either proffering or doxastic. Besides providing evidence for this distinction from a
new domain, the data also advance the current understanding of the formal syntac-
tic/semantic/pragmatic properties of sign language loci and role-shift (phenomena
frequently occurring in sign languages and much discussed in sign linguistics),
namely that 1st-person indexicals under doxastics may not shift, and the 3rd-person
pronoun under role-shift can be evaluated with respect to the matrix context.
1 Introduction
Traditionally, attitude predicates (e.g. believe, think, say) have as a class been
treated as quantifiers over possible worlds (Hintikka 1962), but recent analyses
have highlighted possible different subclasses of attitude predicates with respect to
both semantics and syntax (Kratzer 2006; Moulton 2009). One of these suggested
differences stems from the observation that some attitude predicates are sensitive
to the sentience of their subjects (as in (1)) and these same predicates interact with
epistemics as in (2) (Anand & Hacquard 2008).
(1) a. {OKThe book/OKMary} {said/claimed} that he was happy
b. {*The book/OKMary} {thought/imagined} that he was happy.
(2) a. Holmes {#believed/assumed} that every guest might be the murderer.
Intended: Holmes believed each had the possibility to be the murderer.
b. John {believes/*assumes} that the Earth might be flat.
(Anand & Hacquard 2008)
* We are very grateful to our colleagues for feedback on this project, especially several Deaf colleagues
who provided ASL consultation on the new data that we report here. Jennie Pyers originally shared a
database of experimental trials for an ASL project that elicited embedding verbs which inspired some
of our examples here.
©2020 Elena Koulidobrova and Kathryn Davidson
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Anand & Hacquard (2008) argue that the paradigm in (1)-(2) reflects a subjec-
tivity requirement that certain predicates impose on their complements, captured
in their semantic analysis by having beliefs be evaluated with respect to an event
involving doxastic alternatives held by the subject, while claims are evaluated with
respect to alternatives that are active in the common ground after the claim is ac-
cepted by all (i.e. not specific to the subject). The former holds for an entire class of
verbs that exhibit this type of behavior: believe, think, wonder, imagine, i.a. – the
doxastic verbs. The latter are a class of proffering verbs: e.g. claim, assume, mean.
Anand & Hacquard formalize the contrast as in (3), where fepistemic(e) = lw0.w0 is
compatible with CON(e) (the content of the event).
(3) a. JbelieveK = lel plxlw.Holder(x,e)^ believe08w0 2 \CON(e)[p(w0) =
1], where 2 \CON(e) = DOX(ixHolder(x,e),w)
b. Jclaim(e)(p)K = claim0(e)^8w compatible with Goal (e),
[8w0 2 \CON(eCG w0)[p(w0) = 1]]
(Examples [7], [11],[32] from Anand & Hacquard 2008)
If the suggested doxastic/proffering cut is universal, stemming from the lexical
semantics of the verbs themselves, then we may expect to see it distinguished
in other languages. We demonstrate, using a new kind of test, that it appears in
American Sign Language (ASL), and that manifestation of this difference between
predicates (and how their complements are interpreted in discourse) leads to new
observations about the nature of two other phenomena in the language – ‘role shift’
and ‘referential loci.’
1.1 Notation and methodology
Following conventions in sign language linguistics, all ASL glosses are in SMALL
CAPs. The line above the utterance indicates the spread/duration of the nonmanual
marking associated with either role-shifted material (RS) or topicalization (t); the
letter/number separated with a dash (e.g. a-) indicates the area of signing space
dedicated to a particular referent (Mom) and, thus, the locus of the shift. Subindices
i, j, k, . . . on the right indicate coreference.
Observations newly reported in this paper were based on data that were originally
a part of a language sample collected in early 2000s from Deaf signers of ASL
residing in California (we thank J. Pyers for sharing the data). In several instances
that we investigated further, elicited examples were presented to two other Deaf
individuals who grew up as native signers of ASL with Deaf signing parents in the
Northeast and Midwest of the US, respectively. Each reported judgment was later
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verified with at least one additional native (hearing (Coda) or Deaf) or near-native
(Deaf) signer of ASL. On average, each judgement was verified across 5 signers.
2 Observations
Most recent formal analyses of the phenomenon we will be concerned with in this
paper focus on the shiftability of indexicals in “role shift” (RS henceforth) and so
RS has been the primary term for this, a convention which we follow here. However,
the same term “role shift” is also used descriptively in the literature to refer to the
addition of nonmanual markers such as torso movement (body shift) and/or a shift
in eye-gaze that may accompany attitude reports in many sign languages, including
ASL. We can see evidence of both in our first example of interest, the paradigm in
(4)-(5) (see Lillo-Martin 2012 and Cormier, Smith & Sevcikova-Sehyr 2015 for a
detailed discussion of related terminology, including constructed action, constructed
dialogue, etc.).






‘Mom says she is busy’ / ‘Mom says: I am busy’






‘Mom thinks she is busy’ / ‘Mom thinks: I am busy’
Two properties of RS are immediately apparent in (4)-(5): (i) role shift move-
ments occur concurrently with manual signs and begin after the embedding predicate
for SAY (as in (4)) but on the embedding predicate for THINK (as in (5)); and (ii) in
both the element immediately following the embedding predicate (i.e. the embedded
subject) is a first person indexical pronoun (1-IX , ‘I’) that refers to someone other
than the signer (here: Mom). Typically this type of “indexical shifting” is found in
direct discourse (quotation) and not indirect discourse, although a notable exception
has been reported to be found in a small number of (unrelated) languages including
Amharic (Schlenker 2003), Zazaki (6) (Anand & Nevins 2004), and Ewe (Pearson
2015). A third semantic property will be illustrated in (8) below.
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(6)
A few possibilities arise then for the analysis of the difference in the extent of
role shift and the interpretation of first person pronoun in examples (4)-(5), which we
will see below are representative of two classes of attitude predicates in ASL. First,
ASL may indeed have a first person pronoun that shifts, just as seen in some spoken
languages (as has been argued by Lillo-Martin (1995) for 1-IX). This, of course,
does not explain anything about the extent of role shift, nor does the presence of
such a pronoun in ASL offer an account that distinguishes between its interpretation
under SAY vs. THINK, or dissociates it from quotation. Additionally, one could
argue that syntactically (i.e. regarding integration of the complement), the difference
in the extent of RS marking and indexical interpretation originates from lexical
properties of the embedding predicates. To determine the right path, we’ll briefly
discuss existing formal proposals for the nature of RS.
3 Previous Analyses
3.1 Role-shift
Recent formal analyses of RS-related phenomena (Lillo-Martin 1995, Quer 2005,
2011, Lillo-Martin 2012, Schlenker 2017) generally assume that what is responsible
for the shift of certain indexicals in the report clause under RS is the interaction of a
higher predicate—namely an attitude verb, null or overt—and some sort of operator
below.
(7)
Both (7a) and (7b) are syntactic proposals. On the analysis represented by (7a),
RS occurs with/is licensed by the Point of View (PoV) predicate – essentially an
attitude, which takes as its complement a CP whose Spec is filled with an operator
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binding the indexicals in the IP below. In contrast, in (7b), the relevant operator is in
the head of the lower CP. This head then is stipulated to compose with the embedding
predicate, the precise mechanism for which remains left for future research. (7a)
does not demonstrate how this attitude and the Opi might combine to license the
relevant nonmanual markings over the predicate itself; on the alternative view, RS
markings indiscriminately apply to all attitude predicates. Thus, the pattern in (4)-(5)
showing an asymmetry between two types of attitude predicates is unexplained by
Lillo-Martin (1995) in (7a) and unpredicted by Quer (2005) in (7b).
Semantically, for Quer (see also Zucchi 2004), RS is an overt instantiation of
the context-shifting operator proposed by Schlenker (2003) and expanded for sign
languages in Schlenker (2017). As such, RS changes the context of evaluation for
a clause in its scope. This approach predicts that when under RS, indexicals will
necessarily shift, irrespective of the type of attitude predicate in the complement
of which they are found. Yet, we observe another asymmetry among these classes
of predicates: the aforementioned necessary shift only holds for SAY, and not for
THINK, verbs, as in (8). The latter seem to allow RS forms even when there is
no “shifted” interpretation of the first person pronoun, unexpected under previous
accounts.
(8) Context: You walk into a conversation and see Mary signing to John...
a. Maryi: WOMAN j a-IXi SAY
RS-a
1-IX⇤i/ j PLAY-PIANO
‘A woman said that she [ 6=Mary, =woman] was playing the piano.’
b. Maryi: WOMAN j a-IXi
RS-a
IMAGINE 1-IXi/ j PLAY-PIANO
‘A woman said that she [=Mary, =woman] was playing the piano.’
Extending the use of such operators, Schlenker (2017) proposes that a context
shifting operator occurs not just in cases of reported attitudes but also in reported
actions ("action role shift"). In some cases of reported actions, RS occurs on the
predicate if the predicate is "iconic", while for noniconic predicates RS occurs only
in the following complement clause. For Schlenker, this difference is due to the
action role shift predicates being embedded under a (covert) matrix predicate that
licenses a context shifting operator, while attitude context shifting operators are
themselves part of a matrix clause that licenses context shifting operators within
their scope (see Davidson 2015 for an analysis of action role shift that places the
action predicate itself in the matrix clause). Since this is one of the few cases in the
literature where RS has been discussed as occurring on the predicate and not after,
we might wonder whether the verbs we discuss here fall into Schlenker’s categories.
However, while THINK and IMAGINE might be considered iconic because they are
pronounced with locations near the head, it is difficult to see this as a distinction
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between the verb categories, since SAY would probably also be considered as iconic
(at least in discussing spoken language, appearing near the mouth), and we have
more generally found no revealing relationship between iconicity and SAY versus
THINK type attitude predicates. So, while it is certainly possible that some cases of
more iconic attitude predicates might also involve action role shift (and thus increase
pressure for RS to begin on the predicate), it does not seem to explain the cut that
we find, nor the behavior of the indexicals under these verbs.
Some analyses (Shan 2010, Maier 2014) have been proposed that cover cases of
mixed indexicals (where a single clause includes both shifted and unshifted inter-
pretations, contra, e.g., Anand & Nevins 2004), reported in other sign languages,
including Catalan (LSC, Quer 2005) and German Sign Languages (Herrmann &
Steinbach 2012). Incidentally, the asymmetry in the extent of role shift on different
predicate types under examination here is briefly recorded, albeit not overtly dis-
cussed in Quer’s work on LSC, comparing LSC’s SAY and THINK (9), where RS
starts on, not after, the embedding predicate for THINK (there, Quer demonstrates
that (9) is a case of indirect discourse).
(9) a. ANNAi 3-SAY-2
RSi
IX-1i FED-UP LOSE+++
‘Anna told you that she was fed up with losing so often.’
b. MANUELi
RSi
THINK IX-1i 1-GIVE-2 AT ALL
‘Manuel thinks that he won’t give me anything at all.’
At this stage, of course, the parallelism between LSC and ASL remains suggestive
until this aspect of LSC is examined more systematically.
3.2 Direct or Indirect Discourse (a.k.a. Quote or Clausal Embedding)?
To capture the difference in nonmanual marking and indexical interpretations seen
in ASL in (4)-(5) and (8), one might hypothesize a difference in syntactic integration
- i.e. one is direct/quotation (nonintegrated) and the other indirect (integrated)
discourse. Suppose that in direct discourse, RS begins after the matrix predicate
precisely because the complement of this predicate (e.g. SAY ) is not integrated - i.e.
a "quote" that is not syntactically and semantically embedded under the matrix verb;
otherwise, RS is expected to spread over the attitude predicate. This, essentially,
is the upshot of the analysis in Quer (2005, 2011), and an appealing one given the
semantics of SAY . However, while this path is plausible and at least one of us has
argued for an expanded more flexible view of quotation (Davidson 2015), it runs into
a problem: some role-shifted complements of SAY bear characteristics of clausal
embedding even when the nonmanual difference holds.
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Arguments to determine the status of the syntactic embedding (vis-à-vis di-
rect discourse) of role-shifted (parts of) utterances are presented in detail in the
recent work by Schlenker (2017). The argumentation is based on the finding that
wh-extraction (10), NPIs licensing (11), and VP-ellipsis (12) are possible only in
syntactic embedding/indirect discourse cases, in contrast to their ungrammatical
status in English quotation.
(10) a. What did John say he understands?
b. *What did John say ’I understand’?
(11) a. John didn’t say he understands any chemistry.
b. *John didn’t say ’I understand any chemistry.’
(12) Context: The addressee and John have never met each other.
a. You love Obama. John told me that he doesn’t [love Obama].
b. (#) You love Obama. John told me: ’I don’t [love Obama].’
(Schlenker 2017)
Diagnostics along the lines of (10)-(12) for ASL remain under investigation,
complicated by the fact that (i) our consultants appear to lack clear NPIs and (ii) VP-
ellipsis in ASL raises independent questions regarding the possibility of the bound-
variable interpretation with (vs. without) previously assigned loci (Koulidobrova &
Lillo-Martin 2016, Koulidobrova 2017). Here, we offer preliminary VP ellipsis data
in (13) and wh-extraction data in (14) for some examples with these predicates (we
follow the arguments by Braze (2004) and others that YESTERDAY marks clausal
boundary in ASL).
(13) a. 1-IX LOVE BROCCOLI COOKIES.
t




‘I love broccoli cookies. My kid says he doesn’t [love broccoli cookies],
but he is lying, he’ll eat them up’





BUT WATCH WILL EAT-UP
‘I love broccoli cookies. My kid thinks he doesn’t [love broccoli cookies],
but watch, he’ll eat them up.’
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(14) a. WHO WOMANi SAY YESTERDAY
RS-a
BUSY WHO
‘Who did the woman say yesterday was busy?’
b. WHO WOMANi
RS-a
THINK YESTERDAY BUSY WHO
‘Who did the woman say yesterday was busy?’
There is, of course, a possibility that a-IX NOT in (13a), e.g., is a case of ellipsis
in direct discourse - i.e. that the child says ‘I don’t.’ However, here, such ellipsis is
not expected to be licensed for the same reason ‘I don’t’ is not licensed in (11b). For
an extensive discussion of ellipsis in ASL, see Koulidobrova (2017).
In addition to this, however, we suggest another piece of evidence for some
integration in these examples coming from the use of pronouns. Existing literature
has tended to focus on the 1st person indexical and its shiftability in the context of
utterance vs. report; no one would expect the same of the 3rd person pronoun. In
fact, fairly uncontroversially, a 3rd person subject in the complement of an attitude
predicate, when co-indexed with some NP serving as an argument of that predicate,
signals indirect discourse (as in (a.) sentences in (10)-(12)). Thus, if we demonstrate
that the phenomenon under discussion holds with a 3rd person embedded subject
(a-IX ), then it is rather unlikely that we are dealing with direct discourse but, instead,
with a case of clausal embedding. Consider (15) (Figures 1-2): although grammatical
without any RS markings across the embedded clause, it is also acceptable with
them.
(15) a. A-MOMi SAY
RS-a
A-IXi BUSY




‘Momi thinks shei is busy.’
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The contrast in (15) is surprising for existing analyses of role shift. First, it
cannot be analyzed as direct discourse, since to quote Mom would be to use a first
person pronoun 1-IX . There is also no obvious analysis of this as a full context
shifting operator (Zucchi 2004; Schlenker 2017), since nothing throughout the "role
shift" actually shifts interpretation, and yet the role shift movements occur, with
different extents in the two cases. Finally, it’s not clear how to analyze the RS
here as a manner adverbial (Davidson 2015), since no extra manner seems to be
demonstrated in THINK versus SAY .
We propose that a complete analysis of RS must consider data like those in
(15). Although we will not offer one here, we suspect that a solution will depend
on increasingly sophisticated dissociations of the locus itself from the point to the
locus (IX), as begun in work by Barberà Altimira et al. (2012) and Koulidobrova &
Lillo-Martin (2016). For now, we turn to the issue of the proffering/doxastic cue and
merely note that behavior like (15) helps us rule out a pure direct discourse analysis of
the RS-markings in our SAY vs. IMAGINE examples. Moreover, this same pattern in
(15) can be observed with other clearly nonquotational predicates: ASSUME, SHOW,
MEAN, INFORM, CLAIM vs. THINK, BELIEVE, IMAGINE, DREAM, WONDER,
despite the difference in RS extent.
(16) a. A-MOMi {ASSUME, CLAIM, MEAN, INFORM-2}
RS-a
A-IXi BUSY
‘Momi {assumed, claimed, meant, informed-you} shei was busy.’
b. A-MOMi
RS-a
{BELIEVE, DREAM, WONDER-IF} A-IXi BUSY
‘Momi {believed, dreamed, wondered-if} shei was busy.’
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4 Towards an account
The difference among the predicates in (16) follows precisely the one found in
Anand & Hacquard (2008): profferings vs. doxastics. As mentioned at the outset,
they argue that this division is based on how the complement clause enters the
common ground and the role it plays: for proffering verbs, the worlds in which the
proposition expressed by the complement must hold are considered with respect to
the existing common ground, while the truth of the proposition expressed by the
complement of doxastics is evaluated with respect to the private intensional domain
of the subject/belief-holder and his/her conversational goals, not the overall common
ground. Formally then, the account along these lines follows (3) (Koulidobrova &
Davidson 2015):
(17) a. J MOM IMAGINE A-IX BUSY K
= 1i f f Holder(mom,e)^imagine0(e,w)^8w0 2 \CON(e)[Busy(mom)(w0)],
where \CON(e) = DOX(ixHolder(x,e),Word(e))
b. J MOM SAY A-IX BUSY K
= 1i f f Holder(mom,e)^say(e,w)^8w0 2Goal(e)[8w00 2 \CON(eCG 
w0)[Busy(mom)(w00)]]
Pragmatically, what results from the Anand & Hacquard-style account is the
suggestion that the two classes of predicates interact with the question under dis-
cussion (QUD, Roberts 1996) in different ways: the argument of the proffer (the
complement) is what is up for discussion/"proffered" to be entered to the common
ground (17a); doxastics offer up for discussion the entire proposition (as given in the
main clause), (17b).
(18) a. MOM A-IX {SAY, CLAIM, ARGUE, ASSUME}
RS-a
A-IX BUSY.
! Question under discussion: Is mom busy?
b. MOM A-IX
RS-a
{THINK, BELIEVE, IMAGINE} A-IX BUSY.
! Question under discussion: Does mom {think, believe, imagine} she is
busy?
Perhaps then the difference in the duration of RS marking associated with
different types of predicates in ASL may not be syntactic but rather semantic and
pragmatic. One way to refer to a proposition in ASL discourse is to assign it to a
locus, which can be done through RS. By extending RS over only the embedded
clause in (18a), the signer makes the embedded proposition Mom is busy a target
for later anaphora. This is in contrast to (18b) where RS extends over the matrix
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predicate and thus can make the entire proposition Mom thinks she is busy a target
for later anaphora by later indexical points (IX ) to the locus provided through RS.
Consistent with this view is Sandler’s (e.g. 2010) account of nonmanual spreading
as determined by a mapping at the interface of the prosodic component and the
semantic/pragmatic component, which here may be affected by this potential for a
proposition to provide a locus for future anaphora.
Finally, sign languages also allow the attitude embedding predicate to remain
phonologically null, as is common in spontaneous discourse. Lillo-Martin (1995)
dubs this (null) embedding predicate PoV (see (7a)), typically translated as ’be
like.’ More recently it has been analyzed as a classifier predicate that takes a
demonstration as an argument (Davidson 2015). A natural question arises which
of the two classes of verbs we have been discussing this predicate belongs to. Of
course, since the predicate is phonologically null, the extent of RS-marking over it
cannot be determined. Yet, the data offered here provide another avenue for better
understanding the nature of this predicate: are the available readings compatible
with proffering or doxastic verbs? Preliminary data (three signers but not as part of
the full paradigm) suggest the former (compare (19) with (8)).
(19) Maryi: MOM j
RS-a
1-IX⇤i, j BUSY
‘Mom is like I[6=Mary, =mom] am busy.’
These data offer additional testing ground in sign languages for both PoV and
for SAY. In particular, while our consultants overwhelmingly reject SAY under
RS, native signer reactions to such sentences contrast with those involving lack of
RS-markings on THINK/IMAGINE . A next step will be to contrast SAY with and
without RS-marking in order to test the possibility of subjective stance.
5 Conclusion
While the main focus of this paper has been the nature of nonmanual markings that
vary in form (both extent and expression) depending on embedding predicates (this
has been unsystematically, albeit frequently, noted in the SL literature,Sandler &
Lillo-Martin 2006), the data presented here offer a path previously unexplored in the
examination of RS and morpho-syntactic realization of indexicals in sign languages.
The upshot is this: shift-related phenomena have been considered to be a defining
property of a particular type of discourse: direct, indirect, or ‘mixed’ (Zucchi
2004). However, if the analysis presented here is on the right track, the nonmanuals
associated with RS may be independent of these categorizations. Instead, they
depend in part on semantics of the embedding predicate, which means that the
’doxastic-proffering cut’ ought to reveal itself, for instance, in interaction with
69
Elena Koulidobrova and Kathryn Davidson
epistemics as well as with other quantificational elements. The suggestion for the
analysis of RS markings put forth here should also revive the debate regarding
the views on nonmanual spreading, since in some embedded questions (e.g. with
WONDER and KNOW), nonmanual markings begin on the embedding predicate and
extends over the embedded clause (Sandler & Lillo-Martin 2006). We suggest that
the difference in interpretation and duration between doxastic and proffering verbs,
as well as new data concerning the shiftablity of a third person pronoun associated
with a locus, brings a new perspective to these issues.
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Abstract This article discusses the peculiar distribution of the distributivity 
operator dou ‘all’ under the scope of a universal mei-NP ‘every-NP’ in Mandarin 
Chinese. Dou occurs with mei ‘every’ in most contexts, but the presence of an 
indefinite may exempt this requirement. This article proposes that mei is not 
inherently quantificational but introduces a partition operator, which partitions the 
noun extension into a set of partitions based on the number denoted by the 
numeral, and a choice function variable, which selects one partition from the 
above set of partitions. Since mei is not inherently distributive, an overt 
distributivity operator is required to express distributivity. This explains most 
contexts. On the other hand, indefinites can be either plain indefinites, which do 
not require specific licensing contexts, or dependent indefinites, which require a 
licensor with a distributive feature. Plain indefinites are not inherently distributive, 
whereas dependent indefinites are themselves inherently distributive. When an 
indefinite within the scope of a mei-NP is a plain indefinite, dou is required. In 
contrast, when an indefinite within the scope of a mei-NP is a dependent indefinite, 
dou is not required because the dependent indefinite already expresses 
distributivity. Dou ‘all’ or ge ‘each’ in a sentence such as Mei-ge chshi (dou/ge) 
zuo yi-dao cai ‘Every chef makes a dish (each)’ is optional, because the indefinite 
is ambiguous between the plain indefinite interpretation and the dependent 
indefinite interpretation. 
1 Introduction 
One of the most intriguing studies in Chinese linguistics is the function and 
semantics of mei ‘every’ and dou ‘all’ in universal statements such as (1a) and (1b).  
* The first chapter of my dissertation (Lin 1996) supervised by Angelika Kratzer is on distributivity
in Mandarin Chinese. That chapter was later revised and published in Natural Language Semantics
in 1998 and that was my first published semantics paper. I cannot thank Angelika Kratzer more for
agreeing to supervise my dissertation when I really did not know much about formal semantics and
helping me become a semanticist. The topic of the current paper is strongly connected to that chapter
and is the best topic that I can think of to show my highest respect to my teacher and to celebrate
her retirement and her 70th birthday. I would like to thank Niina Zhang for commenting on this paper




(1) a. Mei-ge       ren   *(dou)  lika-le 
         every-Cl  person   all    leave-Asp  
      ‘Everyone left.’ 
b. Mei-ge    haizi *(dou)  hen  congming 
         every-Cl  child     all   very  smart 
    ‘Every child is smart.’ 
 
In these sentences dou obligatorily occurs with a universal subject NP headed by 
mei. Such sentences have led some linguists to believe that the use of mei ‘every’ 
must be accompanied by dou ‘all’ (Lin 1996, 1998, for example). However, Huang 
(1995, 1996, 2005) pointed out some contexts where dou can be absent when mei 
is present. The first context is one where an indefinite noun phrase appears within 
the scope of a mei-NP such as (2) taken from Huang’s works.  
 
(2)  Mei-ge   chushi  zuo     yi-dao   cai 
every-Cl  chef  make   one-Cl   dish 
‘Every chef makes a dish.’ 
 
Interestingly, as Huang (2005: 21) pointed out, when the object NP of the verb is a 
definite NP instead of an indefinite NP, dou becomes obligatory.  
 
(3)  a.*Mei    yi  ge  xuesheng  xihuan  zhe-ben  shu 
           every one Cl  student      like      this-Cl   book 
         ‘Every student likes this book.’ 
b. Mei     yi  ge  xuesheng dou  xihuan  zhe-ben  shu 
          every one Cl  student     all   like        this-Cl   book 
          ‘Every student likes this book.’ 
 
In addition to indefinite NPs, Huang (1996) also claimed that the presence of a 
reflexive within the scope of a mei-NP is capable of rendering dou unnecessary. Her 
example is given in (4). 
 
(4)  Meiyige   houxuanren  tan-le-tan   ziji 
       every-MW candidate    talk-LE-talk self. 
      ‘Every candidate talked about himself/herself.    (Huang 1996: 34) 
 
Despite Huang’s claim, it is not clear that in (4) it is the reflexive that renders dou 
unnecessary. On the one hand, (5a) does not sound acceptable/complete to the 
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author and many native speakers that I consulted, unless dou is added as in (5b).1 
(5) a. *Mei  yi-ge    houxuanren tan-le       ziji2
every one-Cl candidate  talk-Asp    self
‘Every candidate talked about himself.’
b. Mei yi-ge     houxuanren dou tan-le     ziji
every one-Cl candidate    all  talk-Asp self
‘Every candidate talked about himself.’ 
On the other hand, (4) involves a reduplicated verb, where the second occurrence 
can be viewed as an indefinite cognate with the numeral yi ‘one’ being omitted. So 
tan-le-tan is the elided form of tan-le-yi-tan ‘talked a talk’. In fact, if the 
reduplicated form is not used, the sentence is much worse as (5a) shows. Thus, it is 
very likely that what licenses the omission of dou in (4) is the shortened indefinite 
expression (yi)-tan ‘a talk’ rather than the reflexive. The contrast between (4) and 
(6a) is similar to the contrast between (6a) and (6b) below. While (6a) sounds 
unnatural and incomplete, the addition of an indefinite as in (6b) makes the sentence 
much more acceptable. 
(6) a. *Mei-ge-ren   da-le   ziji
     everyone     hit-Asp self 
          ‘ Everyone hit himself.’ 
b. Mei-ge-ren da-le      ziji    yi-ba   zhang
everyone    hit-Asp   self  one-Cl slap
‘Everyone slapped himself on his own face.’
1 Likewise, (ia) is unnatural unless dou is inserted as in (ib). The contrast is very sharp. 
(i) a. *Mei-ge-ren zai  qipian ziji
everyone   Prog cheat  self
‘Everyone is cheating himself.’
b. Mei-ge-ren dou zai  qipian ziji
everyone    all  Prog cheat self
‘Everyone is cheating himself.’
2 Niina Zhang (p.c.) pointed out that (5a) is much improved if zhi ‘only’ is added to the sentence, 
as shown below. 
(i) Mei-ge    houxuanren zhi  tan-le ziji
every-Cl candidate   only talk.about-Asp self
‘Every candidate only talked about himself.’
I wonder if (i) above is improved because zhi ‘only’ involves universal quantification, which is 
somehow related to the proposal to be made in section 4.	
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That reduplication alone may license the absence of dou is proved by (7) below. 
(7) Mei-ge-ren xiang-le  (yi)-xiang, zuihou haishi jueding liuxialai
everyone  think-Asp one-think   finally  still    decide  stay
‘Everyone thought about it for a little while and decided to stay.’
In fact, according to Zhang’s (2009) corpus study, dou is rarely omitted when a 
reflexive is under the scope of a mei-NP. She pointed out that among 53 examples 
with a reflexive in a post-verbal position that she found in her corpus, dou does not 
appear in only 3 of them. Moreover, the reflexive appears as a possessive modifier 
rather than the object. Indeed, when I tried to google-search the string “mei-ge-ren 
& ziji”, mostly the reflexive ziji appears as a possessive modifier rather than the 
object of a verb as illustrated by (8a) and (8b).3 
(8) a.  Mei-ge     ren     (dou)  you   ziji  de   lu
     every-Cl person  all    have  self  DE  route 
     ‘Everyone has a route of his own.’ 
b. Mei-ge ren        (dou) you    ziji   de  fangjian 
every-Cl person  all    have  self  DE  room 
     ‘Everyone has a room of his own.’ 
However, for such examples, a numeral-classifier can be inserted before the 
reflexive without altering the meaning of the sentence. So (8a) and (8b) are 
equivalent to (9a) and (9b).  
(9) a. Mei-ge  ren        (dou)  you   yi-tiao   ziji  de   lu   
every-Cl person  all    have  one-Cl  self  DE  route
b. Mei-ge ren         (dou) you  yi-jian  ziji   de  fangjian
every-Cl person  all  have  one-Cl  self  DE  room
This indicates that the object NPs in (8a) and (8b) are indefinites which happen to 
contain a reflexive possessor. Since the referent of the reflexive co-varies with the 
universal NP, the indefinite as a whole co-varies with it. Therefore, such examples 
might be better treated on a par with examples such as (2), if possible.  
The difficulty in finding a true reflexive object indicates that reflexives might 
3 In my idiolect, this type of sentence is still not 100% acceptable without the presence of dou. 
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not be a normal strategy to avoid the use of dou.4 In this paper, I will leave the issue 
of reflexives aside, focusing only on the question of why dou is optional when there 
is an indefinite within the scope of mei-(yi)-ge-N ‘every-one-classifier-N’. 
    This article is organized as follows. In section 2, I briefly summarize previous 
works on mei and dou, focusing in particular on Lin (1998). In section 3, I introduce 
Szabolcsi’s (2010) analysis of non-quantificational every in English as background 
information and extends it to Mandarin mei with modifications. It is argued that 
apart from not being inherently quantificational, the semantics of mei has two 
components, one is a partition operator and the other is a choice function variable. 
This type of semantics is supported by constructions in which mei is followed by a 
numeral whose number is greater than one. It section 4, it is shown that an indefinite 
within the scope of a mei-NP whose numeral denotes a number greater than one 
should be analyzed as a dependent indefinite. Following Kuhn (2017), dependent 
indefinites are treated as being inherently distributive. Section 5 answers the 
question of why dou is optional in some contexts with an indefinite. I argue that the 
optionality of dou is a result of the indefinite being ambiguous between a plain 
indefinite and a dependent indefinite. Section 6 concludes this article. 
2 Previous analyses of Mei and Dou  
Based on the contrast between (10a) and (10b), Lin (1996, 1998) proposed that dou 
is a distributivity marker, more precisely, a generalized distributivity operator.  
(10) a. Tamen mai-le    yi-jiang fangzi
     they  buy-Asp  one-Cl  house 
     ‘They bought a house together.’ 
b. Tamen dou  mai-le  yi-jian fangzi
they    all  buy-Asp one-Cl house
‘They each bought a house.’
Lin (1998) pointed out that if dou is a distributivity marker and mei is also 
inherently distributive like every in English, then mei and dou should not occur with 
each other parallel to their English counterparts *Every student all left. However, 
4 We do find reflexives in object position in some examples, as illustrated below. 
(i) Mei-ge-ren fangqi  ziji  zong    you xuduo liyou
everyone  give.up self  always  have many reasons
‘(When) everyone gives himself up, (he) always has many reasons.’
It seems that this type of sentence involves generic quantification and the mei-NP is in a subordinate 
clause. I will deal with this type of sentence in another occasion.	
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as discussed in section 1, dou is able to occur with a mei-NP and in many contexts, 
the presence of dou is even obligatory. In order to account for this fact, Lin (1996, 
1998) proposed that mei in Mandarin Chinese is not inherently quantificational but 
its semantics is instead more like the definite article the, denoting a maximal plural 
entity when combined with an NP. His definition of mei is given below.  
(11) [[mei]] = that function f such that for all P Î D<e,t>, f(P) = È||P||
According to this analysis, what dou does is to distribute the property denoted by 
the predicate over the set of individuals that is collected by mei. This analysis of 
mei, though sounding daring, gains support from the distribution of ge ‘each’, 
which is usually assumed to be a distributivity operator by Chinese linguists (See 
T.-H. Jonah Lin (1998) for example). Like dou, the sorting key of ge must be a 
plural NP, as the contrast between (12a) and (12b) illustrates. However, in contrast 
with dou, ge normally requires that an indefinite appear within its scope. Compare 
(13a) with (13b). 
(12) a. Tamen ge  mai-le   yi-ben shu
they  each buy-Asp one-Cl book
     ‘They each bought a book.’ 
b. *Ta ge    mai-le    yi-ben shu
he each buy-Asp one-Cl book
(13) a. Naxie xiaohai dou likai le
    those kid    all  leave Asp 
     ‘Those kids all left.’ 
b. *Naxie xiaohai ge  likai  le
those kid       each leave Asp
Significantly, mei occurs not only with dou but also with ge ‘each’, a phenomenon 
that is less discussed by Chinese linguists but relevant data can be easily found from 
the internet (Also see Lee, Zhang and Pan 2009; Niu and Pan (2015) for a similar 
observation). Here are two illustrative examples. 
(14) a. Mei-ge-ren     ge  chi-le  yi-ge
every-Cl-person each eat-Asp one-Cl
    ‘Everyone ate one each.’    
b. Mei-ge ren     ge  dian-le   yi-fen zhucan
every-Cl person each order-Asp one-Cl main.meal
      ‘Everyone ordered a main meal separately.’ 
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Again, if mei is inherently distributive, (14a) and (14b) will be difficult to explain 
without abandoning the assumption that ge is also a distributivity operator. 
    Very interestingly, the above idea of mei in Mandarin Chinese has cross-linguistic 
support. For example,	Zimmermann (1992: 177) argued that every may express 
some kind of summation. Landman (2003: 234) claimed that every-NPs have both 
collective definite interpretations and generalized quantifier interpretations. 
Similarly, Beghelli and Stowell (1997) observed that every can be forced into a kind 
of ‘collective reading’5 and proposed that every-NPs introduce set variables that 
can be unselectively bound by a generic operator. Likewise, Szabolcsi (2010) 
proposed that the domain restriction of quantifiers is introduced by a choice 
function variable. It is the set of individuals in the restricted quantifier domain that 
is quantified over by the possibly covert sentence-level distributivity operator. 
Cable (2012: 3) said that “every is “halfway between all and each”, and shares with 
all the function of ‘summing up’ a large set of objects”.6  Cross-linguistically, 
Matthewson (2001) for St’át’imcets claimed that the creation of a generalized 
quantifier always proceeds by a quantifier taking sisters of argumental type, citing 
Lin’s (1998) work on dou as her supporting evidence. Margariti (2014) for Greek 
argued that every-NPs introduce both context set and individual variables and the 
distributive reading is due to the presence of a covert distributivity operator that 
binds the variables in the every-NP as well as in the VP. The above cross-linguistic 
evidence suggests that Lin’s (1996, 1998) treatment of mei not as an inherent 
quantifier and dou as the true source of distributivity is not without its grounds but 
has empirical support from cross-linguistic evidence.  
In this paper, I will further pursue the ideas put forth by the above authors and 
use them to explain the distribution of mei and dou. More precisely, following Lin 
(1996, 1998), Beghelli (1997), Beghelli and Stowell (1997) and Szabolcsi (1997, 
2010), I assume that mei does not contribute universal quantification itself but is 
syntactically specified for a [+Dist] feature, which requires that a distributive 
element is within its c-command domain.  
Though this article focuses only on my own analysis of mei and dou, it must 
be noted that other analyses are available. For example, Huang (2005) argued that 
5 For example, (i) is true in a scenario where the boys are lifting the piano together as a team. 
(i) It took every boy to lift the piano.
6 That every can be collective is clear in the following contrast discussed by Cable (2012: 4): 
(i) a. Take every one of these apples.
(OK if you take the whole bushes at once or take each apple one by one)
b. Take each of these apples.
(Only OK if you take each apple one by one)
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universal quantification, in Chinese and English as well, must involve a skolem 
function, which maps the variable introduced by the common noun to another 
variable whose choice of value depends on the value of the former variable. In her 
analysis, mei is the source of universal quantification, whereas dou sums up the 
events denoted by the VP. Luo’s (2011) approach is somewhat similar to Huang’s. 
He treated both mei and dou as universal quantifiers with a matching function, the 
difference being that the range of the matching function introduced by dou must be 
an event. In addition to the above authors, there are many other authors who focus 
on universal expressions in Chinese or on dou such as Pan (2000), Tomioka & Tsai 
(2005), Yuan (2005), Cheng & Giannakidou (2006), Xiang (2008), Chen (2008), 
among many others. In this article, I will not try to do a comprehensive survey of 
mei and dou nor how the previous literature deals with their distributions. Instead, 
I will focus more on my own alternative proposal.  
3 Treating mei ‘every’ as partition and variable-introducing element 
Although indefinites and universals of the every-NP type are traditionally regarded 
as very different types of noun phrases, Szabolcsi (2010:102-103) argued that they 
are actually very similar. In particular, she showed that like indefinites, universals 
of the every-NP type display potentially unbounded existential scope, can be 
referentially dependent upon a higher operator and have clause-bounded 
distributive scope. These parallel behaviors lead her to propose a uniform analysis 
of indefinites and every-NPs; namely, they both introduce variables that are bound 
by another operator.  
The idea that indefinites introduce variables was first introduced by Kamp 
(1981) and Heim (1982). Under their analyses, indefinites are free individual 
variables that are bound by an operator in the structure such as an existential closure 
operator. This approach explains the island-free nature of the indefinite’s scope. 
The other proposal, made by Reinhart (1997), is that existential closure applies to 
a choice function variable f. A choice function is a function which picks an element 
from any set that it applies to. For example, when applying to a set of capitals, a 
choice function f1 may pick Taipei as its value from the set of capitals, i.e, f1(capitals) 
= Taipei, and another choice function f2 may pick another capital. Different choice 
functions will pick a different element from the same set. This approach to 
indefinites was adopted by Szabolcsi (2010) and extended to every-NP.  
It is well-known that quantifier domains do not range over all individuals in 
the whole world but must be contextually restricted (von Fintel 1994). Stanley and 
Szabó (2000) argued that domain restriction may contain a variable linked to 
another quantifier and that this restriction is specificially located in the NP. 
Following the above thought, Szabolcsi (2010: 105) argued that every-NP’s 
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similarity with indefinites can be captured if the former is analyzed as a (possibly 
skolemized) choice function applied to the denotation of NP, which is the power set 
of the noun set. For example, every child is interpreted as f(Pow(child’)), picking 
out a contextually salient subset of children. Under this analysis, every is not 
quantificational nor is it inherently distributive. 7  Distributivity comes from 
something else in the structure such as a functional [+Dist] head as in Szabolcsi 
(1997), Beghelli (1997), Beghelli and Stowell (1997). The role of every NP is to 
supply the sorting key for Dist as shown below. 
(15) Distp
          f(Pow(child’)) Dist’ 
Dist  " 
Lin’s (1996, 1998) analysis of Chinese mei-NPs and dou is along the same line of 
the above proposal, though he did not assume that mei introduces a variable. 
    With the above as background, I now return to Chinese mei-NPs and extend 
Szabolcsi’s (2010) approach to them with some modifications. To begin with, I note 
a difference between English every-NPs and Chinese mei-NPs. In English, every 
directly modifies the noun that it combines with. In contrast, in Chinese, there is a 
numeral-classifier between mei and the noun that it modifies. The numeral yi ‘one’ 
is optional, as is shown by (16). 
(16) mei   (yi)  ge haizi
every one Cl child
‘every child’
Given this difference, if mei introduces a choice function variable, that choice 
function variable should not be able to take a power noun set as its argument as 
Szabolcsi proposes for English every. I propose that mei in Mandarin Chinese 
actually has two functions. One is to form a set of partitions whose members are 
sets of n-many individuals with n = the number denoted by the numeral. The 
definition of partition of a set is given as follows: 
(17) A partition of a set X is a set of nonempty subsets of X such that every
element x in X is in exactly one of these subsets (i.e., X is a disjoint union of
the subsets).
7 The reader may wonder what then is the difference between indefinites and universals of every-
NP type. The reader is referred to Szabolcsi (ibid: 105) for discussion. 
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Suppose that the extension of haizi ‘child’ in (16) is a set of six atomic children, 
{A,B,C,D,E,F}. Then, what mei does in (16) is to form a set of partitions all subsets 
of which contain exactly one atomic child. When the numeral is yi ‘one’, there is 
only one single partition, in the case under discussion, it is the underlined part in 
(18), which is a set of single-member subsets: 
(18) {{{A},{B},{C},{D},{E},{F}}}
In addition to forming a set of partitions conforming to the specified number 
denoted by the numeral, mei introduces a choice function variable. This choice 
function variable will apply to the set of partitions formed, as follows: 
(19) f({{{A},{B},{C},{D},{E},{F}}}) = {{A},{B},{C},{D},{E},{F}}
In (18), the set contains only one single partition, so when the choice function 
applies to it, the result will be the same partition. This partition will then be 
distributed over by the distributivity operator, yielding a result similar to (15).  
    The partition formation function of mei might not be obvious when the numeral 
is yi ‘one’, as this is a special case, but it will become transparent when the number 
is more than one. In what follows, I discuss this kind of construction which lends 
strong support to the above proposal. 
    Consider the construction in (20). In this construction, mei is followed by a 
numeral whose number is larger than one (represented as mei+Num>1 and has some 
special properties. The first property of this construction is that an indefinite must 
appear within the scope of such universal NPs. Compare (20) with (21). 
(20) Mei liang-ge   ren     chi   yi-ge     mantou
every two-Cl person eat  one-Cl  steamed.bun
‘Every two people eat one steamed bun.’
(21) *Mei  liang ge    ren       likai le
every two  Cl   person leave Asp
  ‘Every two people left.’ 
Another property of mei+Num>1-NP is that dou ‘all’ or ge ‘each’ may not occur 
with it in contrast to mei+Num=1, as illustrated by (22). 
(22) *Mei  san-ge      ren     dou/ge   chi yi-ge       mantou
every three-Cl person all/each eat one-Cl  steamed.bun
‘Every three people eat one steamed bun.’
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Finally, the mei+Num>1-NP construction requires the value of the indefinite NP to 
co-vary with the value of the universal NP.8  
Now consider a scenario where there are six people, A, B, C, D, E and F in 
the context and think about when (20) can be true. In order for this sentence to be 
true, there must be a partition of the six people into two-person groups and the total 
number of the steamed buns must be equal to the number of two-person groups 
formed from the six people. Thus, for (20) to be true, there must be three two-person 
groups and three different steamed buns. In other words, each of the three buns 
varies with the two-people group that it is associated with. Interestingly, as pointed 
out by Wu (2013: 10-11), to form a two-person partition out of six people, there are 
actually 15 partitions as given below. 
(23) {{A,B}, {C,D}, {E, F}}, {{A,B}, {C,E}, {D, F}}, {{A,B}, {C,F}, {D,E }},
{{A,B}, {C,D}, {E, F}}, {{A,C}, {B,D}, {E, F}}, {{A,C}, {B,E}, {D, F}},
{{A,C}, {B,F}, {D, E}}, {{A,D}, {B,C}, {E, F}}, {{A,D}, {B,E}, {C, F}},
{{A,D}, {B,F}, {C, E}}, {{A,E}, {B,C}, {D, F}}, {{A,E}, {B,D}, {C, F}},
{{A,E}, {B,F}, {C, D}}, {{A,F}, {B,E}, {C, D}}, {{A,F}, {B,D}, {C, E}}
(20) is true as long as any of the 15 partitions is chosen in a given context and every
member of this contextually determined partition has the property of eating a
different steamed bun. The sentence by no means means that all the 15 partitions in
(23) are universally quantified. So the question is how a partition from the 15
partitions is chosen. The answer is by choice function. Recall that mei has two
functions. One function is to form a set of partitions whose subsets all contain
exactly n-many atomic individuals with n equal to the number denoted by the
numeral, in the case of (20), the number two. Another function of mei is that it
introduces a choice function variable. This choice function variable, which is
existentially closed, will apply to the set containing all the partitions in (23) and
return one of the 15 partitions as the value. Suppose that the value is the first
partition, ‘{{A,B}, {C,D}, {E, F}}’, then (20) asserts that {A,B}, {C,D} and {E,F}
eats a steamed bun, respectively. The truth conditions predicted seem to be correct.
8 Niina Zhang (personal communication) pointed out that the following sentence seems to allow 
partial sharing (many-to-one) reading. 
(i) Mei liang-ge xuesheng zhao  yi-wei zhidao     laoshi
every two-Cl student  find  one-Cl supervising teacher
‘Every two students find one supervisor.’
The partial sharing reading arises when the total number of two-student groups is larger than the 
total number of the teachers available. If this observation is correct, what is required by mei+Num>1-




I conclude that examples such as (20) support the assumption that the meaning of 
mei has two components, one being partition formation and the other being choice 
function variable.  
    To sum up, the meaning of a mei-NP can be represented as follows, with f 
standing for a choice function variable and Ã a partition operator: 
(24) a. DP 
D NP 
Ã 
mei NumP N’ 
            every    
f             yi-ge/liang-ge             haizi 
one/two child 
b.Ã(NP) = a set of partitions whose subsets contain exactly n-many atomic
individuals. 
c. f(Ã(NP)) = one of the partitions chosen from (24b)
4 Partition mei and dependent indefinites 
The construction in (20) not only supports the treatment of mei as introducing a 
partition operator and a choice function variable but also is the key to answer why 
the presence of an indefinite may render dou unnecessary. Recall that the 
mei+Num>1-NP construction has two important properties. One property is that dou 
is not required and another property is that the value of the variable introduced by 
the indefinite covaries with the value of the variable introduced by the universal NP. 
The latter property reminds us of the discussion of dependent indefinites in the 
literature. It has been observed that in many unrelated languages an indefinite 
determiner or numeral is inflected, mostly involving reduplication, to indicate the 
covariation between the indefinite and its licensor, usually a quantifier or 
distributivity operator (Moravcsik 1978; Gil 1995; Farkas, 1997, 2001; 2015; 
Pereltsvaig 2008; Brasoveanu and Farkas 2011; Henderson 2014; Kuhn 2017). 
Illustrated below are two Hungarian examples taken from Farkas (2015). 
(25) a. Minden gyerek hozott  egy-egy k¨onyvet. (Hungarian)  
      every  child  brought  a-a   book. 
     ‘Every child brought a book.’ 
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b. Minden gyerek hozott  k´et-k´et k¨onyvet.            (Hungarian)  
every  child  brought two-two book
‘Every child brought two books.’
In addition to inflectional morphology, Champollion (2015) argues that each may 
make an indefinite a dependent one as illustrated below: 
(26) Every boy had one apple each.
The previous analyses of dependent indefinites have provided different ways to 
guarantee the covariation between a dependent indefinite and its licensors such as 
postsuppositions in Henderson’s (2014) framework. In this paper, I will not try to 
review those analyses but instead would like to assume with Kuhn (2017) that at 
least dependent indefinites in some languages such as American Sign Language 
studied by him are themselves inherently distributive. On such an analysis, the at-
issue meaning of a dependent indefinite is a universally quantificational lexical 
entry as illustrated below. 
(27) [[two − two books]] = Given a licensor X, presupposing that X is nonatomic,
for all atomic parts x of X, there are two books associated with x
       (Kuhn 2017: 415) 
Returning to the Chinese mei+Num>1-NP construction in (20), I propose that the 
indefinite in this construction is a dependent indefinite licensed by the mei-NP. 
Recall that according to our analysis, mei-NPs in Mandarin Chinese are not 
inherently quantificational but introduce a choice function variable applying to the 
set of partitions derived from partitioning the combination of numeral+noun. This 
analysis, however, leaves the source of the distributive force in this construction 
unexplained. In principle, there are two possibilities to solve this issue. One 
possibility is to say that such constructions involve a covert distributivity operator. 
As argued by Lin (1998), however, distributivity associated with universal NPs in 
Mandarin Chinese seems to require an overt marker such as dou or ge. Given this, 
this possibility is less plausible. The other possibility is that the distributive force 
comes from the indefinite itself. Indeed, given what was proposed by Kuhn (2017), 
I would like to suggest that the indefinite in (20) is a dependent indefinite. Moreover, 
it is inherently distributive as Kuhn (2017) has proposed for dependent indefinites 
in American Sign Language. More precisely, I propose that dependent indefinites 
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in Mandarin Chinese have a denotation like (28).9 
(28) [[yi − ge mantou]] =  lP<e,<e,t>>lX "x [x Î X ® $y [steamed_bun’(y) Ù   P(y)(x)
Ù Cov(y, x)] 
In other words, a dependent indefinite takes the transitive verb as its argument, 
returning an intransitive predicate that takes the partition set X chosen by the choice 
function variable.10 The members of the set X are universally quantified and scope 
over the existential quantifier introduced by the indefinite. In addition, the 
dependent indefinite also introduces a covariation function Cov that guarantees that 
the value of the variable y co-varies with the value of the variable x.11 This analysis 
not only explains the meaning of the construction in (20) but answers the question 
why dou ‘all’ or ge ‘each’ may not be used in this construction. An overt 
distributivity operator is not needed, because dependent indefinites are inherently 
distributive. 
5 Explaining the optionality of the distributivity operator in Mandarin 
Chinese 
In section one, we saw that when an indefinite is within the scope of mei-yi-cl-N 
‘every-one-Cl-N’, an overt distributivity operator such as dou or ge can be optional, 
illustrated again by (29).  
(29) Mei-(yi)-ge  chushi  (dou/ge)   zuo yi-dao     cai
every-one-Cl chef     all/each  make one-Cl dish
‘Every chef makes a dish.’
Now if the assumption is correct that mei is not inherently quantificational or 
distributive as proposed in this paper, a puzzling question to answer is why the 
presence of the indefinite makes the distributivity operator optional. My answer to 
this question is very different from the previous analyses such as Huang (2005) or 
Luo (2011) briefly summarized below. 
Huang (2005) suggested that the universal determiner mei requires a variable 
y in the scope of the universal NP in order to express a “pairing” relation. This 
pairing relation is guaranteed by a skolem function. Moreover, the dependent 
9 If Niina Zhang’s observation in note 8 is correct, the Cov function in (28) should be replaced by a 
weaker condition which excludes only identical referents for the variable y. 
10 The semantics in (28) should be further generalized to include ditransitive verbs. To simplify the 
matter here, I will leave this task open. 
11 The covariation condition might need to be revised given the observation in note 8.	
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variable must be either lexically licensed as in the case of indefinites or 
morphologically licensed (by dou) as in the case of event arguments. On the other 
hand, Luo (2011) proposed that mei is inherently distributive, as opposed to Lin’s 
(1998) non-distributive analysis and that the semantic representation of distributive 
quantification is “standard universal quantification plus a matching function”. He 
proposed that like mei, dou is a distributive quantifier, but it quantifies over events 
rather than individuals. Mei matches an individual with another individual but dou 
matches an individual with an event. Therefore, a universal statement with an 
intransitive predicate such as *Mei-yi-ge ren likai le ‘everyone left’ is 
uninterpretable because mei must match an individual to an individual. Instead, dou 
must be used and mei must be type-shifted to <et,e> to match the semantics of dou.  
    As we saw above, both Huang’s and Luo’s accounts for the presence or absence 
of dou rely on the semantic function of either mei or dou. Here I would like to make 
a different proposal. My answer is that the presence or absence of a distributivity 
operator results from the ambiguity of indefinites. An indefinite can be either the 
familiar plain indefinite or a dependent indefinite when the sentence contains a 
licensor with a quantificational or distributivity feature. When the indefinite is a 
plain indefinite, dou is required because distributivity needs overt marking in 
Mandarin Chinese. By contrast, when the indefinite is a dependent indefinite, it is 
inherently distributive as given in (28). In this case, dou is not required. 
    Let me note an important observation made by Wu (2013: 17-18). He observed 
that there is a meaning difference with or without dou for a sentence like (30).  
(30) Mei-ge    haizi xihuan yi-ge  mingxing
Every-Cl child  like    one-Cl  star
‘Every child likes a star.’
According to him, without dou, (30) can only express a one-to-one correspondence 
between a child and a star as indicated below. 
(31) Child1  like  star1
Child2  like  star2
Child3  like  star3
……
Childn  like  starn
That is, in (31), the star must covary with the child. However, if dou is inserted into 
(30), in addition to the covariation reading, the sentence can also mean that every 
child likes the same star without covariation, as shown below. 
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(32) Child1  like  star1
Child2  like  star1
Child3  like  star1
……
Childn  like  star1
The meaning difference with or without dou can be explained as follows. (30) only 
has a covariation reading because the indefinite yi-ge mingxing ‘a star’ is licensed 
as a dependent indefinite. As proposed in (28), a dependent indefinite is inherently 
distributive and has a covariation function in its meaning to guarantee a one-to-one 
correspondence. Since distributivity is already expressed by the dependent 
indefinite, an overt distributivity marker such as dou or ge is not required. In fact, 
it is even not allowed to appear. 
    But an indefinite can also be a plain indefinite. In this case, it does not have 
inherent distributive force but can introduce a choice function variable. When the 
choice function variable is closed by existential closure at the sentence-level, we 
get the interpretation in (32). When the choice function variable is closed at the VP-
level, the interpretation in (31) is yielded. In either interpretation, the distributivity 
operator dou or ge is required because distributivity in Mandarin Chinese needs 
overt marking. Put another way, we can assume with Lin (1998) that though mei-
NPs are not inherently quantificational, it carries a syntactic [+Dist] feature. This 
feature requires that the structure has an overt expression to express distributivity. 
Either an overt distributivity operator or a dependent indefinite may serve this 
purpos. I conclude that the presence or absence of dou or ge in a context with an 
indefinite is the result of the status of the indefinite being a dependent indefinite or 
a plain indefinite. A plain indefinite requires the presence of a distributivity marker 
to express distributivity, but a dependent indefinite itself is distributive, hence 
making dou or ge unnecessary. Under the proposed analysis, mei has a uniform 
semantics of partitioning the domain of individuals according to the cardinality 
denoted by the numeral and dou is uniformly a distributivity operator across 
contexts. 
    Before ending this section, let me make a further remark on different types of 
mei-NPs. We have to divide mei-NPs into two types depending upon what numeral 
appears after mei. When the numeral is a number greater than one, i.e, ‘mei + 
Num>1+ noun’, the indefinite within its scope must be licensed as a dependent 
indefinite. That is why dou is not allowed in mei+Num>1-NP construction. In 
contrast, when the numeral is the number yi ‘one’, the indefinite within the scope 
of mei+Num=1+NP can be ambiguous between a plain indefinite and a dependent 
indefinite. Therefore, dou/ge is optional when occurring with mei+Num=1+NP. 
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6 Conclusion 
This article provides a new account for the interaction between mei-NPs, dou/ge 
and indefinites. Mei-NPs can be divided into mei-+Num>1+NP and 
mei+Num=1+NP and indefinites can be either non-distributive plain indefinites, or 
distributive dependent indefinites. Although mei is lexically specified for a 
syntactic [+Dist] feature and requires the presence of a distributive element in its c-
command domain, it itself is not inherently quantificational. Instead, it introduces 
one partition formation operator and one choice function variable. An indefinite 
within the scope of mei-+Num>1+NP is always licensed as a dependent indefinite. 
Since dependent indefinites are inherently distributive, dou/ge may not occur with 
mei-+Num>1+NP. By contrast, an indefinite within the scope of mei-+Num=1+NP 
can be ambiguous between a plain indefinite and a dependent indefinite. In the 
former case, dou/ge is required. In the latter case, dou/ge may not appear. 
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Quotes as complements: A Kratzerian approach*
Emar Maier
University of Groningen
Abstract I explore the consequences of extending Kratzer’s (2006; 2016) treatment
of that-complements as essentially nominal modifiers, to the domain of quotation.
1 Introduction
In a Festschrift contribution of her own, Kratzer (2006) rejects the traditional
Hintikka-style analysis of attitude verbs as intensional operators:
(1) a. JbelieveKw = lplx8w0 2 Dox(x,w)[p(w0)]
b. JAnn believes that Ortcutt is a spyKw =
8w0 2 Dox(ann,w)[spy(ortcutt,w0)]
She replaces the traditional account with a Neo-Davidsonian one, where attitude
verbs are simply transitive verbs that take ‘contentful’ direct objects (as in (2a),
where ‘believe(e,x,w)’ abbreviates that e is the eventuality of believing x in w), and
it’s these belief objects that are in turn modified by that-clauses (as in (2b)-(2d),
where ‘content(x)’ denotes the set of worlds compatible with x):
(2) a. JbelieveKw = lxle.believe(e,x,w)
b. JthatKw = lplx8w0 2 content(x)[p(w0)]
c. Jthat Ortcutt is a spyKw = lx8w0 2 content(x)[spy(ortcutt,w0)]
d. Jbelieves that Ortcutt is a spyKw =
le9x[believe(e,x,w)^8w0 2 content(x)[spy(ortcutt,w0)]]
e. JAnn believes that Ortcutt is a spyKw = 9e9x[agent(e,ann)^
believe(e,x,w)^8w0 2 content(x)[spy(ortcutt,w0)]]
In the final steps of this derivation, the CP in (2c) combines with the verb (2a)
via Restrict (Chung & Ladusaw 2004), followed by Existential Closure over the
direct object argument, to get (2d). The eventual truth conditions in (2e) are derived
by adding the subject as the agent of the eventuality (or, as Kratzer 2006 puts it,
* I thank Angelika Kratzer for sponsoring my Fall 2017 sabbatical at UMass Amherst, letting me
use her office, and taking the time to discuss semantics with me. This paper collects some thoughts
inspired by our conversations about speech and attitude reports. I also thank the rest of the UMass
Linguistics community for making this a very enjoyable and productive stay. My research (including




as the possessor of the state), and, finally, applying Existential Closure over the
event argument. In short, on Kratzer’s account, believing that Ortcutt is a spy means
believing something (a belief, a proposition, a thought) with the content that Ortcutt
is a spy.
Kratzer’s move essentially relieves the attitude verb of its modalizing duties and
foists them on the complementizer. In a more recent version of the theory (Kratzer
2016), the modalizing function is pushed down even further, into an embedded Mood
feature, in order to deal with harmonic modals/moods and intransitive ‘manner of
speech verbs’. We’ll ignore this complication for now, but we return to it below in
section 4 and beyond.
The selling points of Kratzer’s approach include a unification of the syntax
and semantics of that-complements modifying verbs (3a) and nouns (3b), and an
immediate explanation of the otherwise puzzling inference from (3a) to the clearly
transitive existential generalization (3c).
(3) a. Ann believes/desires/fears that Ortcutt is a spy
b. the belief/desire/fear that Ortcutt is a spy
c. Ann believes/desires/fears something
In this paper I want to extend Kratzer’s analysis, from that-complements to direct
quotation complements, because those show the exact same patterns, i.e. quotations
can modify both verbs (4a) and nouns (4b), and they license existential inferences
(e.g., from (4a) to (4c)):
(4) a. John said, “Ortcutt is a spy”.
b. the sentence/phrase/utterance “Ortcutt is a spy”.
c. John said something.
In earlier work I’ve sketched a simple event semantics for speech reports, where
communicative events themselves have both a content and a form, and that-clauses
and quotations alike express properties of events (Maier 2017).1 The contribution
of the current paper is to explore what happens if we start from Kratzer’s superior
event-based analysis of that-clauses (where, as we just saw, the connection between
the verbal eventuality and the complement is mediated by a direct object), and extend
that to the quotation domain. In sections 2–3, I first show that this extension indeed
allows us to deal with the basic patterns in (4) above. In sections 4–6 I then more
tentatively explore some further consequences of the resulting nominal modification
1 Analyzing indirect speech and attitude reports in terms of ‘contentful events’ is by no means new, cf.
Brasoveanu & Farkas (2007) and Hacquard (2010), in addition of course to Kratzer’s own variety,




account of quotation for the analysis of free indirect discourse, and be like quotatives.
2 Quotation in canonical direct speech
The goal is to extend Kratzer’s analysis of indirect discourse in (2) to a theory of
quotation. As announced, I’m sticking with the 2006 version of Kratzer’s theory for
now, i.e., all the intensionalizing action is in the complementizer. The idea then is that
quotation marks function much like such a complementizer,2 viz. as taking a clause
and turning it into a property of objects, only this time this property characterizes
the linguistic surface form rather than the content of the object. Thus (4a) (Ann said
“Ortcutt is a spy”) comes out meaning that Ann said something of the form Ortcut
is a spy. In the remainder of this section I’ll make this precise.
On Kratzer’s approach, the complementizer takes an intensional type (st) argu-
ment, which we can assume is supplied by applying Intensional Function Application
(IFA, Heim & Kratzer 1998). For direct discourse then, the corresponding operator,
i.e. the quotation operator QUOT, will have to take a ‘linguistic form’ type argument,
supplied by applying Quotational Function Application (QFA, Sudo 2013). To see
how this works, let’s first settle on some notation. Let u be the type of linguistic
forms or expressions, i.e., Du is the set of finite strings of letters in some (phonetic)
alphabet, e.g. abs1f 2 Du and I am an idiot 2 Du. Moreover, every expression in the
object language corresponds to one such string object. We’ll use a common notation
where ‘pI am an idiotq’ in the metalanguage denotes the phonetic string object I am
an idiot corresponding to the object language expression I am an idiot.
Back to the IFA and QFA composition rules. While that denotes a function of
type (st)et, QUOT denotes the following function of type u(et) (where ‘form(x, f )’
means that the linguistic form of x is f ):
(5) JQUOTK = l fulxe[form(x, f )]
I leave possible worlds and other intensional parameters out of my notations from
here on, since quotation itself is strictly speaking extensional in the current formal-
ization. In order to combine QUOT with its complement we use our dedicated new
composition rule QFA, which says that QUOT, as a function with a type u argument,
can combine with an argument a of any type to form a complex [QUOT a], and that
this complex is interpreted by feeding into QUOT not the denotation of a but the
linguistic form corresponding to a .
(6) JQUOT aK = JQUOTK(paq)
2 This may help explain why some languages use the same marker to introduce both direct and indirect
discourse (e.g. Japanese to, and (arguably) Ancient Greek hoti).
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Note that QFA makes the derivation arguably non-compositional as the meaning of
the complex is not determined by the meanings of its parts, but also by the linguistic
form of the argument. One way to save compositionality perhaps would be to say
that determining the surface form of an LF expression is also a kind of interpretation,
viz. a phonological interpretation, and that quotation shows that this interpretation
must be considered semantic as well. Instead of dwelling on this terminological
distraction let’s apply what we have to our example:
(7) a. JQUOT [Ortcutt is a spy]K = lx[form(x,pOrtcutt is a spyq)]
b. JsayK = lxle[say(e,x)]
c. Jsay [QUOT [Ortcutt is a spy]]K =
le9x[say(e,x)^ form(x,pOrtcutt is a spyq)]
As in Kratzer’s original proposal, reviewed in (2), (7c) is derived by Restrict and
Existential Closure. The resulting interpretation of the entire report, (4a), would be
that there is a speech event with John as agent, which is an event of saying something
of the form Ortcutt is a spy.
3 Quotation as a noun modifier
The essence of Kratzer’s account is that that-complements are always noun modifiers,
and now so are quotations. Just to be sure, consider an example of a quotation overtly
modifying a nominal, which was beyond the scope of more traditional approaches
(including my own earlier attempts):
(8) a. JsentenceK = lx[sentence(x)]
b. Jsentence [QUOT [Ortcutt is a spy]]K =
lx[sentence(x)^ form(x,pOrtcutt is a spyq)]
Treating the as a Fregean (et)t operator we can capture constructions like (9) with
just function application:
(9) Jwrite [the [sentence [QUOT [Ortcutt is a spy]]]]K
For all our derivations above to be interpretable, the thing modified by the
quotation must be something that can plausibly be said to have a linguistic form,
i.e., something like an utterance or a sentence. Although dreams, desires, fears,
intentions and beliefs clearly have contents (and hence allow that-complementation),
they don’t plausibly have a genuinely linguistic structure, and hence such nouns and
the corresponding verbs can’t take quotation complements.
(10) a. *the belief/fear/desire “Ortcutt is a spy”
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b. *Ann believes/fears/desires “Ortcutt is a spy”
Interestingly, thoughts are often conceptualized as ‘inner speech acts’ and hence can
have both form and content, which explains why think, unlike believe, can take both
direct and indirect discourse complements (Maier 2017).
4 Intransitive communication verbs
So far I’ve been following Kratzer’s analysis of believe and say as transitive verbs
with internal object arguments built in. In her later work Kratzer (2016) modifies
the analysis to cover complements of intransitive communication verbs (sigh, groan,
etc.) by assuming a silent report feature [say] high in the left periphery of the
embedded clause, above Mood (which in turn functions roughly like the 2006 that,
or our QUOT). Hence:
(11) John sighed, “What now?”
a. LF: John [sighed [[say] [QUOT [What now?]]]]
b. JsighK = le[sigh(e)]
c. J[say] [QUOT [What now?]]K = le9x[say(e,x)^ form(e,pWhat now?q)]
d. J(11a)K = 9e9x[agent(e, john)^ sigh(e)^
say(e,x)^ form(x,pWhat now?q)]
The intransitive in (11b) and the [say]-phrase in (11c) combine via Predicate Modi-
fication, which, after bringing in the external argument and event closure, derives
the final output in (11d). In words: there was an event of John sighing and (thereby)
saying something of the form What now?.
As a bonus, the flexibility of Neo-Davidsonian event semantics let’s us derive the
common ‘fronted quotation’ order, without postulating overt movement (because,
before existential closure over events, both John sighed and the [say]-phrase both
express properties of events):
(12) a. “What now?” John sighed.
b. [[say] [QUOT [What now?]]] [John sighed]
5 A note on free (in)direct discourse
Looking at uses of quotation in actual narratives, we find many cases of unframed or
free-standing quotations:
(13) She sighed and looked down at her hands with dull concentration. “I know
it’s going to be less than two weeks.”
“I wish you’d promise me something.”
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She looked at him with no anger or suspicion, only faint curiosity. “What?”
“Not to read any more until I’m done. . . or until I have to. . . you
know. . . ”
“Stop?”
“Yes. Or until I have to stop”3
Following the Kratzerian reasoning above, at LF all quotations in this passage will
be headed by (at least) a [say]-feature and a QUOT-operator, in order to derive the
intended interpretation as speech reports.4
But then the same goes for free indirect discourse, where speech and thought
attributions are even less clearly marked on the surface.
(14) Mary panicked. The deadline was tomorrow! What on earth was she going
to do?
One of the puzzles of free indirect discourse is that it doesn’t just cause indexical shift
(tomorrow refers to the day after Mary’s supposed panicking, not the day after the
utterance of (14)), but that it really forces a reportative reading: the author/narrator is
not exclaiming, nor desperately asking the reader what Mary should do; the narrator
is merely reporting what the protagonist Mary is exclaiming and asking (sub voce,
presumably). If we weaken the interpretation of the [say] feature to include also
internal/mental speech acts we can assume that its (covert) presence is responsible
for deriving the reportative interpretation in (14), just as with (13).
The resulting analysis would in principle be compatible with both my quotation-
plus-unquotation account of free indirect discourse (Maier 2017), and the competing
indirect-discourse-plus-context-shift accounts of Sharvit (2008) or Eckardt (2014),
because the [say] feature could embed either a QUOT,5 or Kratzer’s modalizing
that/Mood.6 Either way, introducing the [say] feature here addresses Stokke’s (2013)
objection to Schlenker’s (2004) analysis of free indirect discourse – that the latter
focuses exclusively on context shift and fails to account for the ‘commitment shift’
characteristic of report constructions – and it does so by replacing the ad hoc
3 Stephen King, Misery, 1988. New York: Penguin.
4 Whether to further stipulate a covert subject or leave that to pragmatics is a question for future
research.
5 This QUOT should then in turn embed an UNQUOTation operator to deal with unshifted person and
tense features (Maier 2017).
6 Interestingly, as Fabricius-Hansen & Sæbø (2004) and Eckardt (2014) discuss, free indirect discourse
in German can take the Reportative Subjunctive mood, in which case the interpretation is as a speech
report rather than as a thought report. It is not clear to me whether all cases discussed by these authors
are really free indirect discourse (as opposed to ‘unembedded indirect discourse’, cf. Bary & Maier
2014), and if so how best to deal with it, but one possibility to explore would be that there are distinct
[say] and [think] features, selecting for subjunctive or indicative mood.
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‘FID-operator’ of Sharvit (2008) with an independently motivated feature of report
constructions generally.
6 A note on quotative be like
Quotative be like patterns with intransitive speech report constructions like (11)
(John sighed “What now?”):
(15) John was like, “What now?”
6✏ John was like something.
Moreover, like the intransitive sigh, be like is not inherently restricted to speech
reporting (Davidson 2015):
(16) John was like <looks annoyed and sighs>
Thus, it seems natural to assume that the speech report interpretation of (15) arises
due to a transitive [say] feature that in turn licenses QUOT. To ensure a uniform
treatment of the quotative constructions in (15) and (16), let’s first take a closer look
at the latter.
Following Davidson, like denotes the demonstration relation, i.e., it relates a
demonstration event (in this case, the reporter’s annoyed look and sigh), to the
supposedly similar eventuality thereby depicted (in this case, John’s acting similarly
annoyed).
(17) a. JlikeK = ldle[demonstration(d,e)]
b. Jbe like <looks annoyed and sighs>K = le[demonstration(d0,e)] (where
d0 denotes the event of the reporting speaker’s annoyed look and sigh)
c. J(16)K = 9e[agent(e, john)^demonstration(d0,e)]
In words, (16) conveys that there was an eventuality with John as agent which was,
in the contextually relevant ways, similar to the reporting speaker’s annoyed look
and sigh.
Since they take a demonstration argument, be like quotatives most naturally
occur in ‘live modalities’ (like face-to-face spoken conversation or signing) allowing
vivid gestures, sounds, and other iconic actions. However, following Clark & Gerrig
(1990), Davidson goes a step further and suggests that quotation generally be consid-
ered a special case of demonstration. This would mean that the (printed) phrase, in
quotation marks, in (15) can somehow saturate the demonstration argument. More-
over, canonical say reports as discussed above should then be analyzed as involving
demonstration as well, perhaps through a silent like operator. I’ve argued elsewhere
(Maier forthcoming) against such a radical version of the demonstration account, and
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in favor of a hybrid account, where the use of explicit, linguistic quotation (under be
like or say) involves genuine reference to form (giving rise to a linguistic faithfulness
constraint), in addition to an optional demonstration component (giving rise to an
iconic faithfulness constraint).
On the current Kratzerian approach such a hybrid analysis could take the follow-
ing form:
(18) John was like <sighs>What now?<looks annoyed>
a. LF: John [be like d1] [[say] [QUOT [What now?]]] (where d1 denotes
the whole event of the reporter looking annoyed while sighing and
muttering what now?)
b. Jbe like d1K = le[demonstration(d1,e)]
c. J[say] [QUOT [What now?]]K =
le9x[say(e,x)^ form(x,pWhat now?q)]
d. J(18a)K = 9e9x[agent(e, john)^
demonstration(d1,e)^ say(e,x)^ form(x,pWhat now?q)]
In a way, the reporter’s vivid report, represented as a complex event involving
sighing, speaking, and looking annoyed, thus fulfills two functions simultaneously:
it’s a live demonstration of a partly linguistic, partly non-linguistic event, but the
part that can be construed as a linguistic utterance also serve as argument to QUOT.
7 Conclusion
Like Kratzer, and many others, I believe it’s time to ditch the traditional Hintikka-
style account of attitude and speech reports in favor of a Neo-Davidsonian alternative.
But such a move can take different forms, each with their own merits and motivations.
For me, the primary motivation has been to better understand the various forms
of quotation and their relations to indirect speech and attitude reports. Kratzer’s
original motivation seems to have been a better understanding of complementation.
In this squib I try to bring Kratzer’s significant insights into complementation to
the quotational domain. What I hope to have shown is that Kratzer’s approach has
significant benefits there as well, as it sheds new light on such recalcitrant phenomena
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Clauses as semantic predicates: difficulties for possible-worlds 
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$EVWUDFW  The standard view of clauses embedded under attitude verbs or 
modal predicates is that they act as terms standing for propositions, a view that 
faces a range of philosophical and linguistic difficulties. Recently an alternative 
has been explored according to which embedded clauses act semantically as 
predicates of content-bearing objects. This paper argues that this approach 
faces serious difficulties when it is based on possible worlds-semantics. 
It outlines a development of the approach in terms of truthmaker theory 
instead. 
The standard view of clauses when they are embedded under attitude verbs or 
modal predicates is that they act as singular terms standing for propositions. There 
are a range of difficulties for that view, though, which have motivated an 
alternative approach to the meaning and semantic contribution of embedded 
sentences. According to that approach, clauses act as predicates of content-
bearing objects, such as mental states,  cognitive or illocutionary acts or products 
of such acts, and modal objects (entities like obligations and permissions), objects 
that may be given by the content of the embedding predicate or the discourse 
context. In this paper, I want to point out some serious difficulties for possible-
worlds semantics that arise when clauses embedded under attitude verbs or modal 
predicate are considered predicates of content-bearing objects. I will propose 
instead a situation-semantic account, based on the notion of an exact truthmaker 
or satisfier in the sense of Fine (2014, 2017). This account allows embedded 
sentences to apply to content-bearing objects of various sorts in virtue of a single 
meaning, and it can provide a more adequate semantics of what Kratzer (2016) 
calls ‘harmonic modals’. 
1   The standard view of clausal complements of attitude verbs and of modal 
sentences 
Let me start with the standard view of clausal complements of attitude verbs of 
the sort of assume and hope, before turning the attention to sentences embedded 




      The standard view of clausal complements of attitude verbs as in (1a) is that 
they act as singular terms standing for propositions, which in turn act as 
arguments of the embedding attitude verb. Formally, this is what I call the 
Relational Analysis (Moltmann 2003, 2013a), given for (1a) in (1b):1 
(1) a. John assumes that Mary is happy.
b. assume(John, [that Mary is happy])
Propositions are generally taken to play three roles: to be (the primary bearers) of 
truth values, the meanings of sentences (or referents of embedded clauses), and 
the contents or ‘objects’ of propositional attitudes. There are both linguistic and 
philosophical difficulties for the Relational Analysis.2 First the Relational 
Analysis is considered problematic in that it fails to make a distinction between 
the content and the object of an attitude (treating  propositions as things agents 
have attitudes to, rather than as the contents of attitudes). Second, there are 
problems for the notion of an abstract proposition as such, which are a major topic 
of discussion in contemporary philosophy of language (they concern in particular 
the graspability and truth-directedness of propositions). But also the linguistic 
plausibility of the Relational Analysis has been put into question. The difficulties 
it raises include accounting for the Substitution Problem, the problem of the 
unacceptability of (2b) as an inference from (2a), and the Objectivization Effect, 
the difference in the understanding between (3a) and (3b): 
(2) a. John assumed that S
b. ??? John assumed the proposition that S.
(3) a. John fears that S
b. John fears the proposition that S.
Another issue concerns the analysis of nominal constructions. It has long been 
observed that clausal complements of nouns as in (4) do not behave like 
arguments, since they are not obligatory even if the verb requires a complement: 
(4) John’s assumption that S
1 I chose the verb assume, rather than think or believe.  I consider think a verb of (internal) saying, 
involving a different semantics than verbs like  assume , conclude, or claim (Moltmann 2017b). 
Moreover, believe arguably involves a different semantics as well (Fn 8). 
2 See Moltmann (2003, 2013 chap 4, 2014) and reference therein. 
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Moreover, semantically, the clausal complement seems to stand for something 
closely related to what the nominal construction stands for, a proposition-like 
object, rather than providing an object entering a thematic relation to the event 
described by the verb. Clauses can also be complements of underived nouns, 
where they could not possibly fill in an argument position, as in the idea that S 
and the thesis that S (Moulton 2009). Yet, the semantic relation of the denotation 
of the clausal complement to the denotation of the entire NP is not plausibly that 
of identity: an assumption, idea, or thesis is not just a proposition, but rather, more 
plausibly, the (non-physical) product of a cognitive act in the sense of 
Twardowski (1911) (Moltmann 2014, 2017a) 
      The syntactic status of clausal complements of nouns, though, is far from 
obvious and there is a significant syntactic controversy surrounding it. Some 
researchers assimilate them to relative clauses (Arseneviç 2009, Moulton 2009, 
Kayne 2010).3 Others have argued against such an assimilation (de Cuba 2017). 
The proposal that I will discuss later, that clauses semantically act as predicates, 
would go along well with the view that clausal complements of nouns, and even 
verbs, are relative clauses. But the proposal is not strictly tied to that syntactic 
view. It is compatible with a different syntactic analysis of complement clauses, 
as long as the analysis permits them to be in some way interpreted as properties.4 
      There are also various phenomena where the choice of a category or 
expression in the clause (mood or modals) appears to depend on the semantics of 
the embedding verb and which thus indicate that the clause does not act as a 
referentially independent singular term. Such phenomena were Kratzer’s  main 
motivations for pursuing the approach of clauses as semantic predicates. In 
particular, as Kratzer (2016) points out, deontic modals with relevant sorts of 
speech act verbs as below display two readings, one of which does not contribute 
to the content of the reported speech but simply reflects the inherent modality 
associated with the embedding predicate: 
 
(5) He motioned / proposed / insisted / suggested / recommended / advised /    
 demanded / petitioned / urged / begged / requested / required / wanted / 
 pleaded that we should set up an emergency fund. (Kratzer 2016) 
 
Such modals are what Kratzer calls harmonic modals. Harmonic modals are not 
available with verbs of saying of the sort say, mention, claim, etc.  
     There are, as expected, also harmonic uses of modals of possibility, with 
suitable embedding verbs: 
																																								 																				
3 Kayne (2010) in fact takes the view that all complement clauses are relative clauses. 
4 In fact, even some relative clauses, unrestrictive relative clauses, have been analysed not as 




(6) a. John made Mary the offer that she could use the house.
b. The document indicates that Bill might be guilty.
c. John suggested that Bill might be at home.
For Kratzer, harmonic modals indicate that complement clauses are not 
referentially independent. They spell out the inherent modality of the content-
bearing object of which the clause is to be predicated (a motion, proposal, 
suggestion, recommendation, or offer, for example). 
      Let me briefly turn to the standard view of modals. The standard view of 
modals consists in the quantificational analysis according to which a modal of 
necessity as in (7a) stands for a universal quantifier ranging over possible worlds, 
as in (7b), and a modal of possibility as in (8a) for an existential quantifier, as in 
(8b): 
(7) a. John needs to leave.
b. ∀w’(w’ ∈ f(w) → [John leave]w’ = true)
(8) a. John is allowed to leave.
b. ∃w’(w’ ∈ f(w) &  [John leave]w’ = true)
Here, the contextually given function f maps the world w in which the entire 
sentence is evaluated to the relevant set of worlds, the modal base. The 
quantificational account of modals was extended to verbs expressing belief and 
knowledge by Hintikka (1962), and the Hintikka-style analysis has since become 
a common approach to the semantics of attitude verbs in natural language 
semantics. The assimilation of attitude verbs to modals has been used, for 
example, to account for the presupposition projection behavior of the complement 
of attitude verbs (Heim 1992) and for the understanding of epistemic modals in 
the complements of attitude verbs (Anand /Hacquard 2013). Thus (9a) on that 
view has the truth conditions in (9b), where belw, j is the set of worlds compatible 
with what John believes in w: 
(9) a. John believes that S
b. ∀w’(w’ ∈ belw, j à [S]w’ = true)
(9b) can be reformulated straightforwardly making use of a proposition p (the set 
of worlds in which the complement clause  S is true) as an argument of the 
attitude verb: 
(9) c. believe(j, p) iff  ∀w’(w’ ∈ belw, j  à w’ ∈ p).
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The modal analysis of attitude verbs has generally been applied only to attitude 
verbs that are taken to involve universal quantification over worlds, such as belief 
and knowledge.5 It is not obvious that there are verbs expressing mental attitudes 
that are correlates of modals of possibility and thus would involve not universal, 
but existential quantification over worlds. Yet, at the same time, it is not obvious 
that there aren’t. For example, there seem to be uses of think that function that 
way; thinking in the sense of taking a possibility into consideration (and so of 
course for  hypothesize). Clearly, there are speech act verbs that correspond to 
modals of possibility. While an act of promising or demanding may result in an 
obligation, an act of allowing results in a permission and acts of inviting and 
offering in invitations and offers, modal objects associated with possibility, not 
necessity. 
      There is a notorious problem for possible-worlds semantics to account for 
explicit or heavy permissions, as opposed to implicit or light permissions.6 The 
distinction between the two sorts of permissions is well-reflected in English, in 
the contrast between simple predicates (be + impersonal adjectival passive) as in 
(10a), which display the light reading (as well as a heavy one), and complex 
predicates (light verb + nominal), as in (10b, c), which display the heavy reading: 
(10) a. Mary is permitted to take a walk.
b. Mary has the permission to take a walk.
c. John gave the permission for Mary to take a walk.
The possible-worlds-based account would give the same semantics to the two 
sorts of permission sentences: for a permission sentence such as (10a) or (10c) to 
be true, the clausal complement would have to be true in some world compatible 
with the agent’s obligations. But having a permission means more than that: it 
means that there was an act whose content is, at least in part, given by the 
complement clause and whose product, the permission, can be taken up by 
performing the act described by the complement clause. Moreover, giving or 
receiving a permission does involve a change, but not in the set of worlds 
compatible what the agent is obliged to do. Rather it involves a change in a set of 
options to act that are at the agent’s disposal. 
     A similar issue arises for epistemic modals (and epistemic or doxastic attitude 
verbs), which arguably display the same sort of distinction between weak and 
strong readings (Przyjemski 2017). 
5 Some attitude verbs have been taken to impose an ordering of preference along worlds such as 
want, wish, be happy (Heim 1992). 




        The difference in the predicates in (10a) and in (10b, c) is revealing as to 
what is going on with light and heavy permission readings. The complex 
predicates in (10a, b) involve explicit reference to a permission, the product of an 
act of permission, and the complement clause serves to give the content of that 
product, as I will argue in the next section. By contrast, (10a) contains a stative 
predicate is permitted to describing a deontic state, rather than the product of an 
act, and it is that state that the complement relates to. The heavy reading thus will 
go along with the compositional semantics of complex predicates as in (10a, b), 
and the light or heaving reading with that of a simple stative predicate. Note that 
action verbs like  offer and invite, can only serve to describe explicit forms of 
permission. 
2    Clauses as semantic predicates 
In order to account for the various problems that arise for the view that clauses act 
as singular terms standing for propositions, an alternative view has been pursued, 
namely according to which clauses act semantically as predicates of a content-
bearing object that is given by the semantic or pragmatic context (Kratzer 2006, 
2016, Moulton 2009, Moltmann 2014, 2017a, b, c).  
      Let me briefly elaborate a version of the view according to which clauses act 
as semantic predicates predicated of a content-bearing object, such as a claim, an 
assumption, a permission, or an obligation (Moltmann 2014, 2017a, b, c). For the 
present purpose it suffices to assume that a clause acts as a predicate of a content-
bearing object by specifying its truth or satisfaction conditions.7  
       A first question to address is: where does the content-bearing object come 
from of which the clause is predicated? For different kinds of embedded clauses, 
the content-bearing object may have different sources. For complements of so-
called volunteered-stance verbs such as assume and fear, the object should be 
closely related to the Davidsonian event argument.8 In the case of the verb fear, 
this would be the state of fear that is the event argument of fear. Thus, (11a) will 
have the logical form in (11b):  
(11) a. John fears that S.
b. ∃e(fear(e, j) & [S](e))
7 Another way for clausal complements to act as predicates of content-bearing objects is by 
specifying their structured content or even form, namely when a clausal complement is an indirect 
and direct quote (Moltmann 2017b). 
8 See Cattell (1978) for the notion of a volunteered-stance verb as well as that of a response-stance 
verb. The two sorts of verbs, Cattell argues, behave differently syntactically.  
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In the case of assume, the content-bearing object is more plausibly the product 
product(e) of the act e of assuming, the assumption. The assumption is the bearer 
of representational properties and truth conditions, unlike the act of assuming, 
which intuitively lacks such properties (Twardowksi 1911, Moltmann 2003, 2013, 
2014, 2017a). Thus, (12a) will have the logical form in (12b): 
(12) a. John assumes that S.
b. ∃e(assume(e, j) & [S](product(e)))
This analysis straightforwardly accounts for nominal constructions as in (13a), 
which would be analysed as in (13b), with the that-clause acting as a predicate of 
the referent of the NP: 
(13) a. John’s assumption that S
b. ιd[assumption(d, j) & [S](d)]
The nominalization in (13a) is semantically related to the verb in that (13b) is 
synonymous with ιd[∃e(assume(e, j) & d = product(e) & [S](d))].9 
     Not all embedded clauses should lead to a logical form as in (11b) or (12b). 
Such an analysis is hardly applicable to factive verbs, where the complement 
more plausibly characterizes a fact (however that may be conceived), in addition 
to perhaps characterizing the content of a mental state or act. It is also implausible 
for response-stance verbs such as agree, deny, repeat or confirm, where the 
complement arguably characterizes a contextually given content bearer (a claim, 
rumor, or suggestion, for example), in addition to characterizing (the product of) 
the act described by the verb. Thus, (14a) would have the logical form in (14b), 
where d is a suitable contextually given content bearer (Moltmann 2017c):10 
(14) a. John agreed that S.
b. ∃e(agree(e, j) & [that S](product(e)) & [that S](d))
Also a clause in subject position with a predicate like is true arguably gives the 
content of a contextually given content-bearer (e.g. a claim, rumor, or suggestion) 
(Moltmann 2015a): 
(15) That S is true.
9 There is an issue whether the verb of the nominalization is semantically prior, see Moltmann 
(2017a). 
10 Kratzer (2016) also proposes such an account for believe, which, she argues, behaves 
syntactically different from verbs like think  and assume regarding its clausal complement. 
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The general view that clauses act semantically as predicates of content-bearing 
objects naturally carries over to modals as well. This is most intuitive for deontic 
modals as in it is obligatory to do V and it is permitted to do V (Moltmann 2015b, 
2017a). (Deontic) modals arguably take as implicit (Davidsonian) arguments 
entities that I call modal objects, entities of the sort of needs, obligations, and 
permissions. Modal objects may be produced by an illocutionary act (of 
demanding, promising, or permitting). As such, they have the status of (abstract) 
artifacts (in the sense of Thomasson 1999), for example as laws or rules. But they 
need not be the product of an illocutionary act. What is important about modal 
objects rather are their characteristic properties, most importantly that they come 
with satisfaction conditions: a need may be satisfied; a promise fulfilled, a 
permission or offer taken up.  The clausal complement of a modal predicate (or 
the subject clause or prejacent) then serves to give the satisfaction conditions of 
the modal object that is the implicit argument of the embedding verb. (17a) and 
(18a) will thus have the logical forms in (17b) and (18b) respectively: 
(16) a. John needs to leave.
b. ∃d(need(d) & [John to leave](d))
(17) a. John is permitted to leave.
b. ∃d(permission(d) & [John to leave](d))
How does a clause characterize the content of a content-bearing object, that is, 
what property of content-bearers does it express?  Given possible-worlds 
semantics, the property below would be the most obvious candidate, a view 
endorsed by Kratzer (2006, 2016) and Moulton (2009): 
(18) [S] = λd[∀w(w ∈ f(d) à  S is true in w)]
Here f(d) is the set of worlds compatible with the content of d (or in which the 
conditions represented by d are fulfilled). f thus represents the modality associated 
with the content-bearing object d, and various features or elements of the clause S, 
according to Kratzer, may relate to it. 
      There is a problem, however, with the possible-worlds-based property in (16), 
and that is that it could apply only to modal objects of necessity, not of 
possibility. In application to modal objects of possibility, it would have to stand 
for the property below, given the standard view of modals of possibility:	
(19) [S] = λd[∃w(w ∈ f(d) & S is true in w)]
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But then clauses as complements of modal predicates as in (17a) and (18a) would 
not have a single meaning, but would be ambiguous, depending on the lexical 
meaning of the embedding predicates. This of course violates compositionality. 
The very same compositionality problem arises for complements of speech act 
verbs associated with necessity and with possibility (demand, request vs give the 
permission, invite, offer).  
      In addition to the problem for compositionality, of course, the possible-worlds 
account is just not applicable to explicit permissions and obligations (and explicit 
doxastic and epistemic attitudes).11 
3    A different approach: clauses expressing truthmaker-based properties 
Possible-worlds semantics thus faces serious difficulties with complements of 
verbs describing explicit attitudes and speech acts, content-bearing objects 
described by underived nouns, with explicit obligations and permissions. 
Furthermore, it is unable to provide a single meaning of clauses applicable to 
embedding predicates (or nouns) associated with different modal forces. 
   In what follows, I will sketch an alternative to the possible-worlds-based 
account. It uses situations or actions instead of possible worlds and makes use of 
the exact truthmaking relation of Fine’s recent truthmaker semantics.  The 
advantages of that account will be first that it applies to explicit permissions as 
well as explicit attitudes and second that it allows for a single meaning of clauses 
applicable to content-bearing objects associated with different modal forces. 
      Here is a very brief outline of Fine’s (2014, 2017, to appear a, b) truthmaker 
semantics, which should suffice for the present purposes. Truthmaker semantics 
involves a domain of situations or actions containing actual, possible, as well as 
impossible situations and actions. This domain is ordered by a part relation and is 
closed under fusion. A situation or action s stands in the relation ╟	 of exact 
truthmaking (or exact satisfaction) to a sentence S just in case s is a truthmaker of 
S and s is wholly relevant for the truth of S. ╟ applies to both declarative and 
imperative sentences: declarative sentences are made true by situations that are 
their exact truthmakers; imperatives are complied with by actions that are their 
exact satisfiers. 
      The following standard conditions on the truthmaking of sentences with 
conjunctions, disjunctions, and existential quantification then hold:12  
11 Fine (to appear a, b) gives distinct accounts of deontic modals of possibility and of necessity 
within truthmaker semantics. This will raise the very same problem for compositionality if clauses 
are treated as semantic predicates.  
12 The truthmaking condition for sentences with universal quantification and conditionals are less 
obvious and would require a lot more discussion. 
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(20) a. s ╟ S and S’ iff for some s’ and s’’, s = sum(s’, s’’) and s’╟ S and
     s’’╟ S’. 
b. s╟ S or S’ iff s╟ S or s╟ S’.
c. For a one-place property P, s ╟ ∃x S iff s╟ S[x/d]  for some individual d
Truthmaker semantics assigns sentences not only truthmakers or verifiers, but 
also falsifiers, situations or actions that are falsemakers of a sentence and wholly 
relevant for the sentence being false. This allows a straightforward formulation of 
the truthmaking conditions of negated sentences: a truthmaker for ¬ S is a 
falsifier for S. With ╢	as the relation of (exact) falsification (or contravention), the 
condition on the truthmaking of a negated sentence is given below: 
(21) s╟	not S iff s ╢	S
Also complex sentences are assigned both truthmaking and falsemaking 
conditions. For conjunctions and disjunctions the false-making conditions are 
those below: 
(22) a. s ╢	S and S’ iff s ╢	S or s ╢	S’
b. s ╢	S or S’ iff for some s’ and s’’, s = sum(s’, s’’) and s’ ╢	S and s’’╢ S’
A sentence S has as its meaning a pair <pos(s), neg(S)> consisting of a positive 
denotation, the set pos(S) of verifiers of S, and a negative denotation, the set 
neg(S) of falsifiers of S. In what follows, I will not make use of the positive and 
negative denotation of a sentence, but just of the meaning of a sentence S as a 
property of content-bearing objects, namely [S].  
      We can now turn to formulating the meaning of a sentence as a property of 
content-bearing objects. First of all, let us note that sentences may underspecify 
the truth conditions of a modal or attitudinal object. Complement clauses may 
underspecify an attitudinal or modal object with respect to its satisfaction 
conditions (as well as, of course, in other respects).  One case of such 
underspecification has recently been discussed by Graff Fara (2013), namely 
desire reports in which the clausal complement underspecifies the satisfaction 
conditions of the reported desire, as in Graff Fara’s example below: 
(23) Fiona wants to PRO catch a fish.
The desire described by (23) is not simply satisfied in case Fiona catches some 
fish or other. It is satisfied only when she catches a fish suitable for eating, for 
example. In a desire report, the clausal complement of the desire verb may give 
only necessary, not sufficient conditions on the satisfaction of the reported desire. 
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This is captured by assigning to a sentence S as its meaning the property of modal 
or attitudinal objects in (24): 
(24) [S] = λd[∀s(s ╟ d → ∃s’(s’╟ S & s < s’) & ∀s’(s’╟ S  à ∃s(s ╟ d & s <
s’))]
That is, a sentence S expresses the property that holds of a modal or attitudinal 
object d just in case every satisfier of d is part of a satisfiers of S and every 
satisfier of S contains a satisfier of d as part – or in other words, the content of S is 
a partial content of the content of d (Fine 2017). In (24), ╟ is the relation of exact 
truthmaking or satisfaction now holding between situations or actions s and modal 
or attitudinal objects d as well as sentences. 
     The relation ╟ as a relation between situations or actions and modal or 
attitudinal objects comprises different satisfaction relations reflected in the use of 
different satisfaction predicates in natural language applicable to modal and 
attitudinal objects. They include the truthmaking, satisfaction, fulfillment, 
acceptance, and compliance relation.  
(24) cannot yet be adequate, though, since it would not allow distinguishing
necessity and possibility semantically. Given (24), a permission (for Mary to enter 
the house) could be a modal object with the very same satisfaction conditions as 
an obligation (for Mary to enter the house). But the permission for Mary to enter 
the house is not an obligation for Mary to enter the house.  
        What distinguishes a permission from an obligation? Permissions allow for 
certain actions, those they permit. Obligations allow for certain actions, those that 
comply with them, but they also exclude certain actions, those that violate them. 
The permission for Mary to enter the house allows for actions of Mary entering 
the house, but does not exclude any other actions. By contrast, the obligation for 
Mary to enter the house allows for actions of Mary entering the house and 
excludes actions of Mary’s not doing so. This means that permissions have only 
satisfiers, whereas obligations have both satisfiers and violators. Also 
illocutionary products can be distinguished in terms of having violators or not. An 
offer or an invitation has only satisfiers, but no violators. By contrast, a request or 
an order has both satisfiers and violators.   
      To account for that difference requires modifying (24) by adding a condition 
on the falsification or violation or the modal or attitudinal object, namely that 
every falsifier of the sentence also be a falsifier or violator of the modal or 
attitudinal object (Moltmann 2018). The notion of violation or falsemaking ╢ will 
now be a relation between actions or situations and modal or attitudinal objects or 
else sentences. The modified meaning of a sentence S then is as follows: 
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(25) [S] = λd[∀s(s ╟ d → ∃s’(s’╟ S & s < s’) & ∀s’(s’╟ S  à ∃s(s ╟ d & s <
s’)) & ∀s(s ╢ S → s ╢ d, in case neg(d) ≠∅]
That is, a sentence S expresses the property that holds of a modal or attitudinal 
object d just in case the content of S is a partial content of d and if every exact 
falsifier of S is exact falsifier of d, should there be falsifier or violator of d. 
      On this account, modals of necessity and modals of possibility lead to exactly 
the same logical form; but they involve different sorts of modal objects with 
different satisfaction and violation conditions. Thus, (26a) and (26b) will have the 
logical forms in (27a) and (27b) respectively, involving the very same meaning of 
the complement clause in (28): 
(26) a. John asked Mary to come to his house.
b. John allowed Mary to come to his house.
(27) a. ∃e(ask(e, j, m) & [Mary come to his house](product(e)))
b. ∃e(allow(e, j, m) & [Mary come to his house](product(e)))
(28) [Mary to come to his house] = λd[∀s(s ╟ d → ∃s’(s’╟ Mary to come to his
house &  s < s’) & ∀s’(s’╟ Mary to come to his house à ∃s(s ╟ d & s <
s’)) & ∀s(s ╢ Mary to   come to his house → s ╢ d, in case neg(d) ≠∅]
Unlike the possible-worlds-based account of attitude verbs and modals, this 
account applies to explicit permissions and obligations. If the object d to which a 
clause S applies is a permission, then S will specify which sorts of actions will be 
exact satisfiers of d; S will not just say what is true in some world in which d is 
satisfied. If d is an obligation,  then a clause S applying to it will specify what 
sorts of actions fulfill d and what sorts of actions violate it; S will not just say 
what is true in all worlds in which d is fulfilled (which may not content-wise 
relate to the fulfillment of d).  
      The account is thus tailored to explicit (strong or heavy) permissions and 
obligations. Would it also account for implicit (weak or light) permissions and 
obligations? The answer is yes, since these would simply be different modal 
objects, modal objects that are not products of illocutionary acts, but states 
(however they may have been set up) that come with a greater range of satisfiers 
and violators. 
4     Another application: harmonic modals 
Kratzer (2016) proposes an account of harmonic modals based on a possible-
worlds-based property meaning of clauses.  She focuses on modals of necessity as 
in (29a) and proposes that the harmonic modal in the embedded clause spells out 
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universal quantification over possible worlds that make up the content f(d) of the 
content-bearing object d, as in (29b): 
(29) a. John requested that Mary should leave.
b. λd[∀w(w ∈ f(d) → [Mary leave]w = true)]
One major problem for this account is that it is inapplicable to modals of 
possibility, as in (6a-c), repeated below: 
(30) a. John made Mary the offer that she could use the house.
b. The document indicates that Bill might be guilty.
c. John suggested that Bill might be at home.
(31) does not make sense as the meaning of the clauses in (30a-c), with the
existential quantifier spelling out the contribution of could or might:
(31) λd[∃w(w ∈ f (d) & [S]w = true)]
In (30a), the that-clause does not just specify what is the case in some world 
compatible with the content of the offer, that is, in which John’s offer is taken up. 
Rather it states (at least) what is the case in all the worlds in which the offer is 
taken up. Similarly in (30b), the that-clause does not just say what is the case in 
some world compatible with what the document indicates, but what is the case in 
all such worlds, and so for (30c).  
        In fact, the content of the offer, indication, or suggestion in (30a-c) should 
not be considered the modal base determining the possible worlds in which the 
complement clause is to be evaluated. In the case of a light permission the modal 
base consists in the agent’s obligations and not in what he or she is permitted to 
do.  There is no correlate of that, however, for offers, indications, or suggestions. 
This, again, means that the possible-worlds-based analysis of modals of 
possibility is just unsuited for ‘heavy’ content-bearing objects. These include not 
just explicit permissions, but also offers, suggestions, and indications. 
      The truthmaker-based semantics of clauses as semantic predicates allows for a 
straightforward account of harmonic modals, by considering harmonic modals as 
performative uses of modals in embedded contexts.13  
       The semantics of performative modals will be parallel to that of sentences 
with a performative use of an illocutionary verb. Sentences with a performative 
use of an illocutionary verb such as (32a) and (32a) can be assigned as their 
13 With the performative use of a modal a speaker puts forward a modal state of a affairs described 
by the sentence. For the notion of a performative use of a modal see Portner (2007). 
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meaning the properties of illocutionary products in (33a) and (33b), where s is the 
speaker of the utterance:  
(32) a. I ask you to leave.
b. I allow you to leave.
(33) a. λd[∃e(ask(e, s) & d = product(e) & [(addressee) leave](d))]
b. λd[∃e(allow(e, s) & d = product(e) & [(addressee) leave](d))]
That is, a performative use of an illocutionary verb leads to the sentence 
expressing a property meant to hold of the illocutionary product produced by 
uttering the sentence. Similarly, sentences with a performative use of a modal 
such as (34b) and (34b) will express properties of modal products meant to be 
produced by uttering the sentence, as in (35a) and (35b): 
(34) a. You must leave!
b. You may leave!
(35) a. λd[must(d) & [(addressee) leave](d)]
b. λd[may(d) & [(addressee)  leave](d)]
A modal product can be produced by the very same illocutionary act as an 
illocutionary product, and it will have the very same satisfaction conditions as the 
illocutionary product (Moltmann 2017a). Thus, an act of demanding produces a 
demand as well as possibly an obligation, and an act of permitting produces both 
a permission in the sense of an illocutionary product and a permission in the sense 
of a modal product. 
     With a harmonic modal having the status of a performative use of a modal in 
an embedded context, (36a) will simply have the logical form in (36c) based on 
the meaning of the embedded clause in (36b): 
(36) a. John requested that Mary should leave.
b. [that Mary should leave] = λd[should(d) & [Mary leave](d)]
c. ∃e(request(e, John) & [that Mary should leave](modal-product(e)))
Similarly (37a) will have the logical form in (37c), based on (37b): 
(37) a. The document indicates that Bill might be guilty.
b. [that Bill might be guilty] = λd[might(d) & [Bill be guilty](d)]
c. ∃e(indicate(e, [the document]) & [that Bill might be guilty](modal- 
                product(e))) 
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Thus, truthmaker semantics combined with an ontology of modal objects permits 
an account of harmonic modals based on a single truthmaker-based meaning of 
embedded (and independent) sentences. 
5     Summary 
There are a range of semantic and syntactic reasons to consider clauses semantic 
predicates of content-bearing objects. However, possible-worlds semantics turns 
out to be unsuited for developing that view. In this paper, I have outlined a 
particular version of truthmaker semantics which allows assigning sentences a 
single meaning as a property of content-bearing objects of different sorts, 
including implicit (light) and explicit (heavy) permissions. In addition, this 
account provides a straightforward analysis of harmonic modals. 
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University of Nantes / LLING - UMR 6310 
Abstract   Diagnostics for indexicality reveal that some constituents exhibit an 
indexical behavior that goes beyond that of any inherently indexical words they 
contain.  I suggest that this is because unpronounced indexicals can occupy world 
argument positions associated with predicates. 
1   A familiar picture … 
In this paper, I will be looking at the consequences of a familiar picture of 
sentence interpretation issuing from Kaplan 1977. The picture is designed to 
account for a phenomenon that we find in sentences like those in (1).  When these 
sentences are used to make a claim, the truth of that claim depends on very 
specific details of the situation in which the sentence is uttered: on who uttered it, 
to whom, when. And this obviously has to do with the existence of particular 
words in the sentence: I, you, today.   
(1) a. I am Danish.
b. You are Belgian.
c. Today is Wednesday.
The familiar picture I will be exploring starts from the view that, in the case of 
sentences like these, what claim is made by an utterance of the sentence depends 
on details of the situation in which the sentence is uttered. That is, I utter (1a) to 
* For many of my own silent anchors I have Angelika to thank. Her path-breaking remarks, her
support at crucial moments, her friendship have all been hugely consequential for me. Following
my year at UMass, I think that in one way or another I got to see Angelika every year or so –
including at the Gare de l’Est – until 2014 when I presented this material in Tübingen. After that,
there was a discontinuity. A number of things got put on hold. Now that I have finally written up
the talk (much as I gave it, without any significant changes), I hope that the rest of the pattern will
fall back into place too.
So this paper is an attempt to catch up. (I fear some will say on reading it: a few decades late.) 
I am grateful to have had the opportunity to present this work to audiences at NYU and in Kyoto, 
Tokyo and Tübingen back in 2014. I remember thought-provoking observations from Dylan 
Bumford, Stefan Kaufmann, Makoto Kanazawa, Maribel Romero and Philippe Schlenker. The 




make the claim that Orin is Danish, my neighbor utters (1a) to make the claim that 
he is Danish, and so on. And it takes the semantic values of the sentences – the 
objects we compositionally derive on the basis of their syntactic structures – to 
reflect that. According to the picture, the semantic value that we derive from a 
sentence’s structure is a function that gives us a proposition when we supply 
information about the utterance situation – more technically, when we supply an 
object called a “context” whose features are determined by the utterance situation.  
The idea is that, when a speaker utters a sentence like I am Danish, he is saying 
that the sentence’s semantic value, applied to the context that corresponds to the 
utterance situation, gives a true proposition. In the case of I am Danish, for 
example, the semantic value would be a function that accepts a context c and 
yields the proposition that a certain feature of the context cI that corresponds to 
the utterer is Danish. These aspects of the picture are summarized below in (2). 
(2) An idea about semantic values
a. The semantic value of a sentence is a function that accepts “contexts”
(objects of the kind that make up the relevant features of an utterance
situation) and that returns propositions.
b. A speaker may use the semantic value of a sentence to claim that the
proposition that results from applying the “context of utterance” is a
true one.
(2’)  Example1 
 [[ I am Danish ]], given context 1, yields the proposition that Orin is Danish 
 [[ I am Danish ]], given context 2, yields the proposition that Ilea is Danish 
… 
[[ I am Danish ]], given context c, yields the proposition that c
I  (the utterer) is 
Danish 
The picture also says something about how these semantic values are built up 
compositionally – and thus about how I, for example, comes to be responsible for 
the fact that the proposition we derive from I am Danish depends specifically on 
the cI feature of the input context. The main idea here is that every constituent has 
a semantic value that is a function from contexts, from the words up.  Some words 
are just constant functions, but words like I are not: the semantic value of I takes a 
context and yields the feature corresponding to the utterer. Then semantic 
composition generally works in such a way that, if you are a constituent and 
contain something whose semantic value is a non-constant function from 
contexts, then your semantic value will encode the same kind of dependency on 
1 I use “X” for “the syntactic structure of X.” I use “[[ Y ]]” for “the semantic value of Y.” 
Sometimes to talk about semantic values I will write “[[ A ]]” but mean [[ A ]]. 
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context. So, for example, given that the semantic value of me encodes a 
dependency on the “I” feature of the context, the semantic value of related to me 
and of Somebody is related to me will too: 
(3) An idea about composition
a. The semantic value of any constituent is a function from contexts.
b. The rules of semantic composition guarantee that, if the value of one
constituent given a context depends on a particular feature of the context,
then the value of constituents containing it will behave that way too.
c. Generally speaking, when a complex constituent has a semantic value
that encodes a dependency on context, this will have been inherited from
its pieces via the rules of semantic composition.
(3’)  Examples 
[[ me ]], given c, yields cI 
[[ related to me ]], given c, yields the property of being related to cI 
I am not going to question this picture. On the contrary: various arguments 
from language can be given in support of it, and I will review them (in section 3). 
These arguments specifically have to do with the usefulness of saying that 
constituents have semantic values that encode a dependency on particular features 
of the context. My main point will then be the following (in section 4): if we 
accept these arguments, then we are also led to the position that there are 
constituents that encode a dependency on particular features of the context even 
though these constituents don’t contain a pronounced item like I to which we 
could attribute this dependency. What does this mean?  The picture as I presented 
it suggests that, when a constituent behaves like that, this behavior is nonetheless 
inherited from its pieces in some way.  One might conclude, then, that there is an 
unpronounced piece somewhere that is creating the dependency.  This will in fact 
be my conclusion, and (in section 5) I will speculate about what the unpronounced 
pieces are and where we find them.  (Throughout, I will speak of “unpronounced 
indexicality” because I have in mind a technical definition of “indexical” on 
which it means “have a semantic value that is a non-constant function from 
contexts.”) 
It is proper to mention that a lot of what I will be doing has already been 
brought up in another setting – in connection with the old debate about the so-
called “referential” uses of descriptions. I won’t get to that until the final page, 
I’m afraid.   
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2   … fleshed out a bit
In telling the story I just promised to tell, I will be assuming some details that will 
significantly influence the discussion. Here they are, quickly. 
Very importantly for the way I will frame the discussion, I will be assuming 
an ontology involving possible worlds. I will also be assuming that the same 
individual – like me or my neighbor – may inhabit different worlds, and I will be 
assuming that there is a single time line along which events that take place in the 
various worlds are ordered. These assumptions allow me to articulate a bit further 
the familiar picture that I just presented – as follows. 
To begin with, as far as the semantic values of sentences are concerned, I said 
“proposition” but will more precisely take this to mean “function from possible 
worlds to truth values.”2 And I said “context,” but more specifically what I will 
take a context to be is a triple of an individual, a moment on the time line, and a 
possible world.3  So I can rephrase. I said: a speaker who utters a sentence claims 
that the sentence’s semantic value, applied to the context that corresponds to the 
utterance situation, yields a true proposition. I now say4: he claims that the 
sentence’s semantic value, applied to the triple made up of him, the moment of 
utterance and the actual world, yields a function that returns 1 for the actual 
world.  (Accordingly, in talking about a speaker X who utters a sentence at time T 
in world W, I will use the term “context of utterance” for the triple <X,T,W>.)  
To put it another way, a speaker may utter a sentence to claim that in doing so he 
is saying something true, and on this approach “say something true” is to be 
explicated as in (4c) below.  
2 There are some salient alternatives to consider. The objects that we obtain from sentences once 
we supply a context might need more than just a possible world to make a truth value. They might 
instead be properties of times – needing a moment on the time line as well – or “centered 
propositions” – needing an individual too (and thus, overall, all the elements of a context as 
construed just below).  I think it could be useful to review the arguments in section 3 bearing these 
alternatives in mind. 
3 Cf. Haas-Spohn 1995. 
4 For the record, I don’t mean to dismiss altogether the possibility of a speaker using a sentence to 
claim that its semantic value yields a true proposition when applied to some other context. But, 
when it comes to the examples I consider in this paper, I will take the position that the claims 
made concern the utterance context (in the sense here). I think it reasonable to regard this as the 
typical case. 
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(4) Semantic values
a. The semantic value of a sentence, given a context, yields a function from
worlds to truth values.  (Ex. [[ I am Danish ]] = ck. ws. c
I is Danish in w. )
b. Contexts are individual-time-world triples. (Notation: c has members cI,
cT and cW.)
c. A speaker X who uses a declarative sentence S at time T in world W says
something true (… false) when [[S]](<X,T,W>)(W) = 1 (...0).
Then to fill out the picture, as far as semantic composition is concerned, I will 
assume standardly that the composition rules generally pass up the context 
argument. (5) shows what I mean.  The standard notation for this (in the box) uses 
a superscript to talk about application of a semantic value to a context, and it is 
customary in this case to talk about “evaluation at a context.”  I will sometimes 
use that notation (for readability’s sake), but not always. 
(5) Composition
Usual notation 
       [[ I ]] = ck. cI   [[ I ]]c = cI 
       [[ you ]] = ck: cI is addressing someone at cT          [[ you ]]c = cI’s addressee at cT in cW 
      in cW. cI’s addressee at cT in cW (defined only if there is one)  
       [[ Danish ]] = ck. xe. ws. x is Danish in w. [[ Danish ]]c = xe.ws. x is Danish in w. 
       [[ I Danish ]] =  ck. [[Danish]](c) ( [[I]](c) ) [[ I Danish ]]c =  [[Danish]]c  ( [[I]]c)   
      = ck.  ws. cI is Danish in w.           = ws. cI is Danish in w. 
       [[ you Danish ]] = ck. [[Danish]](c) ([[you]](c))       [[you Danish ]]c = [[Danish]]c  ( [[you]]c)   
      =              =  
       (In these cases, composition is via functional application “passing up the context argument.”) 
I can now be a little more precise about the plot as well. I said that the 
discussion would take me to the position that there are constituents that encode a 
dependency on particular features of the context even though they don’t contain 
familiar items like I or you or now.  Specifically, we will see that the constituents 
encode a dependency on the world feature of the context. You can see looking at 
(5) that the way in which we arrive at functions from worlds to truth values has to
do with the fact that predicates select for a world argument.5 What I will suggest
5 Although I didn’t include this for Danish in (5), I assume that predicates can take time arguments 
too. In accordance with my assumption that the semantic values of sentences take us from contexts 
to functions characterizing sets of possible worlds (rather than, say, to properties of times as 
alluded to in fn. 2), I will imagine that matrix present tense generally indicates the presence of an 
indexical time argument. I won’t be very careful with temporal aspects of interpretation in this 
paper – maybe a more careful consideration would lead to a slightly different view about the 
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is that the special indexicality of our constituents arises from a silent indexical 
filling the world argument slot of a predicate. 
3   Arguments for a picture of this kind
In this section I will review arguments for the picture I just described – a picture 
on which sentences have semantic values that are functions from contexts to 
propositions, and on which they are built out of ingredients whose semantic 
values are also functions from contexts, in the way I indicated. (My discussion 
here owes a lot to Heim 2004.6) 
In light of the details I provided in section 2, you can see that there is in fact a 
clear alternative. Look again at (4c) and you will see that, at least when it comes 
to explicating what it means for an uttered sentence to be true, we are not making 
use of all aspects of a sentence’s semantic value. We could have said just the 
same thing by writing the condition as in (4c’) below, so really we are only 
making use of the piece of the semantic value that I underlined there (Stalnaker’s 
“diagonal,” essentially). In the case of I am Danish, this piece comes out to the 
function ck. c
I is Danish in cW , a function that characterizes contexts whose 
individual coordinate is Danish in their world coordinate. This makes one wonder 
if we could instead adopt a picture on which the semantic value of a sentence is 
this simpler function. 
(4) c’. Equivalent to (4c):
A speaker X who uses a declarative sentence S at time T in world W says
something true when c.[[S]](c)(c
W)(<X,T,W>) = 1.
The arguments, then, are arguments that we need the additional structure for 
something. In particular, their point will be that there is a notion that our more 
complicated picture makes available that is relevant for natural language.  
Specifically, our picture allows us to talk about the semantic value of an 
expression evaluated in its utterance context, and this is the notion that turns out 
to be useful. Kaplan calls this an expression’s “content” given its utterance 
context.  I will call it the expression’s “utterance value”: 
semantic values of sentences. I will continue to approximate (probably) and to imagine that 
Danish doesn’t take a time argument.   
6 These lecture notes on indexicality by Irene Heim contain an exceptionally comprehensive and 
rigorous discussion of arguments for the position I am defending here. Heim specifically brings up 
the argument from propositional anaphora in subsection 3.2 (only to return to it more skeptically 
in Heim 2011), and the other arguments I present are largely inspired by her discussion. The 
arguments discussed by Heim build to some degree on remarks in Stalnaker 1970. 
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(6) When a sentence with constituent A is uttered by X at T in W, the utterance
value of A is [[ A ]](<X,T,W>).
For example, the utterance value of I when uttered by me is me, Orin. Similarly, 
the utterance value of I am Danish when uttered by Barack Obama is the 
proposition that Barack Obama is Danish, that is, ws. Obama is Danish in w.   
Here are some phenomena that the notion of utterance value makes it possible, 
or natural, to describe. 
3.1   Ellipsis 
One phenomenon that utterance values seem necessary to describe is ellipsis. My 
examples here will involve VP ellipsis, and I will take the position that they 
literally contain unpronounced VPs (marked “”). To indicate possible 
interpretations for the unpronounced VP, I will write in brackets expressions that 
have those interpretations – and that thus constitute candidates for the VP that 
goes unpronounced:   
(7) A: John thinks that Mary hates Fred.
B: Does he really?  I know he thinks that Jane does  [ hate Fred ].
The kind of example that is of interest to us here is (8). In the context of A’s 
utterance in (8), B’s response can be interpreted in the way the potential response 
in (9a) with hates you would be. It cannot be interpreted in the way the potential 
response in (9b) with hates me would be. So to characterize the way in which we 
are allowed to interpret elided constituents, we need a notion that allows us to 
pinpoint what connection there is between A’s utterance and the potential 
response in (9a) that we do not find between A’s utterance and the potential 
response in (9b) (which nonetheless contains the same literal VP that A’s sentence 
does). 
(8) A: John thinks that Mary hates me.
B: Does he really? I know he thinks that Jane does  [√ hate you, # hate
me].
(9) a. ... B: Does he really?  I know he thinks that Jane hates you.
b. ... B: Does he really?  I know he thinks that Jane hates me.
The notion of utterance value does this. As illustrated in (10), if B had uttered 
the response with hates you, the utterance value of B’s hates you would have been 
the same as the utterance value of A’s hates me, while, if B had uttered the 
response with hates me, the utterance value of B’s hates me would not have been 
the same as the utterance value of A’s hates me. (In (10), for ease of presentation, 
124
    Orin Percus
I include some details that – unless I specify otherwise – I will generally assume 
in this paper when I consider utterances that take place in the same world: the 
utterances take place in a world I call ; the utterances occur on November 8, 
2014.) 
(10) a. [[ hates me ]]c =  xe. ti. ws. In w, at t, x hates cI.
b. [[ hates you]]c = xe.ti. ws. In w, at t, x hates cI’s addressee at cT in cW.
 (9a) :  [[ hates me ]]<A, 08.11.2014..., >  =  xe. ti. ws. In w, at t, x hates A.   
      [[ hates you ]]<B, 08.11.2014..., > = xe. ti. ws. In w, at t, x hates A.   
 (9b) : [[ hates me ]]<A, 08.11.2014..., >  =  xe. ti. ws. In w, at t, x hates A.   
[[ hates me ]]<B, 08.11.2014..., > =  xe. ti. ws. In w, at t, x hates B.   
So the notion of utterance value is useful in describing how we interpret elided 
VPs (or, if you prefer, in describing what VPs can be elided). Apparently, we are 
forced to take the elided VP in (8) as having the same utterance value as a 
constituent of A’s utterance.  In (11) I wrote the generalization that comes to mind 
instantly given the kind of data we have just seen. According to this naïve 
generalization, a VP can only go unpronounced when it has the same utterance 
value as a constituent in its environment.  
(11) Generalization (naive version): The utterance value of an elided VP must be
the same as the utterance value of a constituent of a salient sentence.
I did say that the generalization in (11) is naïve.  There is a lot of controversy 
about how to formulate the identity condition relevant for ellipsis, and nobody 
these days would think that this is all there is to say about the conditions under 
which constituents can be elided. But at the same time I think it is clear that, 
whatever the right condition is, it will have to make reference to utterance values.  
For example, take the view that much discussion in the past two decades has 
started from: a VP can be elided when you can find a constituent including it that 
contrasts with another syntactic constituent in the vicinity. On this view, what lies 
behind the successful interpretation of the ellipsis in (8) would be the fact that B’s 
utterance contains a constituent like [JaneF hate you] that contrasts with the 
constituent [Mary hate me] of A’s utterance7. But, in what sense does the 
constituent [JaneF hate you] of B’s utterance contrast with the constituent [Mary 
hate me] of A’s utterance?  In the sense that, when we consider the alternatives 
evoked by [JaneF hate you] and look at their values at B’s context of utterance 
7 For simplicity, I imagine here that the contrast is between untensed constituents – constituents 
that we have before the level at which the verb’s time argument makes its appearance. My reason 
for writing hate rather than hates is just to make this salient. I don’t wish to take a position on 
where the verbal inflection is (if anywhere) in the structure that is interpreted. 
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(that is, the utterance values they would have had if B had uttered them instead, so 
to speak), we find among them the value of [Mary hate me] at A’s context of 
utterance. Specifically, among the alternatives evoked by [JaneF hate you] is 
[Mary hate you], and [[ Mary hate you ]]<B, 08.11.2014..., > = [[ Mary hate me ]]<A, 
08.11.2014..., >. 
Given what I just said, you can probably see that one can give a similar 
argument on the basis of deaccenting phenomena, where parallel contrasts obtain: 
(12) A: John hates Mary.
B: That’s not surprising given that BILL has a poor opinion of Mary.
(13) A: John hates me.
B: That’s not surprising given that BILL has a poor opinion of you / # me.
I won’t go into this, but what matters for deaccenting seems to be precisely that, 
when we look at the focus alternatives and consider the utterance values they 
would have had, we find among them one that is entailed by the utterance value of 
the antecedent. 
3.2   Anaphora 
Our picture allowed us to describe the ellipsis cases we just saw by saying that the 
utterance value of the elided constituent was the same as the utterance value of a 
constituent in the environment. In fact, the utterance values of nearby constituents 
seem to be relevant to anaphora more generally – a point made explicitly by Heim 
2004, who uses the term “content anaphora.”   
In (14) I give an example along the lines of Heim’s where that is used as a 
“propositional anaphor.” The contrasts in (14) are reminiscent of our ellipsis 
contrasts. We can describe what is happening there by saying that that can be 
resolved in such a way that its utterance value is identical to that of a suitably 
local clause – and that it is not sufficient merely for its semantic value to be the 
same. So there is a second argument for the utility of the notion of utterance 
value.8  
8 Very possibly, the same kinds of considerations that motivate a more sophisticated view of 
ellipsis interpretation can be used to motivate an analogously more sophisticated view of that-
interpretation.  But, as was the case with ellipsis, utterance values would remain important.   
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(14) A: John and I are cousins.
B: That [ # John and I are cousins, √ John and you are cousins ] is unlikely.
B’: That [ # John and I are cousins, √ John and you are cousins ]’s not true.
B’’: I learned that [ # John and I are cousins, √ John and you are cousins ]
       yesterday. 
(15) That can be resolved in such a way that its utterance value is identical to
that of a clause in the environment (and merely having the same semantic
value is not sufficient).
3.3   “Saying the same thing”   
Perhaps relatedly, the notion of utterance value also seems to be useful when it 
comes to explicating what we mean when we say that people “are saying the same 
thing.”9  Consider (16). There is a sense in which A, B and C all “say the same 
thing” here. What is this sense? Arguably, it is that their sentences all have the 
same utterance value: as sketched in (17), each sentence evaluated at its own 
context of utterance yields the same proposition, namely the proposition that New 
York is A’s birthplace. 
(16) A (in NY): I was born here.
B (to A): You were born in NY.
C: A was born in NY
(17) a. [[ I was born here ]]
= ck:...ws. In w, cI is born in the location of cI at cT in cW. 
b. [[ You were born in New York ]]
= ck:...ws. In w, cI’s addressee at cT in cW is born in NY. 
c. [[ A was born in New York ]] = ck.ws. In w, A is born in NY.
 [[ I was born here ]]<A, 08.11.2014, >  = ws. In w, A is born in NY. 
 [[ You were born in New York ]]<B, 08.11.2014..., >
= ws. In w, A is born in NY. 
9 This argument can be seen as reflecting Stalnaker’s (1970) view that utterance values serve as 
the “common content” associated with utterances of different linguistic expressions, together with 
Kaplan’s view that the utterance value of a sentence constitutes “what is said.” It exemplifies a 
form of argument discussed by Heim 2004, according to which utterance values are useful for 
explicating intuitively natural relations between utterances. Frege described the basic intuition 
here in a quote that Kaplan (1977/1989: 501) cites: “If someone wants to say the same today as he 
expressed yesterday using the word ‘today’, he must replace the word with ‘yesterday’. Although 
the thought is the same its verbal expression must be different ….” 
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 [[ A was born in New York ]]<C, 08.11.2014..., > = ws. In w, A is born in NY. 
(18) One sense of “say the same thing” is “utter a sentence with the same
utterance value.”
At this point, it is only fair to mention a skeptical response to this kind of 
argument for the utility of utterance values. As Lewis 1980 emphasizes, there are 
many different ways to understand “say the same thing” and sameness of 
utterance value would correspond to only one of them. To take a simple example, 
there is also a use of “say the same thing” which corresponds to “utter the same 
words”: it thus makes sense to say that, if B had said “I was born here,” then A 
and B would have said the same thing.  But then how useful really is the notion of 
utterance value if it only serves to account for one use of many? Wouldn’t we 
prefer an explication of “say the same thing” that accounts for all its uses and that 
doesn’t need as background a picture that allows us to talk about utterance 
values? The same kind of objection can be levelled against the previous argument.  
Anaphora to utterance values would only correspond to one use of that.  
Reference to utterance values doesn’t seem to be relevant when it comes to the 
deictic use of that, for example (“That was certainly a surprise!”). Wouldn’t we 
prefer a theory of that that accounts for all of its uses and that doesn’t need as 
background a picture that allows us to talk about utterance values? It is possible 
(though perhaps not correct) to read Lewis, and also Heim 2011, as making 
objections of this kind.   
Honestly, I don’t really know what to say against this objection. I do agree 
that it would be nice to have a comprehensive analysis of “say the same thing” 
and of that. But I also think that, if talking about utterance values allows us to 
describe what is happening in the kinds of examples that I just brought up, then it 
is useful to be able to talk about utterance values. Maybe this says something 
about my standards. 
3.4   “A priori but contingent” truth 
Finally, as many people have emphasized in one way or another – notably Kaplan 
– a position on which propositions are the utterance values of sentences gives us a
natural way to describe the special character of sentences like (19a). (19a) is in a
certain sense true a priori – when uttered, we know that it is true simply by virtue
of knowing the language. But at the same time it is contingently true – that is, true
by virtue of the way the world is. This contingent aspect is revealed by the
coherence of the continuation in (19b).
(19) a. I am uttering a sentence now.
 b. But things could have been otherwise!
128
    Orin Percus
Our picture allows us a simple way to explicate this dual character. (19a) is 
true a priori in the sense that, on any occasion of utterance of (19a), its utterance 
value will always be true. But it is contingently true in the sense that the utterance 
value, even if it is true in the world of utterance, will be false in other worlds. For 
example, if I had uttered this sentence on November 8, 2014, the resulting 
proposition, the proposition that Orin is uttering a sentence at the time in question 
on November 8, 2014, would have been true, but this proposition would have 
characterized some worlds and not others: 
(20) [[ (19a) ]]c = ws. In w, at cT,  cI is uttering a sentence.
For any event of (19a)’s utterance by X at T in W, [[ (19a) ]]
<X,T,W> (W) = 1. 
But at the same time, for a given event of (19a)’s utterance, its utterance 
value [[ (19a) ]]
<X,T,W> will be a function that yields different values for 
different worlds. 
(Incidentally, when it comes to the continuation But things could have been 
otherwise, arguably we have another instance of the kind of anaphora we 
considered when we considered that: in this example, the expression otherwise 
behaves like different from that, where that is resolved to the utterance value of 
the first sentence.) 
4   More indexicality than we might have expected 
We have now seen some arguments for our overall picture. The claim at the heart 
of these arguments is that certain phenomena should be described by making 
reference to utterance values – ellipsis, certain kinds of anaphora resolution, and 
so on.   
If we accept this claim, then that means that we can use those kinds of 
phenomena to diagnose utterance values – to draw conclusions about utterance 
values in particular cases. That will be my point of departure now. I will suggest 
that, when we proceed in this way, we discover that some constituents have an 
analysis beyond those we might have expected prior to this discussion, an analysis 
with some extra indexicality. Notably, the indexicality that these constituents 
exhibit implicates the world feature of the context.  
(21) gives an example of what I mean. In (21) I wrote side by side the kind of
semantic value that we would standardly expect for My mother is Danish ((21b)) 
and the kind of semantic value that I am claiming that the sentence has on a 
second analysis ((21c)). The kind of semantic value that we would standardly 
expect is the kind of value we would get, say, if we gave all predicates a variable 
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as their world argument and if we bound all those variables with a binder at the 
top. By contrast, in the second analysis, the world feature of the context plays a 
role. Looking at these two semantic values side by side, you can see that finding 
evidence for the second analysis isn’t easy. Both semantic values are associated 
with the same truth conditions: both imply that, in uttering the sentence, X utters 
something true at T in W if, in W, the mother in W of X is Danish. Their 
utterance values, however, will not generally be the same. This is why our 
diagnostics for utterance values will be important.      
(21) a. My mother is Danish.
b. ck.ws:...  In w, c
I’s mother in w is Danish.
c. ck:...ws. In w, c
I’s mother in cW is Danish.
In what follows, I will concentrate on sentences with definite descriptions. As 
I will make clear later, however, this choice is not crucial. It’s just easier this way 
to construct the kinds of arguments I want to construct. By proceeding in this 
manner, I am staying close to the literature where these issues have come up.  
Others too have taken the position that sentences with definite descriptions may 
be analysed in a way that involves some extra indexicality. I will signal below 
some of the precedents for the arguments I invoke. 
4.1   Ellipsis 
We have seen that we can use ellipsis as a diagnostic for utterance values. I will 
start with that.  In this discussion I will be focusing my attention on the sentence I 
saw the woman on my right – or, to be honest, the fragment “the woman on my 
right” in a context where it very plausibly realizes the sentence I saw the woman 
on my right. The context is this one: 
(22) A (at time T, whispering to B and nodding in Mary’s direction): ... And you
know who I saw at that party twenty years ago?  The woman on my right!
...
If we just think about the truth conditions here, there seems to be a kind of 
temporal indexicality that is relevant to the description. After all, A is saying, in 
effect, “I saw the individual who is a woman now [let’s say she was a girl then] 
and who is on my right now.” What he is saying is true iff, in his world , at a 
certain party twenty years prior to T, A saw the individual who is a woman at T in 
 and who is on the right of A at T in .  But it seems to me that with ellipsis we 
can construct an argument that the sentence has an analysis with even more 
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indexicality than that. We need some elaborate stage directions for this, though, 
so here is the full scene: 
(22’)  A (at time T, whispering to B and nodding in Mary’s direction): ... And you 
know who I saw at that party twenty years ago?  [I saw] The woman on my 
right!        
(Mary gets up and starts walking toward the dance floor. Sally approaches 
and B exchanges a few words with her – she knows that Sally was at that 
long-ago party and wants to verify A’s claim. Sally shakes her head.) 
B (at time T + 15 seconds, to A): Sally thinks you didn’t. 
Intuitively, what B expresses here is that Sally thinks that A didn’t see Mary.  
And this is the result we would get if the VP see the woman on my right had a 
semantic value as in (23a), one that encodes a dependency not only on the 
individual and time coordinates of the context but also on the world coordinate. If 
see the woman on my right has the semantic value in (23a), then the 
corresponding utterance value of see the woman on my right when A utters his 
sentence is the property of seeing Mary ((23b)), and the constraints on ellipsis will 
insure that this is also the utterance value of the elided VP: 
(23) Right for this case:
a. [[ see the woman on my right ]]c
= xe.ti. ws. In w, at t, x sees the individual who is a woman at c
T 
in cW and who is on the right of cI at cT in cW. 
b. [[ see the woman on my right ]]<A,T,>
= xe.ti. ws. In w, at t, x sees Mary.  
Given that the elided VP has the same utterance value, this correctly 
predicts that B’s sentence attributes to Sally the belief that A didn’t see 
Mary. 
By contrast, we would not get the right result from a semantic value for the VP as 
in (24a), where the world argument of the context does not play a role. In that 
case, the corresponding utterance value would be different ((24b)), and the use of 
an elided VP with the same utterance value would wind up expressing a different 
claim. The details are complicated, but B’s sentence would then express a 
proposition whose truth depends on Sally situating herself in a world where there 
131
Silent anchors: the case for unpronounced indexicality 
is an individual to the right of A.10 This is not the right result: in our scenario, B 
clearly does not mean to imply that Sally has an opinion about anyone being on 
the right of A at any point.   
(24) Not right for this case:
 a. [[ see the woman on my right ]]c
= xe.ti. ws: There is a unique individual who is a woman at c
T in 
w and who is on the right of cI at cT in w. In w, at t, x 
sees the individual who is a woman at cT in w and 
who is on the right of cI at cT in w. 
b. [[ see the woman on my right ]]<A,T,>
= xe.ti. ws: There is a unique individual who is a woman at T in w 
and who is on the right of A at T in w. In w, at t, x 
sees the individual who is a woman at T in w and 
who is on the right of A at T in w. 
Given that the elided VP would have the same utterance value, B’s sentence  
would end up attributing to Sally a belief according to which there is a 
woman to the right of A. 
So the conclusion from the ellipsis example seems to be that the VP see the 
woman on my right can have the semantic value in (23a). That will give us the 
utterance value that the elided VP seems to have accessed. This is not necessarily 
to deny that the VP admits an analysis on which it has the semantic value in (24a).  
It is rather to add that it admits an analysis on which it has this other semantic 
value with some extra indexicality.11 One might reasonably speculate that the 
indexicality is present at the level of the definite description: 
10 In a nutshell, this is because the compositional semantics works in such a way that the utterance 
value of the whole complement of think “inherits” the partiality in the utterance value of the elided 
VP. The utterance value of the complement of think thus comes out to be a function whose domain 
is limited to worlds in which there is a single woman at T who is on the right of A at T. 
11 This suggests a possible conjecture: in cases where a sentence admits two different analyses that 
give rise to the same truth conditions, both analyses may be used to provide antecedents for 
ellipsis. The traditional explanations of strict-sloppy ambiguities in ellipsis assumed something 
like this. (And by the way, now that we have found cases of ellipsis whose antecedents seem to 
contain indexical descriptions, I think it worth noting that studies of strict-sloppy identity in 
ellipsis have not taken this into account. It might be useful to revisit them with this in mind.) 
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(25) A possible speculation
[[ the woman on my right ]]c
= the individual who is a woman at cT in cW and who is on the right of 
   cI at cT in cW 
4.2   Propositional anaphora 
The idea here will be similar: that-anaphora diagnoses an utterance value that 
could only have come from a constituent with some extra indexicality. The 
argument from anaphora is actually the main kind of linguistic argument that has 
appeared in the literature for the indexicality of descriptions – see Dahl 1973, and 
the discussion of Stalnaker in Heim 2011. Here is the example to consider12, with 
stage directions again: 
(26) (B enters the office A shares with Mary.)
A (at time T, smiling): My office mate got the University X job!
B: (to Mary) Congratulations, Mary!  I actually learned that yesterday.
(to A) You know, I only realized now that you shared your office. You’re 
lucky to have Mary as an office mate.   
When you learn a proposition, you acquire the belief that the proposition is 
true ((27)).  What is the proposition that B is saying that he learned? It is the 
proposition that Mary got the University X job. So we can explain what is 
happening here if that is resolved in the same way that we imagined earlier, as the 
utterance value of A’s sentence, and if the utterance value of A’s sentence is the 
proposition that Mary got the University X job. This is the result that we get if 
A’s sentence has a semantic value as in (28a), one that gives a role to the world 
coordinate of the context argument: 
(27) [[ learn ]]c
= p<s,t>. xe. ti. ws.  As of t and not earlier, all of x’s candidates in 
w for the actual world are p-worlds  (...and...) 
12 My use of the verb learn in this example echoes an argument from Heim 2004. 
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(28) Right for this case:
a. [[ My office mate got the University X job ]]c
=  ws. In w, prior to c
T, cI’s office mate at cT in cW gets the 
University X job. 
b. [[ My office mate got the University X job ]] <A,T,>
= ws. In w, prior to T, Mary gets the University X job.  
If that receives the same utterance value, this correctly predicts that B’s 
sentence expresses that the proposition he learned the previous day is that 
Mary got the University X job. 
Again, we would not get the right result from a semantic value as in (29a) without 
this little bit of extra indexicality. Using the utterance value that this generates 
would amount to B conveying that, as of the previous day, he situated himself in a 
world where A had, or was going to have, an office mate, and B specifically states 
that this is not the case. 
(29) Not right for this case:
 a. [[ My office mate got the University X job ]]c
=  ws:... In w, prior to c
T, cI’s office mate at cT in w gets the 
      University X job. 
 b. [[ My office mate got the University X job ]] <A,T,>
= ws:... In w, prior to T, A’s office mate at T in w gets the 
     University X job. 
If that received the same utterance value, B’s sentence would imply that he 
already situated  himself the previous day in a world containing an office 
mate of A.
As before, it is natural to suppose that this little bit of extra indexicality is 
already present at the level of the description: 
(30) A possible speculation
[[ my office mate ]]
     = ck: cI has a unique office mate at cT in cW. cI’s office mate at cT in cW 
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4.3   “Saying the same thing” 
I claim that the notion of “saying the same thing” that unites A, B and C’s 
utterances in our old example (16) also includes the case just below in (31). I 
think that this is really the intuition. 
(31) A’s husband: My wife was born in NY.
(A, B, C and A’s husband all say the same thing.)
But then, maintaining the position that the relevant notion of “saying the same 
thing” is having the same utterance value, this suggests that My wife was born in 
NY can have the semantic value in (31’), with a dependency on the world feature 
of the context. This semantic value will give us the same utterance value that we 
had in the other cases – the proposition that New York is A’s birthplace. 
(31’)  [[ My wife was born in NY ]] 
= ck:...ws. In w, the wife at cT in cW of cI is born in NY. 
4.4   Contingency 
Finally, our discussion of sentences like I am uttering a sentence now, and 
specifically of the intuition that they are contingent, suggested that intuitions of 
contingency could also serve as a diagnostic of utterance value. I think that these 
kinds of intuitions too support the view that sentences can have some additional 
world-related indexicality.  (See Zimmermann 2012 for a similar argument.13) 
Look at the sentences in (32a) and (32b). Intuitively, these sentences have 
contingent readings. They have readings that make it quite sensible to say that 
things could have been otherwise. What would I be expressing in saying that 
things could have turned out otherwise? In the case of (32a), it seems to be that 
things could have turned out in such a way that I was not born in New York, the 
city where I was born in actual fact – things could have been such that I was born 
elsewhere. In the case of (32b), it seems to be that things could have turned out in 
such a way that Ora, the individual who happens in actual fact to my mother, did 
not give birth to me – things could have been such that she gave birth to someone 
else instead, for example.14 These intuitions about what I am saying might not 
have come to pass suggest that the utterance value of (32a) is the proposition that 
I – Orin – was born in New York and that the utterance value of (32b) is the 
proposition that Ora gave birth to me.   
13 Zimmermann discusses the sentence The German chancellor is a politician. 
14 Or, if you don’t think that my having Ora as a mother is an essential property of mine, things 
could have been such that someone else gave birth to me instead. I find this reading quite natural 
when my mother is accented. 
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(32) a. I was born in my birthplace. (But things could have been otherwise.)
b. My mother gave birth to me. (But things could have been otherwise.)
Again, this is the result that we would get from an analysis of these sentences 
with some world-related indexicality at the level of the description but not from 
an analysis without one. The analysis with the additional world-related 
indexicality is in (33). It is also informative to look at what I am supposing would 
be the result of an analysis without one; this is in (34). Basically, the utterance 
values of the sentences would come out to be “restricted tautologies,” true in 
every world of their domain. That is not the way these sentences sound, I 
believe.15   
(33) Right:
a. [[ (32a) ]]
c = ws. In w, c
I is born in the birthplace of cI in cW.
a’. [[ (32a) ]]
<Orin,...,the actual world> = ws. In w, Orin is born in NY.
b. [[ (32b) ]]
c = ws. In w, the mother of c
I in cW gives birth to cI.
b’. [[ (32b) ]]
<Orin,...,the actual world> = ws. In w, Ora gives birth to Orin.
(34) Not right:
a. [[ (32a) ]]
c
= w: c
I has a birthplace in w. In w, cI is born in the birthplace of cI in w.
 a’. [[ (32a) ]]
<Orin,...,the actual world>
= ws: Orin has a birthplace in w. In w, Orin is born in the birthplace of 
       Orin in w. 
b. [[ (32b) ]]
c
= ws: c
I has a mother in w. In w, the mother of cI in w gives birth to cI.
 b’. [[ (32b) ]]
<Orin,...,the actual world>
= ws: Orin has a mother in w. In w, the mother of Orin in w gives birth 
     to Orin. 
15 Compare them for example to the “restricted tautologies” below: 
(i) ?? Either Mary has quit smoking or she still smokes. (But things could have been
otherwise.)
(ii) ?? Either Mary knew at the time that John was born in New York or she was unaware of
that.   (But things ...)
Now, the semantic values in (34) do abstract away from the contribution of tense. Maybe the real 
semantic values are not literally “restricted tautologies.” I acknowledge this, but I don’t think that 
this detail seriously affects the point. 
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5   Where does the indexicality come from? 
As promised, by taking the arguments for our overall picture seriously, we found 
evidence that a variety of constituents have an analysis with more indexicality 
than we might otherwise have expected. Specifically, we found that they can have 
semantic values that encode dependencies on the world feature of the context.   
But what does this mean? Those constituents must have a syntactic structure 
for which the rules of semantic composition yield a semantic value with this kind 
of dependency, but what structure? Given our overall picture, it is natural to think 
that, in our sentences with descriptions like the woman on my right or my wife or 
my mother, the dependency at the level of the sentence’s semantic value is 
inherited from a dependency in the description’s semantic value. In that case, the 
descriptions would have semantic values as in (35). But what ingredient of the 
description – if any – is responsible for the description’s indexicality? 
(35) a. [[ my wife ]]
= ck: cI has a unique wife at cT in cW. the wife of cI at cT in cW 
b. [[ my mother ]] = ck: cI has a mother in cW. the mother of cI in cW
c. [[ the woman on my right  ]]
= ck: Exactly one individual is a woman at cT in cW and on the right 
of cI at cT in cW. the individual who is a woman at cT in cW 
and on the right of cI at cT in cW 
Here is one speculation. In the same way that we have an element whose 
semantics makes its utterance value the individual coordinate of the context of 
utterance – I – we also have, for example, an element whose semantics makes its 
utterance value the world coordinate of the context of utterance – call it W*. The 
thing about W* is that it’s unpronounced. Those indexical descriptions get to be 
indexical because their structures include indexical elements like that. 
The kind of picture that this proposal assumes as background is a picture on 
which predicates project (or at least may project) all their arguments, even their 
time and world arguments. That is, there are syntactic positions available for the 
time and world arguments of predicates. We might not pronounce the items that 
occupy these positions, but they are there. This idea itself is pretty familiar: it is a 
common view that silent variables can occupy positions like that. What I am 
suggesting now is that the elements occupying these positions need not be silent 
variables: they could instead be silent indexicals. If the variables that occupy 
those positions are unpronounced, then it is in a certain sense unsurprising that the 
indexicals are too. Maybe those positions are simply never phonetically realized.   
This proposal comes naturally to mind if one starts from the view that the 
utterance values of sentences are propositions, i.e., functions from possible worlds 
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to truth values.16 In that case, it is natural to think that there is a silent time 
indexical – call it T* – that can occupy a position reserved for time arguments.17  
There is some evident indexicality involving the time feature of the context, and it 
can be accounted for in just this way. On the one hand, it is easy to find predicates 
that behave as though they are modified by a silent “now” – think of On that day I 
met my wife or my initial remarks about I saw the woman on my right – and that is 
essentially what T* is, a silent “now.” On the other hand, we have to account for 
the connection between matrix present tense and reference to the time of 
utterance, and one way to do so is to say that present tense on a matrix predicate 
reflects the presence of T* in the predicate’s time argument position. What comes 
out of these considerations is an analysis of simple present tense sentences of the 
kind I sketch in (36)-(37), where, in accordance with the view that silent variables 
may occupy the world argument position, you see silent world variables and 
binders for them.18 (In these examples, for ease of exposition, I assume that the 
interpreted structures involve reconstruction into VP.) In this picture, there is an 
obvious place for an analogous element W* ((38)).  W* will allow us to generate 
structures for our definite descriptions ((39)) that have the kinds of semantic 
values we wanted.   
16 But should we? I have done so here, but, as I mentioned in an earlier footnote, there are 
alternatives to consider. Also, even if we do imagine that the utterance values of sentences are 
propositions, it is not obvious that matrix present tense deserves exactly the analysis I sketch 
below. It is worth thinking about what treatment would allow us to maintain the generalizations I 
argued for in my discussion of utterance values – as noted earlier, in that discussion I abstracted 
away from the semantic contribution of tense, to a great extent. 
17 See Kusumoto 2005 for an earlier, somewhat related use of T*. 
18 To say that there are variables and binders for them is to move to a picture slightly different 
from the one I started out with. It means adopting a view on which semantic values take an 
additional assignment argument. Following standard assumptions, just like the context argument, 
the assignment argument is generally passed up by the semantic composition rules (hence the 
additional g superscript in (36) and subsequent examples); there is however a special rule for 
calculating the semantic value of a constituent beginning with a binder. Adding this further 
assignment argument has consequences: everything I have said here from page 1 on has to be 
reformulated in order to take the assignment argument into account. However, it seems to me that 
the modifications to make are minor.  As far as our basic assumptions about how semantic values 
are used, in what follows I will suppose that truth and falsity are now to be explained in terms of 
evaluation with respect to the null assignment. (4c) should thus be revised to: A speaker X who 
uses a declarative sentence S at time T in W says something true when [[S]]<X,T,W>,(W) = 1. This 
minimal modification implies that there are no free variables, and I think that this is a perfectly 
reasonable assumption (the remarks about pronouns in section 6 will indicate why).  Below I will 
return briefly to the discussion of utterance values, bearing the assignment argument in mind.   
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Background picture. 
(36) a. I love you (37) a. My mother loves me
b. 1 [VP w1 [T* pres] I love you ] ] b. 1 [VP w1 [T* pres]
[the [2 w1 x2 my mother ] loves me ] ]
    [[ love ]]c,g = xe. ye. ti. ws.  In w, at   [[ mother ]]c,g = xe. ye. ws.  In w, y
t, y loves x.        is mother to x. 
    [[ I ]]c,g = cI    [[ the ]]c,g = f<e,t>: | f | = 1. the unique 
    [[ you ]]c,g = cI’s addressee at cT in cW  element of f
      (defined as long as cI has one) 
    [[ T* ]]c,g = cT      
    [[ pres ]]c,g = ti : t = cT. t   
c. [[ (36b) ]]c,g = ws.  In w, at cT, cI loves c. [[ (37b) ]]c,g = ws: cI has a mother in
    cI’s addressee at cT in cW.  w. In w, at cT, the
    (defined as long as cI has one) mother of cI in w
loves cI.
(38) [[ W* ]]c,g = cW    (just as [[ T* ]]c,g = cT)
(39) a. [the [ 2 W* T* x2 my wife ] ]
 b. [the [ 2 W* x2 my mother ] ]
 c. [the [ 2 W* T* x2 woman ][ 2 W* T* x2 on my right ] ]
A variant of this proposal would say that, rather than silent indexicals, we 
have silent indexicalizing operators like those in (40). The counterpart of T* 
((40a)) would combine with a predicate at the point when it wants its time 
argument; the counterpart of W* ((40b)) would combine with a predicate at the 
point when it wants its world argument.  
(40) a. [[ IT]]
c,g = P<i,st>: P(c
T) is defined. P(cT) 
 b. [[ IW]]
c,g = P<s,t>: P(c
W) is defined. P(cW)
This would break the parallel with I, but, at the moment at least, I don’t see a real 
difference overall – after all, as I have presented these operators, they would 
combine at exactly the points where the silent indexicals combine. I mention this 
variant in part because it resembles an actual well-known proposal whose effect is 
not exactly the same. Kaplan famously formulated an indexicalizing operator 
dthat which he specifically imagined to apply to functions that yield individuals.  
An operator like Kaplan’s would account for indexical individual-denoting 
definite descriptions, and indeed the cases of unpronounced indexicality that have 
been entertained in the literature generally involve expressions seen in that way.  
The picture that I have been suggesting here is different in that the indexicality 
does not start with the definite description: the predicate itself, the complement of 
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the, is indexical. I like my picture better because I think that predicates can 
behave as though they have indexical world arguments even in cases that do not 
involve descriptions of an individual. For instance, (41) and (42) contain 
examples involving quantifiers which seem to behave like the examples with 
definites that we have seen. In (41), B is expressing that Sally thinks that A didn’t 
say hello to all (or any) of those people; in (42), B is expressing that he learned 
yesterday that those people got rejected from Conference X.19  
(41) A:  I think I have the right to go over to the bar now.  I’ve been sociable.  I
      said hello to everyone / someone on my right.  
... 
 B: Sally thinks you didn’t.  
(42) A (who just arrived at the hotel): Everyone else on my floor got his paper
     rejected from Conference X. 
 B: I know. Actually, I learned that yesterday.   
There are two further remarks that I would like to make here about the 
proposal I have just put on the table. They concern its relation to problems 
discussed in the recent literature.   
One remark has to do with the skeptical voices that I alluded to earlier when I 
discussed the arguments for the relevance of utterance values. In Heim 2011, 
there is a comment that one can see as a challenge to those who wish to use that-
anaphora to make the argument I made there. Though going into the fine details 
would be complicated, I think that the view that I put forward can potentially 
meet this challenge, so I would like to say a few words about this. Heim 
specifically reacts to the claim that the instance of that in the second sentence of 
(43) is anaphoric to the utterance value of the first sentence, and that the
description in the first sentence should therefore be analyzed as in (44a). (She
attributes this claim, or something like it, to Stalnaker.)  The challenge is how we
could account in the same way for the contribution of the apparently parallel use
of that in (45).
19  I do feel that it is easier to come up with examples of indexical predicates when one looks at 
definite descriptions than it is when one looks at indefinites and examples with other determiners. 
I suspect that pragmatic factors are at work here. One factor, I conjecture, is that we refrain from 
using silent indexicals to create predicates whose utterance value might be empty. When we use an 
indexical predicate, we thus presuppose the existence of individuals satisfying it – and, plausibly, 
due to additional factors (see Section 6), we presuppose of a certain set of individuals that they are 
the ones satisfying it. The pattern then becomes understandable to the extent that, in cases where 
we presuppose this kind of thing in connection with a predicate, there is pressure to apply a 
definite determiner. But this is just a conjecture. It doesn’t follow from anything I have said.    
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(43) The man in the purple shirt won. I had expected that [i.e. that that person
would win]. (Heim 2011: 1016, ex. 49)
(44) a. [[ the man in the purple shirt ]]c
=  the (...) man in cW who wears a purple shirt at cT in cW 
b. [[ The man in the purple shirt won ]]c
=  ws. In w, prior to cT, the (...) man in cW who wears a purple shirt 
   at cT in cW wins. 
(45) Every time the most controversial candidate got hired, people later claimed
that they had expected that all along [i.e. that the person in question would
get hired]. (Heim 2011: 1017, ex. 50)
In order to address this comment, we need to think about constituents with 
bound variables. I entirely ignored the existence of variables in my initial 
discussion. Bringing them in means saying that constituents are evaluated not 
only “with respect to a context” but also “with respect to an assignment” – once 
we supply a context, we have a function from assignments.20 Accordingly, 
sticking to the way I have used the term “utterance value” until now, utterance 
values would really be functions from assignments. With this in mind, look at the 
case of that-anaphora in (46) below, for example. We can potentially account for 
the anaphora there in exactly the way we accounted for other instances of that-
anaphora. The idea would be21 that we analyze these sentences as having 
structures like those I sketched in (46’), involving the same binder, and that gets 
resolved in such a way that its utterance value comes out as the utterance value of 
he hates me. (I boldfaced in (46’) the constituents whose utterance values are 
identified.)  Similar remarks apply to (47).  In this case, the idea would be that the 
binder in the relative clause (where I take the relative pronoun itself to be 
uninterpreted) is the same as the binder at the top of the subject’s sister. Note that 
this treatment of (47) implies that the relative clause gives us a property, a 
function from individuals to propositions, once we supply the context and 
assignment arguments.   
(46) A: Everybody said that he hates me.
 B. Come on, nobody said that [ he hates you ].
(46’)  a. everybody 1 t1 said that he1 hates me  
b. nobody 1 t1 said that
20 See footnote 18 for details. 
21 Permit me here some assumptions that are dated in the same way that my ellipsis assumptions 
were.   
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(47) Every person who knows you regrets that [he knows you].
(47’)  [ every person [ (who) 1 t1 knows you ] ]  1 t1 regrets that 
Now we can see how Heim’s example in (45) could perhaps be analyzed. To 
begin with, here are the truth conditions we intuitively associate with (45): this 
sentence is true when uttered by X at T in W if, for every moment t prior to T 
such that the most controversial of the candidates at t in W gets hired at t in W, 
there is a moment t’ following t such that someone in W claims at t’ in W to have 
expected all along the proposition w’. The most controversial of the candidates 
at t in W gets hired at t in w’.  Before we brought assignments into the picture, we 
would have said that this suggests an analysis according to which, when we 
provide a context c, we get the proposition below. Now that we have assignments, 
we would say22 that, when we provide a context c, we get a (constant) function 
that takes an assignment and yields this proposition: 
(45’)  w. For every moment t prior to cT such that the most controversial of the 
candidates at t in cW gets hired at t in w, there is a moment t’ following 
t such that someone in w claims at t’ in w to have expected all along the 
proposition w’. The most controversial of the candidates at t in cW 
gets hired at t in w’.   
Heim’s example is a lot like the example we just saw with a relative clause: 
instead of every person we have every time. Suppose we say, then, that along with 
every time we have two properties of moments, and that these two properties 
come from constituents headed by the binder 2. Looking at (45’), it should be 
clear that we will be able to arrive at the desired meaning if the material that 
combines with the binder in the first constituent has the semantic value in (48), 
and if that picks up the corresponding utterance value. Well, it is clear how our 
approach allows us to form a structure for the most controversial candidate get 
hired with the semantic value in (48). We would use a silent world indexical, 
together with silent time and world variables. 
 c. g. w. The most controversial of the candidates at moment g(2) in cW 
gets hired at g(2) in w. 
The second remark that I wish to make concerns the way in which my 
proposal adds to an existing discussion that concerns structures where world 
argument positions are projected. It is well known by now that assuming 
structures with world variables comes at a cost: not all variable binding 
configurations seem to be possible, and an explanation has to be given for why.  
The kind of example that is relevant here is the one in (49)-(50) (see Keshet 2011 
22 See footnote 18 if it is not clear why. 
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for a catalogue of such cases). It seems that the world argument position 
underlined in (50a) – the position reserved for the world argument of the 
embedded predicate Canadian  – cannot be occupied by a variable bound at the 
top.  In other words, the structure in (50b) seems to be excluded.  The reason for 
saying this is that the sentence Mary thinks that my brother is Canadian does not 
seem to have the interpretation that would derive from a structure like that. But 
now let us bring in world indexicals. A structure with a world indexical in a given 
position will give us the same truth conditions that we would get from a parallel 
structure where that position is occupied by a world variable bound at the top – 
indeed, it was in a certain sense this fact that forced us to chase after arguments 
for world-related indexicality. But this means that, in addition to ruling out a 
structure like (50b), we also need to rule out a structure like (50c) with a world 
indexical. (50c) would give rise to the same unavailable interpretation that (50b) 
does. Is there a lesson to be drawn from this? I don’t think that these 
considerations should make us immediately suspicious of the world indexical 
idea. Rather, they tell us that the reason that we find for excluding the use of 
structures like (50b) with world variables bound at the top should extend to the 
use of parallel structures with a world indexical. To summarize: the facts show us 
that, even if some predicates can behave as though their world arguments are 
variables bound at the top, not all predicates behave this way; the facts also show 
us that, even if some predicates can behave as though they have an indexical 
world argument, not all predicates behave this way; our position on one of these 
problems should inform our position on the other. 
(49) Mary thinks that my brother is Canadian.
(50) a.    1 w1 T* Mary thinks [ 2   [the ... w2 ... my brother] Canadian ]    
b. * 1 w1 T* Mary thinks [ 2  w1 [the ... w2 ... my brother] Canadian ]
c. * 1 w1 T* Mary thinks [ 2 W* [the ... w2 ... my brother] Canadian ]
Let me close this section by addressing a possible doubt. I have endorsed a 
picture in which we have both indexicals and variables – a picture where semantic 
evaluation is both with respect to a context and with respect to an assignment.  
The remarks that I just made attended to the consequences of a picture like that: 
the first was about what it allows us to capture; the second was about the costs 
that come with adopting it. Now that variables have entered the scene, however, 
one might begin to have second thoughts about the arguments that I gave earlier.  
I argued (in good company) that a picture where there is selection for a context 
argument allows us to capture generalizations that we could not express 
otherwise, and I argued that a picture with silent indexicals allows us to maintain 
these generalizations in face of data that might at first sight look problematic.  
However, when I argued this I did not entertain the possibility that constituents 
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were evaluated with respect to an assignment, and maybe that makes a difference.  
Maybe, once we entertain this possibility, we have other ways available of 
expressing or maintaining these generalizations.   
I think this is worth thinking about, but my hunch is that other ways that 
suggest themselves will essentially amount to notational variants of the picture we 
developed. To see what I mean, take the following aspects of the picture I have 
been pushing: every constituent up to the sentence level is a function from both 
contexts and assignments, and the context argument is always passed up by the 
composition rules. In a certain sense, these aspects were not necessary. We could 
imitate our picture perfectly with a different picture where only the lexical items 
that we identified as indexicals select for a context argument, where composition 
rules only pass up the assignment argument, and where those lexical items 
combine in the syntax with a designated silent context variable.  This imitation 
picture – look at (51) and (52) – would yield different semantic values for 
sentences. They would be functions just from assignments to propositions, rather 
than functions from contexts and assignments to propositions. At the same time, 
there is a way of translating into the new picture’s terms everything we said on 
the old picture.  In particular, wherever before we needed to invoke the value of a 
constituent with respect to a context c and an assignment g, we would now invoke 
the value of the corresponding constituent with respect to the assignment g  [ 0 
 c ].  So for example there is a way of recovering our old utterance values:  to 
arrive at our old utterance values for a constituent A uttered by X at T in W, we 
now take g. [[A]](g  [ 0  <X,T,W> ] ). My point is that, to the extent that 
these two pictures are completely intertranslatable – and they seem to be – they do 
not constitute alternative hypotheses in any substantive way.  I suspect that we 
will find the same thing when we try to imagine alternatives that make more 
sophisticated use of the assignment argument.23  
23 If you are fond of free variables – if you think of pronouns that way, for example – then more 
alternatives will suggest themselves.  Someone who thinks that free variables can happily inhabit 
sentences, and who adopts a view where semantic evaluation is with respect to a context as well as 
an assignment, would say something along these lines about when we say that a sentence is true: a 
speaker X who uses a declarative sentence S at time T in W with an assignment g “in mind” says 
something true when [[S]]<X,T,W>,g (W) = 1. (The idea would be that a speaker X has an 
assignment g “in mind” when the codomain of g is made up of items X intends as values for the 
free variables in S.) And, in order to describe what is going on in our basic cases of ellipsis and 
so forth, an adherent of this position would probably invoke a slightly different notion of utterance 
value: when a sentence with constituent A is uttered by X at T in W with assignment g “in mind,” 
the utterance value of A is [[ A ]](<X,T,W>)(g). This point of view opens up another possibility 
for sentences that we have analyzed as having a structure like (52a) with a silent world indexical. 
Perhaps the cases that we have analyzed in this way should instead be analyzed as having a 
structure with a silent free world variable whose intended value is the world of evaluation. Here 
too, I believe that there is ultimately no substantive difference – what we can do one way with a 
free variable, we can imitate perfectly the other way with an indexical expression. It does seem to 
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(51) John likes me.
a. 1 w1 [T* pres] John likes me. old 
b. 1 w1 [T* c0][pres c0] John likes [me c0] new 
[[ (51b) ]] = g. w. In w, at g(0)T, John likes g(0)I
(52) John likes my mother.
a. 1 w1 [T* pres] Mary likes the [ 2 W* x2 my mother ] old 
b. 1 w1 [T* c0][pres c0] Mary likes the [ 2 [W* c0] x2 [my c0] mother ] new
[[ (52b) ]] =  g. w. In w, at g(0)T, John likes the mother of g(0)I in g(0)W
6   Some notes for the future and the past 
This was a starting point.  Here are some directions to think about for the future. 
If what I have said is on the right track, then many sentences are ambiguous 
between different structures that are ultimately associated with the same truth 
conditions – but via different semantic values. My mother is Danish would be like 
that, for instance. The question then arises whether, in such cases, we prefer using 
one structure over another, and, if so, why.  I think that future work could usefully 
address these issues of pragmatics. Stalnaker has argued for one principle that 
could end up making a difference: the claim is that we try to use sentences in such 
a way that it is unambiguous what the utterance value is.24 This implies that, in a 
situation where it is not established which individual is my mother, I would avoid 
using the structure for My mother is Danish that makes my mother indexical.  
There are also other principles that one can imagine: for example, all else being 
equal, we might choose to avoid structures with partial utterance values. This 
would imply that, in a situation where it is established which individual is my 
mother, I would prefer using the structure for My mother is Danish that makes my 
me that the treatment of constituents with bound variables would lead to intricacies that I have 
done without here. 
24 If we want to entertain this idea seriously, then it would seem something has to change in the 
assumptions that I have made up to here. I have imagined that there are time indexicals all over, 
and in particular that matrix present tense typically contributes a time indexical – though in 
sentences with predicates like Danish I have been able to abstract away from this.  In that case, to 
the extent that we never know at what point on the time line we are located, we will rarely if ever 
be able to satisfy this condition perfectly. Because our different candidates for the utterance 
context contain different time coordinates, they will generally lead to different candidate 
propositions for utterance values. One way of avoiding this difficulty might be to move to a 
system in which sentences evaluated at contexts yield temporal properties rather than propositions, 
and accordingly to treat present tense differently. (One could perhaps imagine the level at which 
we supply a time in order to obtain a proposition as a separate, temporal tier of indexicality.) 
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mother indexical. Our diagnostics for utterance values might give us a way of 
investigating empirically whether these kinds of claims are correct.  
I have suggested that silent indexicals can appear in positions where silent 
variables can appear. I think that it could be interesting to search for useful 
applications of this idea. Pronouns might be worth a look.25 Modern views of 
pronouns see them as syntactically complex items in which features combine 
together with other expressions. This syntactic complexity contains room for 
silent variables, and thus potentially for silent indexicals. Take a case like (53a).  
Since the features are what determines a pronoun’s pronunciation, it is perfectly 
conceivable that the bulk of the pronoun in (53a) is something that is itself 
syntactically complex, even a full description that would be pronounced on its 
own like my uncle. As for the gender feature sitting next to this expression (the 
only feature I will consider here), we can plausibly see it as selecting for a world 
argument and insuring that the expression’s referent is male in the world that it 
takes as an argument. The structure of the embedded clause would then be as in 
(53b), where two co-bound world variables occur within the pronoun – one that 
belongs to the description and one that is selected by the feature. In principle, 
though, the same pronunciation he could equally well realize an indexical 
description together with a feature taking an indexical world argument. With this 
in mind, it is worth recalling an older view of pronouns. The old Cooper treatment 
of a pronoun like he or she views the pronoun’s gender as essentially indexical – 
as reflecting the gender of the pronoun’s referent in the actual world.  (53a) shows 
that this view is too simple. It just doesn’t seem right to say that the pronoun in 
(53a) has a referent who inhabits the actual world. But, if there are silent 
indexicals that can serve as an argument to the gender feature, then that older 
view was onto something. 
(53) a. Mary thinks I have an uncle.  She thinks he [= my uncle] is Danish.
b. ...  1 w1 [[the ... w1… my uncle][ masc w1]]  Danish
Finally, I think that more thought should be given to the relation between the 
semantic values of constituents and the objects that we have derived as their 
utterance values. I claimed that, in order to characterize a variety of linguistic 
phenomena, we need to make reference to objects that are one step away from 
semantic values. Everything we saw, however, was equally consistent with the 
idea that these objects we need to make reference to are in fact two or more steps 
25 I have specifically argued that, when it comes to understanding the use of pronouns in F(ree) 
I(ndirect) D(iscourse), it is helpful to see pronouns as potentially realizing indexical descriptions 
(Percus 2013). Readers familiar with Schlenker’s 2004 analysis of FID might not find this 
surprising. For Schlenker, the treatment of FID pronouns as variables is important, and the 
remarks to come suggest that those pronouns that have been analyzed as free individual variables 
could alternatively be analyzed as indexical descriptions. 
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away from semantic values. We pursued an idea according to which the semantic 
value of a sentence like I am related to you needs a context c and yields the 
proposition that cI is related to cI’s addressee at cT; on this idea, the object we 
need is what we get by applying this semantic value to the sentence’s context of 
utterance. However, an equally viable idea given what we have seen would have 
been that the sentence needs a context c and a context d and yields the proposition 
that cI is related to dI’s addressee at dT; in that case, we would say that the object 
that we need is what we get by applying the sentence’s semantic value to the 
context of utterance, twice. How many context arguments should we imagine, 
then?  In reality, at least two, I would think – one that is relevant for expressions 
like I and you, and one that is relevant for certain perspective terms (and maybe 
for “shifting indexicals” which I have steered clear of here). And then, to the 
extent that there are silent expressions of one variety, it is likely that there are also 
silent expressions of the others.   
It is healthy to think about the future but we mustn’t forget the past that made 
us what we are. There is one prominent place in the literature where indexical 
descriptions have played a role, and that is in the context of Donnellan’s 
distinction between “referential” and “attributive” uses of descriptions (Donnellan 
1966).  It would be wrong to conclude without saying a few words related to this, 
and here they are, as a brief appendix to this paper.   
Donnellan illustrated his distinction with the sentence Smith’s murderer is 
insane – to keep things as close as possible to our discussion up to this point, we 
can replace this by Smith’s daughter is Danish.26  We can utter this sentence to 
convey that a certain individual is Danish, presupposing that that individual is 
Smith’s daughter; in that case, according to Donnellan, we are using Smith’s 
daughter “referentially.”27 We can also utter this sentence without meaning to 
take a position in doing so on who Smith’s daughter is; in that case, we are using 
Smith’s daughter “attributively.”  The historical connection with our topic is that 
a number of authors (and notably Kaplan 1978) have suggested that Donnellan’s 
pragmatic distinction results from a semantic distinction, and in particular that the 
“referential” use is the use of an indexical description. I would endorse this line of 
26 I have my reasons. I would like to continue to abstract away from the contribution of tense – this 
has to do with the difficulties alluded to two footnotes back.  
27 I use “presuppose” here to mean “take it as established for the purpose of the conversation.”  I 
am actually departing slightly here from what Donnellan said. Donnellan talked about cases where 
the speaker believes that his own background assumptions will be recognized – where “we expect 
and intend our audience to realize whom we have in mind when we speak of Smith’s [daughter] 
and, most importantly, to know that it is this person about whom we are going to say something.” 
(Donnellan 1966: 285) My way of putting things thus diverges from Donnellan’s in the case of 
deliberate misdescriptions. 
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thought. Once we take the view that descriptions can be indexical, we are in a 
position to naturally explicate a number of the intuitions discussed by Donnellan.  
To begin with, if the speculations about pragmatics at the start of this section 
are correct, then someone who utters Smith’s daughter is Danish is to use the 
indexical variant of Smith’s daughter exactly when it is established of a certain 
individual that she is Smith’s daughter. This would mean that the indexical 
description is indeed specifically tied to a “referential” use, supporting the way in 
which Donnellan has been interpreted, and also suggesting that his distinction is a 
significant one. (And, just as far as the term “referential” is concerned, it is clear 
that an indexical description of this kind can legitimately be said to be referential.  
The description’s utterance value is a particular individual, and the utterance 
value of the sentence as a whole will be the same proposition that we would arrive 
at if we were to replace the description by another expression denoting that 
individual.)   
Our view also lends itself to explaining a further intuition that Donnellan 
famously called attention to. Suppose Smith has no daughter. Suppose that 
someone who clearly takes Johanna to be Smith’s daughter says, while looking at 
her as she eats open sandwiches and peruses a book by Kierkegaard: “Smith’s 
daughter is Danish!”  If Johanna is indeed Danish, then there is an intuition that in 
some sense the person who uttered the sentence said something true – even if he 
misdescribed Johanna. Arguably, the way in which we are liberal with a truth 
judgment here isn’t general. (If alternatively Johanna is Smith’s daughter and is 
not Danish, there is no sense in which a speaker wrongly convinced of Johanna’s 
Danishness says something true when he says “Smith’s daughter is Danish.”)  
Donnellan’s position was that these cases of truth despite misdescription involve 
“referential” uses of the description. On our view, they come out as cases where 
the speaker has used an indexical description believing its utterance value to be 
different from what it is. As a result, the speaker is also mistaken about the 
utterance value of the sentence, and we say “true in some sense” to say that the 
intended utterance value holds of the actual world. Specifically, in the case at 
hand, the speaker made a mistake as to what he took to be established for the 
purposes of the conversation – he took it to be established (or easily 
accommodated) that Johanna was Smith’s daughter – and this fact led him to use 
the indexical variant of Smith’s daughter.  He was wrong but, if he had been right, 
the structure he used for the sentence would have had as its utterance value the 




Dahl, Östen. 1973. On so-called sloppy identity. Synthese 26. 81-112. 
Donnellan, Keith S. 1966. Reference and definite descriptions. Philosophical 
Review 75. 281–304. 
Haas-Spohn, Ulrike 1995. Versteckte Indexikalität und subjektive Bedeutung. 
Berlin: Akademie Verlag. 
Heim, Irene. 2004. Lecture Notes on Indexicality. Ms., MIT. Available at:  
http://ocw.nur.ac.rw/NR/rdonlyres/Linguistics-and-Philosophy/24-954Fall-
2004/02105696-3CFC-479B-9568-0A2089C79B9D/0/lec_notes_oindex.pdf . 
Heim, Irene. 2011. Definiteness and indefiniteness. In C. Maienborn, K. von 
Heusinger & P. Portner (eds.), Semantics. An international handbook of 
natural language meaning, Vol. 2, 996-1025. Berlin: de Gruyter. 
Kaplan, David. 1977. Demonstratives. Manuscript, University of California at Los 
Angeles. Published in Almog, J., Perry, J., and Wettstein, H. K., editors, 
Themes from Kaplan, 1989, 481-563. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Kaplan, David. 1978. Dthat. In P. Cole (ed.), Syntax and Semantics, Volume 9, 
221–253. New York: Academic Press. 
Keshet, Ezra. 2011. Split intensionality: A new scope theory of de re and de dicto. 
Linguistics and Philosophy 33. 251–283. 
Kusumoto, Kiyomi. 2005. On the quantification over times in natural language. 
Natural Language Semantics 13. 317-357. 
Lewis, David K. 1980. Index, context, and content. In S. Kanger & S. Öhman 
(eds.), Philosophy and grammar, 79–100. Dordrecht: Reidel. 
Percus, Orin. 2011. Indexicality and compositional semantics. Ms., University of 
Nantes. Available at: 
https://www.academia.edu/1468710/Indexicality_and_Compositional_Semant
ics_Lecture_notes_ESSLLI_2011_ . 
Percus, Orin. 2013. Free Indirect Discourse for the naïve.  In Département de 
Linguistique de l’Université de Génève (ed.), Travaux du 19ème Congrès 
International des Linguistes. On-line publication. 
http://www.cil19.org/uploads/documents/FID_for_the_naive.pdf.   
Schlenker, Philippe. 2004. Context of thought and context of utterance: A note on 
free indirect discourse and the historical present. Mind & Language 19. 279–
304. 
Stalnaker, Robert. 1970. Pragmatics. Synthese 22, 272–289. 
Zimmermann, Thomas Ede. 2012. Context Dependence. In C. Maienborn, K. von 
Heusinger & P. Portner (eds.), Semantics. An international handbook of 
natural language meaning, Vol. 3, 2360 - 2407. Berlin: de Gruyter. 
149







Abstract Factive predicates are at the nexus of two challenging topics that are cen-
tral for a theory of how natural language is understood in context. They syntactically
embed clausal complements and semantically express attitudes towards proposi-
tional content. Importantly, the content of their complement clause is generally
assumed to be presupposed. From the very beginning, it has been clear that there
is an additional complication in terms of apparent variation between factive predi-
cates. The present paper reports experimental data relating two recent approaches
to variation among factives to one another. These two approaches apply a roughly
parallel theoretical approach to separate empirical domains. The core theoretical
notion is that the presupposition of factives may or may not simultaneously be part
of the entailed content for a given factive verb. Chierchia (2016) puts this notion to
use to explain variation in NPI-licensing of factives in English and Italian. Djärv,
Zehr & Schwarz (2017) present experimental evidence for differences between
cognitive and emotive factives in English, which they also explain based on this
notion. The natural next move in an attempt to integrate these works is to extend the
experimental paradigm from the latter to Italian, which is what we do in this paper.
Overall, the results for Italian do not exhibit the differences from English that we
would expect given the two proposals. They thus pose a challenge for maintaining a
uniform theoretical approach to the two sets of empirical observations. We consider
some potential avenues for understanding the full set of data theoretically, but have
to leave a resolution of the theoretical conundrum for future work.
1 Introduction
Factive predicates are at the nexus of two challenging topics that are central for
a theory of how natural language is understood in context. They syntactically
* We are grateful to numerous colleagues and audiences at various occasions, as well as attendees of
lab meetings at the University of Pennsylvania, for feedback and discussion on this project. Special
thanks to Gennaro Chierchia for ongoing discussions of the work we refer to here. Andrea Ceolin
provided crucial help with Italian translations, and Jacopo Romoli provided additional feedback —
we’re grateful for their input. The work reported here received financial support from NSF grant
BCS-1349009 to Florian Schwarz.
©2020 Florian Schwarz, Kajsa Djärv and Jérémy Zehr
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embed clausal complements and semantically express attitudes towards propositional
content. Importantly, the content of their complement clause is generally assumed
to be presupposed. From the very beginning, it has been clear that there is an
additional complication in terms of apparent variation between factive predicates.
The present paper reports experimental data that relates two recent approaches to
variation among factives to one another. These approaches apply a roughly parallel
theoretical approach to separate empirical domains. The core theoretical notion is
that the presupposition of factives may or may not simultaneously be part of the
entailed content for a given factive verb. Chierchia (2016) puts this notion to use
to explain variation in NPI-licensing of factives in English and Italian. Djärv et al.
(2017) present experimental evidence for differences between cognitive and emotive
factives in English, which they also explain based on this notion. The natural next
move in an attempt to integrate these works is to extend the experimental paradigm
from the latter to Italian, which is what we do in this paper. Overall, the results for
Italian do not exhibit the differences from English that we would expect given the
two proposals. They thus pose a challenge for maintaining a uniform theoretical
approach to the two sets of empirical observations. We consider some potential
avenues for understanding the full set of data theoretically, but have to leave a
resolution of the theoretical conundrum for future work.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the core theoretical notion
shared by both approaches, as well as its application to the respective sets of data.
Section 3 presents the new experimental results on Italian. Section 4 assesses the
tension between the theoretical perspective and the overall empirical situation, and
presents some tentative explorations of possible new avenues for reconciling the
results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Background
2.1 Entailed vs. non-entailed presuppositions
A central, and — as it turns out — extremely intricate, question in presupposition
theory is whether there are lines to be drawn between different types of presup-
position triggers, and if so, how to analyze these differences. This was already
noted in seminal work by Karttunen (1971), but the issue didn’t play an overly
prominent role in the theoretical literature until more recently, with a variety of
proposals, perhaps most prominently the soft vs. hard distinction, motivated by
differences in the availability of suspension in if -clauses (Abusch 2002: also see
Abusch 2010), as well as a variety of others (see, e.g., Zeevat 1992; Simons 2001;
Romoli 2012). For present purposes, we focus on another theoretical take, variations
of which have been presented by various authors in slightly different contexts, most
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explicitly by Sudo (2012) and Klinedinst (2010), with more or less direct precursors
in Glanzberg (2005), Yablo (2006), and Gajewski (2011). The core notion is that
some triggers simultaneously contribute their presupposed content at the levels of
entailment and presupposition, whereas others are purely presuppositional. This is
illustrated schematically in (1) and (2), following the notational convention from
Heim & Kratzer (1998) in representing presupposed content between the colon and
the period to indicate that the proposition is only defined for worlds in which the
presupposition holds true.1
(1) a. Angelika sneezed again.
b. Angelika continued sneezing.
(2) a. λw : t ′ < t p & sneezew(a)(t ′). sneezew(a)(t p)
b. λw : t ′ < t p & sneezew(a)(t ′). t ′ < t p & sneezew(a)(t ′) & sneezew(a)(t p)
Taking the presupposition triggers again and continue, which give rise to similar
presuppositions with regards to there having been prior events of the same sort as
described in the current sentence, the central idea is that triggers like again only
introduce the notion of, say, there having been a relevant prior sneezing event as
part of the presupposed content (between the colon and the period), whereas triggers
like continue introduce it both there and as part of the entailed content (underlined,
following the period).
At first sight, it may not be obvious what is gained by such a distinction, as
the ‘doubling’ of the presupposed content as entailed content doesn’t really add
anything, and in particular won’t make a difference for which worlds are mapped to
true by these partial functions. However, as first noted by Sudo (2012), one context
in which predictions of these two renderings come apart is that of non-monotonic
quantificational environments, e.g., the scope of quantifiers like exactly one: in
particular, assuming that the quantificational claim introduced by the quantifier only
pertains to the entailed content, it matters whether or not what is presupposed is also
entailed. For example, based on an analysis along the lines of (2a), (3) is predicted to
be false in a situation where two students sneezed, even if only one of them sneezed
before:
(3) Exactly one student sneezed again.
1 We are glossing over many important details, in particular with regards to tense and aspect, for the
sake of illustrating the general idea. t p and t ′ represent the time indicated by the past tense and a
contextually salient preceding time respectively. A quantificational analysis of tense (as well as the
preceding time introduced by the presupposition triggers) gives rise to the Binding Problem, i.e.,
variables in the presuppositional and entailment parts would need to be bound by the same existential
quantifier. See Sudo 2012 for a proposal to address this issue.
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This is because if the presupposition plays no role in the entailed content and
the quantificational claim is only evaluated relative to the entailed content, then all
that is counted is how many students sneezed at the time introduced by the past
tense, regardless of their prior sneezing history. In contrast, extending the analysis
in (2b) to (4), the students’ prior sneezing history does matter for evaluating the
quantificational claim introduced by exactly one, and correspondingly, the sentence
is predicted to be true in a context where multiple students are sneezing at the time
introduced by the past tense, but only one student sneezed previously.
(4) Exactly one student continued sneezing.
Assessing the empirical adequacy of these predictions is by no means trivial,
especially given the potential additional impact of local accommodation (Heim
1983), but initial experimental results reported by Zehr & Schwarz (2016) and
Zehr & Schwarz (to appear) support the general notion of a contrast along these
lines between triggers (though perhaps most clearly for the comparison between
also and stop). For present purposes, all we aim to convey is the general notion
of the distinction between what we will refer to as ‘entailing’ and ‘non-entailing’
presupposition triggers and a sense of how the relevant triggers should behave
differently in certain environments.
2.2 Factives, entailment, and NPI-licensing
An entirely separate line of work has alluded to a parallel notion to account for NPI-
licensing phenomena. In particular, Gajewski (2011) (also see Gajewski & Hsieh
2014; Gajewski 2016) models differences between singular and plural definites with
respect to the availability of NPIs in their noun phrase in terms of a contrast in their
entailment, namely whether or not the existential presupposition is also part of the
entailed content. Chierchia (2016) extends this approach to account for differences
in NPI-licensing between English and Italian factives. This section sketches the core
line of reasoning of the latter with respect to both phenomena.
While plural definites readily allow NPIs in their scope, singular definites don’t
(second example modeled after those in Chierchia 2016, but altered in response to
native speaker feedback to yield clearer intuitions):
(5) a. The clients that had any complaints were rare.
b. ∗The client that had any complaint was refunded. (Chierchia 2016)
(6) a. The students in this class who have {ever} taken {any} statistics will
quickly notice that the data is unreliable.
b. ∗The student in this class who has {ever} taken {any} statistics will quickly
notice that the data is unreliable.
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This is puzzling at first sight, especially if one wants to maintain an overall
uniform analysis of the definite article for both cases. However, following Gajewski,
Chierchia argues that the following denotations for the singular and plural definite
article can explain this difference, crucially because they differ in whether or not
the existence condition is part of the entailed content or not (while being uniformly
presupposed):
(7) [[T HEPL]] = λPλQλw : ∃xPw(x) & ∀yPw(y)→ y≤ x.∀x[Pw(x) → Qw(x)]
(8) [[T HESG]] = λPλQλw : ∃xPw(x) & ∀yPw(y)→ y≤ x.∃x[Pw(x) & Qw(x)]
More specifically, these two meanings differ in whether or not the nominal
restrictor of the respective definites constitutes a downward entailing environment
or not. This is the case for the plural, but not the singular. Given an account of
NPI-licensing in terms of downward entailingness (and assuming that this property
is only relevant at the level of entailed content), this explains the pattern above
(Chierchia spells out a specific proposal along these lines based on contradictions
resulting from obligatory exhaustification; see his manuscript for details).
Turning to the phenomenon we are concerned with in this paper, Chierchia
(2016) extends Gajewski’s account of the contrast between singular and plural
definites (which Chierchia shows to also hold in Italian) to a cross-linguistic contrast
in NPI-licensing by factives, illustrated in (9) and (10):
(9) a. She was surprised that there was any food left.






























‘I am sorry I ever met him’
This intriguing cross-linguistic difference raises important questions about the
nature of NPI-licensing and possible sources of cross-linguistic variation. Chierchia
proposes to locate variation in a functional element, namely the complementizer that
(and its correlates), rather than positing variation in how NPIs are licensed in different
languages. The contrast between the ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ variants of a factive C-head
that he posits mirrors closely that between the singular and plural definite articles, in
that they vary in whether the presupposed content is also entailed. This is illustrated
for the sentence in (11) below (note that rendering of the presuppositional dimension,
which is constant across the two possible analyses, is ignored here, as in Chierchia):
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(11) John regrets that he {ever} met Mary.
a. English: ‘weak’ factive C (presupposition not entailed)
∀w′[[Sw(w′) & ¬∃t ∈ D[metw′(mary)(john)(t)]]→¬regretfulw′(john)]
b. Italian: ‘strong’ factive C (presupposition entailed)
∃t ∈ D[metw(mary)(john)(t)] &
∀w′[[Sw(w′) & ¬∃t ∈ D[metw′(mary)(john)(t)]]→¬regretfulw′(john)]
(adapted from Chierchia 2016)
Parallel to the case of singular vs. plural definites, the two versions differ with
regards to whether an existential statement, corresponding to what is presupposed
by the respective expressions, is included as part of the entailed content. In the
case of factives, this corresponds to the complement clause, represented here by
an existential statement about there being a time t at which John met Mary. In
Italian, this presupposition is posited to be entailed, and correspondingly, NPIs
in the complement clause are not expected to be licensed, given that this part of
the representation of the entailed content does not constitute a downward entailing
environment. In contrast, in English, this statement is not part of the entailed content,
but rather merely included as a presupposition (not shown here). The restrictor of
the universal quantification over worlds in the other clause of the entailed content,
where the embedded clause is also factored in, is of course a downward entailing
context. This then accounts for the fact that in English, NPIs are possible in this
environment.
For reasons of space, we have to gloss over various other details of Chierchia’s
account here (among other things, he also discusses the inability of cognitive factives
to license NPIs when no negation is involved, as well as intervention effects), and
refer the reader to the original work. What is crucial for present purposes however,
is that there is a puzzle about cross-linguistic variation in NPI-licensing by emotive
factives, for which there is an account based on the notion that some presupposition
triggers simultaneously introduce their presupposed content as entailed content,
while others do not. The locus of variation is in the type of complementizer available
in different languages, mirroring the variation in definites discussed in prior work,
thereby making it possible to maintain a uniform approach to NPI-licensing across
languages based on downward entailingness.
2.3 Results from the Yes, but. . . paradigm
As noted in the introduction, the question of whether there are classes of presupposi-
tion triggers that need to be distinguished has played a central role in the theoretical
literature, and there is a growing body of experimental work on this question as well
(for an overview, see Schwarz 2016). Most relatedly to the experiments reported
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below, Cummins, Amaral & Katsos (2013) and Amaral & Cummins (2015) investi-
gate various triggers in questions and test the acceptability of Yes, although and No,
because answers that deny the presupposed content:2
(12) Q: Did Brian lose his wallet again?
A: Yes, although he never lost it before.
A’: No, because he never lost it before.
(13) Q: Did John stop smoking?
A: Yes, although he never smoked before.
A’: No, because he never smoked before.
While such answers contradicting a presupposition in a question were overall de-
graded compared to controls, the triggers in their results seem to be grouped into two
classes with regards to the extent to which Yes- and No-responses differ from one an-
other: for expressions such as stop and still, the Yes-versions were significantly worse
than No-versions, but for triggers like again and too, both answer versions yielded
comparable acceptability ratings. Cummins et al. (2013) interpret their results in
terms of a distinction between ‘lexical’ and ‘resolution’ triggers (Zeevat 1992), and
allude to differences in the availability of local accommodation, corresponding to
variation in the acceptability of No-responses. A further dimension to the variation
that comes into play (also related to Zeevat’s notion of lexical triggers), is that, as
Amaral & Cummins (2015: 169) put it, in the case of certain triggers ‘the responses
in condition [A; Yes-continuation] appear self-contradictory, if we assume that the
presupposition is a logical prerequisite for the at-issue content of the trigger.’ In
other words, the content introduced in the question cannot be affirmed independently
of the presupposition. This roughly corresponds to the notion we have built on in
experimental approaches to factives, though we couch it in terms of the entailment
contrast introduced above.3
The central idea is that Yes-responses relate differently to entailed and presup-
posed content. While the default is likely that in general, a Yes-response is understood
to endorse both types of content (e.g., that a plain Yes answer to (12) effectively
indicates both that Brian lost his wallet AND that he did so before), it is in principle
possible to exclusively target the entailed content, making a Yes-response followed
by a denial of the presupposition possible. Assuming that it holds for some triggers,
such as stop, that their presupposition is also part of the entailed content, while for
2 Similar tasks involving the selection of the best answer from a set of options had previously been
used to investigate clefts and focus (Onea & Beaver 2011; Velleman, Beaver, Destruel, Bumford,
Onea & Coppock 2012; Destruel, Velleman, Onea, Bumford, Xue & Beaver 2015).
3 Another closely related notion in the literature is that of ‘Obligatory Local Effects’ of the presupposi-
tions of certain triggers (Tonhauser, Beaver, Roberts & Simons 2013).
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others, such as again, it is not, we then expect a difference in acceptability of yes,
although/but. . . continuations of the sort above, in line with the reported findings.
In Djärv et al. (2017), we adopted this paradigm to experimentally compare
cognitive and emotive factives, starting from the hypothesis that the former entail
their presupposition (that the embedded clause is true), whereas the latter do not.
We used an acceptability rating task to assess the acceptability of Yes and No
continuations. The latter provide an important point of reference with regards to
the relative availability of local accommodation (which can also be related to the
entailment contrast; for discussion, see Klinedinst 2010). Sample items are provided
in (14).
(14) Q. {Is Maria aware /happy} that [P Mike is moving back to Chicago]?
A1. Yes, although he isn’t.
A2. No, because he isn’t.
Participants had to rate how natural the answer sounds in light of the question, on
a scale from 1 (‘completely unnatural’) to 7 (‘completely natural’). In line with our
hypothesis, the results from 62 participants — summarized in Figure 1 — showed
this type of Yes-continuation to be more acceptable for emotive factives than for
cognitive factives, with the latter showing no difference from unacceptable control
items. In contrast, there was no difference in the acceptability of No-responses
for cognitive and emotive factives, which in turn were close to ceiling based on a






































Figure 1 Mean ratings by answer type and predicate type.
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3 Experiment: Yes, but. . . with Italian factives
3.1 Predictions for Italian
A logical next step in investigating the properties of factives, specifically with regards
to the posited entailment contrast, is to put the predictions of the two empirical
applications of this contrast together and test them. This is precisely the endeavor we
report on here. Recall that Chierchia’s explanation of the contrast between Italian and
English emotive factives in NPI-licensing rested on the assumption that the former
entail their presupposition whereas the latter do not. This is of course perfectly
in line with our previous finding for English emotive factives, which also suggest
that English emotive factives do not entail their presupposition, and therefore allow
Yes-responses to target their entailed content only. Assuming that in both cases, what
is operative is indeed the entailment contrast, we expect Italian emotive factives to
differ from the English ones, if the former do entail their presupposition. The current
study addresses this issue by extending our yes, but. . . paradigm to Italian factives.
3.2 Design & materials
The design of the experiment was completely parallel to the English one reported
in Djärv et al. (2017). The sentences were translated to Italian with some minor
adjustments, yielding versions of each item with a cognitive and an emotive factive
in a yes/no question, paired with either a Yes- or a No-answer containing a direct
denial of the factive presupposition in the question. The emotive factive predicates
used were felice (‘happy’) and apprezato (‘appreciated’), and the cognitive ones



































































‘No, because he isn’t coming.’
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One choice point concerned the use of mood for the emotive factives. While
cognitives only allow for the indicative, both subjunctive and indicative are in
principle available for emotives. We decided on the subjunctive, as it is generally
noted to facilitate NPI-licensing in Italian, although, according to Chierchia (2016),
this does not prevent emotive factives with NPIs from being unacceptable. Since
our hypothesis is that there is a link between NPI-licensing and entailment of
presuppositions, using the subjunctive for emotive factives then amounts to the
most conservative choice, by virtue of providing otherwise favorable conditions for
NPI-licensing.
The experiment included 24 critical items in four conditions. In addition, there
were 48 filler items, 24 using pensa (‘thinks’) and 24 using conjunctions. Half of
these were respectively presented with good Yes- and No-continuations, which did
not directly contradict an endorsement or denial of the proposition put forth in the
question, and the other half had continuations that were contradictory based on the
respective answer given.
3.3 Participants & procedure
We recruited 59 speakers of Italian through prolific.ac, who completed the study
online via IBEX. Critical items were counterbalanced across participant groups such
that every participant only saw each item in one condition. Yes- and No continuations
were separated into two blocks to simplify the task, and the order of blocks was
counterbalanced across participants. Fillers were divided evenly across blocks, with
Yes- or No-continuations matching the critical items in their block.
3.4 Results
Given that the central prediction of our hypothesis is that Yes-answers for Italian emo-
tive factives should differ in acceptability from those for English emotive factives,
specifically in comparison to cognitive factives and No-answers, we pooled the data
from the two experiments for statistical analysis, adding a third factor of Language
to the previously considered factors of Emotive type and Yes- vs. No-continuation,
yielding a 3-way interaction design. Recall that the proposal for accounting for
the inability of Italian emotive factives to license NPIs under consideration is that
in contrast to their English counterparts, they entail their presupposition. Thus,
assuming with Djärv et al. (2017) that Yes-answers invariably commit you to the
entailed content put forward by the question, Italian emotive factives should be
just as incompatible with continuations denying the presupposition as cognitive
factives. Correspondingly, the nature of the expected 3-way interaction would be
that the 2-way interaction found for English, with Yes-answers for emotives being
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rated relatively better than for cognitives, in comparison to comparable ratings for
No-answers, is not present in Italian, as Yes-answers for emotives should be on par
with those for cognitives. The overall results are summarized in Figure 2, and exhibit
a parallel pattern for English and Italian in the Yes-answers, and lower acceptability

















Figure 2 Mean ratings by answer type and predicate type.
To assess the outcome patterns statistically, we ran mixed effect models in R,
using the lmer function of the lme4-package. Results from maximally complex
converging models are reported here (Barr, Levy, Scheepers & Tily 2013). For
the initial 3-way interaction analysis, all three predictors were centered. Overall,
we find a significant 3-way interaction (β = 0.54, SE = 0.19, t = 2.87), as well as
2-way interactions between Factive type and Yes/No-answers (β = 0.60, SE = 0.09,
t = 6.45) and Language and Yes/No-answers (β = 0.65, SE = 0.31, t = 2.13).
Furthermore, there were main effects of Answer type, with No-answers rated much
higher overall (β = 2.89, SE = 0.15, t = 18.89), as well as Factive type, with slightly
higher overall ratings for emotives (β = 0.32, SE = 0.07, t = 4.71), but no main
effect of language.
Follow-up analyses using treatment coding with different baselines were con-
ducted to shed further light on the nature of the observed interactions. Setting Italian
emotives (with Yes-continuations) as the baseline revealed a contrast between factive
types parallel to English, with a simple effect showing emotive Yes-continuations to
receive higher ratings than those for cognitives (β = 0.48, SE = 0.12, t = 4.02), as
well as different patterns for Yes and No-continuations, reflected in an interaction
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between Answer type and Factive type (β = 0.33, SE = 0.13, t = 2.44). The pattern
for emotives across Answer types was not significantly different across languages, as
reflected by the interaction term for Language and Answer type. However, a parallel
analysis with Cognitives and No-answers as baseline did reveal an interaction of
Language and Answer type for Cognitives (β = 0.92, SE = 0.32, t = 2.88), as well
as a simple effect of Language (β = 0.76, SE = 0.28, t = 2.76), with higher ratings
for English No-continuations than for their Italian counterparts (no such effect was
found for Yes-answers).
Taken together, these results reveal Italian emotives to parallel English emotives
in yielding greater acceptability than the respective cognitives. The main difference
found between languages that is driving the 3-way interaction is in No-continuations
for cognitives, which are significantly less acceptable in Italian than in English.
Thus, while some potentially interesting differences between languages emerge,
the pattern predicted by an account of differences between factives based on the
entailment contrast, in line with both of the two prior approaches reviewed above, is
not found in the present results.
Two additional aspects of the data should be noted here to highlight some nuances
of interest. First, there are suggestive indications in the data that the differences in
patterns between English and Italian are largely driven by the adjectival items, as
can be seen in Figure 3. While there seem to be differences in the acceptability of
No-answers for both adjectives and verbs, the relative pattern for the within language
2-way interactions is entirely parallel for verbs, but different for adjectives, with the
key difference in the relative goodness of emotive and cognitive No-continuations
in Italian. Including the adjective vs. verb distinction as an additional factor in
an analysis using centered predictors yielded a 4-way interaction that seems to be
approaching significance (β = 0.71, SE = 0.37, t = 1.92). Since we are only looking
at one lexical item in each of these categories, it remains an open question not only
to what extent this effect can be substantiated and broken down statistically, but also
whether it generalizes to the relevant classes of lexical items (an interesting related
experimental result comes from Bacovcin & Djärv 2017 who find a difference in the
‘projection’ behavior of verbal and adjectival non-factives). However, we have to
leave more detailed exploration of these issues for future investigation.
The second point to note here, again without great elaboration of detail, is that
some differences emerged between the Italian and English materials with regards
to the fillers as well, specifically for the case of the think-fillers: in particular, the
‘good’ fillers, designed to be fully acceptable, are significantly lower in both the Yes
and No versions, while the other fillers, using conjunctions, seem comparable, as
can be seen in Figure 4. It’s unclear what this effect should be due to. One relevant
point to note is that these fillers, like the cognitive factives but unlike the emotive




















Figure 3 Mean ratings by answer type and predicate type split by Adjectives and
Verbs.
not provide a straightforward explanation of the apparent pattern in the data, as the
No-continuations for the two types of verbal factives seem to be equally acceptable,
despite the use of subjunctive with emotives and indicative with cognitives. Further


































Figure 4 Mean ratings for fillers vs controls in English (left) vs. Italian (right).
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4 Discussion: factives, entailment and (lack of?) variation
In a nutshell, the results for the Italian variant of the yes, but. . . study, in comparison
to earlier results for English, do not conform to the neat prediction that we get
from combining the accounts in Chierchia 2016 and Djärv et al. 2017. If both
the cross-linguistic variation in NPI-licensing and the interpretation of the increase
acceptability of Yes-continuations with denials of the presupposition introduced
in a preceding yes/no-question were to be attributable to variation with regards to
whether the relevant factives do or do not entail their presupposition, then the Italian
Yes, but. . . -data should look quite different from the English data, precisely with
respect to Italian emotives. While we do find some differences, they are in no way
straightforwardly relatable to the theoretically predicted contrast. To the contrary,
Italian emotives look remarkably similar to English emotives in this paradigm.
So something will have to give. Maintaining the strong assumption that the
cross-linguistic entailment contrast is present at a general level, due to its source
in the inventory of functional elements, specifically complementizers, leaves us
with little wiggle room. Either the entailment contrast is not to blame for the NPI-
licensing variation between English and Italian factives, or the relative increase
in acceptability of Yes-answers with presupposition denials is not indicative of
presupposition entailment. If one weakens the cross-linguistic assumption the space
of options becomes broader, but also less elegant and simple in theoretical terms. For
example, one could allow different factives within each language to choose which
type of complementizer they go with, and correspondingly whether or not they entail
their presupposition. In this regard, it’s worth noting that the particular emotive
factives we looked at, be happy and appreciate, don’t license NPIs in English to
begin with. That shouldn’t matter if the complementizer choices are general across
either entire languages or classes of factives (in particular cognitive vs. emotive,
as would need to be posited for English). But if there is more language-internal
variation in presupposition entailment, then our results may simply indicate that
the specific emotive factives we are looking at do not entail their presupposition,
consistent with the Yes, but. . . result, and fail to license NPIs for other reasons.
But without further motivation of what factive predicates are of what type, such a
perspective of course is unsatisfying with regards to its explanatory potential.
Another possibility to consider is that the Yes, but. . . test does not provide
a diagnostic after all for whether or not a presupposition is entailed. A possible
starting point for such a rethinking of this paradigm might be the observation that
emotive factives are generally richer in content, specifically in terms of expressing
an emotive relation between the attitude holder and the embedded proposition that is
at least largely, and perhaps entirely, independent of whether or not the embedded
proposition is true (see for instance Djärv 2017 for an account of factivity and the
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associated yes/no contrast, which does not rely on the notion of entailment, for either
type of trigger). Thus, a presupposition denying Yes, but. . . response can be seen as
endorsing one fairly independent part of the information presented in the question
while denying another. In the case of cognitive factives this would seem harder,
as the relevant doxastic attitude ascription is more directly linked to the speaker
endorsing the truth of the complement clause. The conjunction fillers were intended
as a control for this possibility, as a Yes, but. . . reply that goes on to deny one of the
conjuncts also has the property of a partial endorsement of separately introduced
information in the question. However, the status of the relevant pieces of information
may well be different in the cases of emotive factives and conjunction, so that the
different results we observe for them need not entirely debunk this possibility.
5 Conclusion and Outlook
We set out to test the predictions of combining two accounts of intricate empirical
data from a unified theoretical perspective, based on the idea of the entailment
contrast between presupposition triggers. In some ways, it might have been too
good to be true to find a new empirical result for Italian that neatly confirms this
perspective. What we are left with then, is a situation all too familiar in theoretically
ambitious and empirically well-grounded research on natural language meaning:
intricate theoretical proposals accounting for different types of empirical data, which
lead to new puzzles once we attempt to unify the various accounts. Unsurprisingly,
we are not in a position to resolve the new puzzle presented by the endeavor we
report on here. But in line with what the first author was taught by his advisor in
graduate school, learning that intriguing and interesting theoretical proposals are (at
least in part) wrong is every bit as important as finding further confirming evidence
for what seems to be a successful analysis, as is finding new problems and puzzles.
For the time being, we therefore are happy to leave a possible resolution of the
puzzle arising from the considerations above to the reader, and to the future.
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The Representation of Focus, Givenness and Exhaustivity
Roger Schwarzschild
MIT
Abstract This paper ends with rules of interpretation for a grammar in which an expression
can have an N-marking (‘novel’), an F-marking (‘focus’), both or neither. Silent exhaustivity
operators associate with focus and are susceptible to intervention by overt associators. F-
marking can trigger N-marking on an expression even though it represents old information.
A second occurrence focus is a focus that is not N-marked.
1 Introduction
Focus boosts intonational prominence, givenness weakens it. What happens when an
expression is both given and focused? We’ll look at a suite of examples pointing to three
conflicting answers to this question. In one case, the result is reduced prominence, in one
case increased prominence, and in one case the result is infelicitous. I will negotiate a path
out of the conflict by embracing the following hypotheses:
 Givenness and focus co-exist in the grammar. Each is represented with its own
syntactic marker associated with its own phonological consequence.1
 Givenness status is determined relative to the discourse context and the immediate
syntactic context in which an expression is found in a way that minimizes the amount
of material deemed novel (Schwarzschild 1999).
 Every focus associates with a focus-sensitive operator2
 There are silent exhaustivity operators that associate with focus (Chierchia 2013,
Fox 2007, Katzir 2013 a.o.)
 Structures containing nested focus-sensitive operators in which all the associated
foci are in the scope of the inner operator are problematic. (Beck & Vasishth 2009)
My analysis of the conflicting examples is offered as further support for these hy-
potheses. The discussion will also produce a new corollary to the theory of givenness. In
1 This view is endorsed in some form in Beaver & Velleman (2011), Féry & Ishihara (2009), Féry & Samek-
Lodovici (2006), Katz & Selkirk (2011), Kiss (1998), Kratzer & Selkirk (2009, 2017), Rochemont (2016) and
Selkirk (2008).
2 “The focus theory that forms the foundation of this discussion must be explicitly distinguished from the
semantic association-with-focus theories, such as the structured meaning theory of focus (see Jacobs (1983,
1991b), and von Stechow (1991)) or the theory of alternative semantics (Rooth (1985)). Within these theories
it is assumed that every focus-sensitive particle is associated with a focus and, conversely, that every




Schwarzschild (1999), I did not discuss association with focus, but once foci are added to
the mix, it turns out that an expression which otherwise would be deemed Given, acquires
novel status because of the presence of focus. Such expressions will appear to confuse the
phonology of givenness and the phonology of focus.
The data to be discussed will include the crêpes example, which has been a matter
of some controversy in the literature on second occurrence focus. I will propose that the
difficulty with this example has to do with nested focus-sensitive operators. So I side with
Büring (2015, 2016) in viewing these examples as problematic, but with Rooth (2010)
and with Beaver & Velleman (2011) in thinking the problem is not the business of focus
phonology.
Finally I will break ranks with the abovementioned authors for whom second occurrence
focus is the result of a competition among foci, as well as those who take it to be anaphora-
to-focus (Selkirk 2008, Krifka 2004). Rather, I endorse the idea that second occurrence
focus results from the confluence of independently derived focus and givenness marking
simultaneously implemented in the phonology as in Féry & Ishihara (2009).
2 Ingredients for intonation
In this section, we’ll briefly review factors that determine how an expression is intoned.
Intonation and Meaning (Büring 2016) is a remarkably comprehensive and clear treatment
of this question. The diagram in (1) below, based on Chapter 6 of that book, reflects the role
played by syntax:
(1)
In (1), prosodic structure and pitch accents are associated with the sentence Jack ate eel.
The construction is guided by constraints that refer to syntax, such as the following:
(2) • The right edge of an XP aligns with the right edge of a ϕP
• The head of ÌP is aligned with the head of its rightmost daughter
As a consequence of these constraints, if an adjunct is added to the sentence, the nuclear
accent, felt to be the highpoint of prominence in the utterance, shifts to the adjunct. This is
indicated with SMALL CAPS in (3).
(3) Jack ate eel in VENICE.
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Sometimes, a word or phrase will fail to receive the prominence expected based on its
syntax because it expresses content previously introduced in the discourse. In this case, we
say that the expression is Given. Such is the fate of the dog in (4)B, which unlike eel in (1)
does not receive a nuclear accent. Likewise, (5)B differs from (3) because in (5)B, Venice is
Given so its prominence is weakened and the accent remains on the object.
(4) A: Jack is getting better. He now has an apartment and a dog.
B: Has he NAMED the dog?
(5) A: What did Jack eat in Venice?
B: He ate EEL in Venice.
Sometimes the location of main prominence is correlated with a difference in content.
(6) is one such case.
(6) a. Jack only ate EEL in Venice.
b. Jack only ate eel in VENICE.
(6)a is felt to convey that in Venice, Jack ate eel and nothing else, while (6)b is felt to
convey that Jack ate eel in Venice and nowhere else. EEL is focused in (6)a and only is a
focus sensitive operator that associates with it. In (6)b, only associates with the focused
occurrence of VENICE.
3 Focus meets Givenness: The Puzzles
Consider the following interchange:
(7) Q: What food would Renee only eat in PARIS?
A: She’ll only eat CRÊPES in Paris.
At first, the response in (7)A sounds fine. But upon reflection one has the intuition that the
wrong question has been answered, that (7)A says that Renee eats nothing but crêpes in
Paris making it inappropriate as an answer to (7)Q. Here’s an intuitive analysis: to get a
felicitous interpretation only has to associate with focused Paris but the accent on crêpes
gets in the way and the lack of accent on Paris, due to its Givenness status, doesn’t help
matters. The problem is solved by fronting crêpes, taking it out of the scope of only:
(8) a. Crêpes, she’d only eat in Paris.
b. It’s crêpes she’d only eat in Paris.
We draw two tentative conclusions from (7):
(9) (a) If an expression is focused but also Given, it doesn’t get an accent, or at least
not a nuclear accent. (Paris)
(b) A focus-sensitive operator cannot associate with a reduced focused phrase
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across an intervening accented expression. (only)
The conclusion in (9)(b) is contradicted by this next example, and others like it in Büring
(2016: §7.3.3):
(10) Q: Radiology? Why did you take radiology?
A: because they only OFFERED radiology.
In (10)A, only associates with radiology. We readily understand that radiology was all
that was offered. Despite its focus status, radiology is not accented because it’s Given, in
keeping with (9)(a). The surprising fact is that the prominence on offered does not interfere
with the focus-association. In fact, the more emphatically one pronounces offer, the better it
gets, while in (7), the more emphatically you pronounce crêpes, the worse it gets.
The next example, in (11) below, was offered by Tony Kroch (pc) as a challenge to the
Givenness account invoked earlier regarding (4)B, NAMED the dog. In that case, the object
DP the dog is Given, so prominence falls on the transitive verb. That’s not what happens in
(11)A2:
(11) A1: Jack had a car and a yacht.
B: What did he do when he lost his money?
A2: He sold the YACHT.
In Kroch’s example, yacht intuitively contrasts with car. So one might say, and I will,
that yacht is focused. And then one might go on to say that the prominence falls on yacht
because of focus. But that can’t be right, for recall in the last two examples we saw that an
expression that is focused and Given does not get an accent, (9)(b).
Summarizing now, our first example seems to show that an intervening prominence
interferes with association with focus. Our second example shows it doesn’t. Our first
two examples show that Givenness leads to deaccenting even if there is focusing. Our last
example showed that it doesn’t. In the next three sections, I’ll say more about how focus
and givenness works. Following that, we’ll return to our examples with a fresh perspective.
4 Givenness: N marking
Below is brief summary of the theory of Givenness3 as presented in Beaver & Velleman
(2011) using the syntactic marker N, reserving F for focus. N is mnemonic for not-given or
it can be taken to stand for new so long as new can be understood in a relative sense. When
I replace the knob on the front door, the door is old but the knob is new. The knob is new
because it was just made or it’s new, in the relative sense, because it just became part of the
door.
The theory runs on an implication relation that relates expressions, propositional and
non-propositional alike. It subsumes coreference and entailment relations and it generalizes
3 See Büring(2016: chapters 3-5) and Rochemont (2016) for balanced discussion of this theory. The theory is
presented in this section somewhat informally. There is a precise statement in the final section of the paper.
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to functional types by raising or lowering the type of any predicative expression to proposi-
tional type by existentially quantifying arguments. Constituent questions are understood to
be predicates of propositions. The relation is illustrated in (12) and the rules for deploying
N markers are in (13). Following that are examples to illustrate how it works.
(12) IMPLY relation
• Generalized entailment
Jack ate eel in Venice IMPLIES Jack ate eel.
ate eel in Venice IMPLIES ate eel
• Coreference
if [the senator]i and shei corefer, then [the senator]i IMPLIES shei
• Constituent questions behave like existential statements
What did Jack eat? IMPLIES Jack ate something
What did Jack eat? IMPLIES ate something
• Yes/No questions behave like declaratives
Has he named the dog? IMPLIES named the dog
(13) Givenness Rules
(I) If an expression α is not N-marked, then it must be that:
a. α is implied by a piece of prior discourse.
or
b. the result of existentially quantifying any N-marked parts of α is IMPLIED
by a piece of prior discourse
(II) N-mark as little as possible
The main prominence falls on eel in an utterance of Jack ate eel in Venice when uttered in
response to the question What did Jack eat in Venice?
(14) {What did Jack eat in Venice?}
Jack ate EEL in Venice.
Let’s see why that is so. With the exception of eel, all the words in the sentence can satisfy
(I) without N marking because they’re IMPLIED by words in the question. Since they can
be without N-marking, by (II) they should remain un-N-marked. eel cannot satisfy (I) so it









4 satisfies (I), it’s implied by the same expression in the question. 2 also satisfies (I).
Since eel is N-marked, 2 requires an antecedent that IMPLIES:
(16) ∃x ∃y x ate y in Venice.
The question IMPLIES (16). Note that the first existential, ‘∃x’ is from generalized entailment
and the second existential is due to the N-marking. By similar reasoning, 3 and 1 satisfy
(I) and so by (II) none of these constituents should be N-marked. Next we adopt the rule in
(17) correlating N-marking with prominence:
(17) N-marking Phonology
If α and β are sisters, and α is N-marked or contains an N-marked expression and
β is not N-marked and does not contain N-marking, then α is more prominent than
β .
This rule entails that eel will be more prominent than any other expression in (15). It will
bear the nuclear accent. (17) is not in Schwarzschild (1999) or in Beaver & Velleman
(2011). It can be thought of as a constraint ranked high relative to syntactic constraints like
those in (2). Recall that those constraints by themselves require nuclear accent on Venice.
Givenness, expressed here as lack of N-marking, reduces prominence on Venice. The object
the dog suffers a similar fate in (18):
(18) {Jack owned an apartment and a dog}






the dog is Given due to prior utterance of a dog4 while named is not Given, hence it
must be N-marked.
4 This reasoning requires it to be the case that a dog in (18) IMPLIES the dog. That constrains our choice of
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To best illustrate the way in which N represents new in the relative sense, we turn to an
example in which, to use Beaver and Velleman’s phrase, there is N-marking “for the sake of
a larger expression”.
(19) {Who did Mary name when Doug was in the courtroom?}
She named [DOUG]N
All the words in (19) satisfy Givenness rule (I) so by rule (II), none of them should be




we find that 1 does not satisfy (I); nothing in prior discourse IMPLIES that Mary named
Doug. In fact, nothing IMPLIES that anyone named Doug, so 2 also fails to satisfy (I).




The preceding discourse IMPLIES that she named someone. This means that in (21), both
1 and 2 satisfy (I) and, in fact, N marking Doug achieves this result with the least
amount of N-marking.5 Summarizing, the structure in its entirety demands N-marking of
Doug even though the word itself is not newly mentioned.
semantics for definites and indefinites. One option is to treat them as non-quantificational and coreferential in
(18) at the level at which the Givenness rules apply.
5 In (21), N-marking on Doug is determined at the node immediately above it. Compare that to (i) below from
Sauerland (2005):
(i) {Which of praising and applauding did Mary do to John?}
She PRAISED John.
Sauerland observes that “the verb and the object are given, but the verb phrase is not.” This means that there
must be an N-marker on praised or on John, but as Sauerland’s discussion implies, an N-marker on either
word will suffice. It’s only at the next level that the choice is made. The question which did Mary do to John?
IMPLIES that Mary did something to John, making she [praised]N John ok, but nothing IMPLIES that Mary
praised anyone, so she praised [John]N is not ok.
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5 Association with focus: F-marking
(6) above displays a correlation between locus of intonational prominence and truth condi-
tional content. That connection between sound and meaning is mediated by a logical form
that includes F-marking. The examples with the F-marking are repeated in (22). Below
each example is a gloss instantiating the general statement in (23) of the interpretation of
F-marking.
(22) a. He only1 ate [eel]F1 in Venice.
‘he ate eel and nothing else in Venice’
b. He only1 ate eel in [Venice]F1.
‘he ate eel in Venice and nowhere else’
(23) F-marking contributes to truth conditions by determining what alternatives are
excluded by only6
In (22), I’ve coindexed only with the F-marker. I anticipate examples featuring more
than one operator and the indexing will help us keep track of the intended associations. The
coindexation confers a level of expressiveness that has been questioned; more on this below.
The locus of intonational prominence in these examples would be determined through
N-marking with a contribution from F-marking. The N-marking in (22) would work as
in previous examples. Paired with a context, we’d determine where to sparingly place
N-marks to guarantee compliance with Givenness rule (I). F-marking enters in to that
calculation insofar as it affects the truth conditional content. This applies to all the parts of
(22) including only itself which I assume can be N-marked, as in the following example
from Beaver & Velleman (2011: 1677):
(24) a. Mary eats vegetables?
b. That’s not all.





3 in the structure on the right in (24) is IMPLIED by the question in (24)a., so it needs no
N-marking. However, if there were no N-marking at all in the sentence, 1 would violate
Givenness, for nothing entails that Mary only eats vegetables. N-marking only, allows 1
to obey Givenness, since the question in (24)a. IMPLIES (25) below, assuming that the
identity function is a possible value for X .
(25) ∃X She X eats vegetables.
6 There is a precise formalization in the final section of the paper.
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Katz & Selkirk (2011) detected a “super-high H tone” on only in all-new utterances.
Lee (2012) reports the same for the Korean adverb ozik ‘only’. These observations lend
some plausibility to the idea that only participates in intonationally relevant N-marking. I
will assume that whenever only is newly uttered it is N-marked.
I defer discussion of the phonetics of F-marking to a later section.
6 Exhaustivity: silent EXH
There is a robust intuition that (26)A can be used as an exhaustive answer to the question in
(26)Q.
(26) Q: What did Jack eat?
A: Jack ate [eel]N.
By this we mean that (26)A can be used to convey that Jack ate eel and nothing else.
According to a growing consensus, an exhaustive interpretation is a sign of a silent operator
that may associate with focus (see eg Chierchia 2013: §2.3.2, Katzir 2013: 341, Spathas
2010: §2.5). If we spell out that operator in (26)A using the notation in Fox (2007) we get:
(27) Q: What did Jack eat?
A: EXH1 Jack ate [eel]F1
The action of EXH is described in (28) below, which makes reference to Fi-alternatives. An
Fi-alternative for a sentence α is a proposition that would be expressed by α if its Fi-marked
parts had meanings other than the ones they actually do (Rooth 1985). The proposition that
Jack ate oatmeal is a reasonable F1 alternative to Jack ate [eel]F1. Unreasonable alternatives
to Jack ate [eel]F1 would be that Jack ate food or that Jack ate baby eel (see Bar-Lev & Fox
2017 and references therein for a theory of what counts as a reasonable alternative)
(28) For any sentence α , “EXHi α” is true just in case α is true and any reasonable
Fi-alternative to α is false.
The reply in (26)A includes N-marking and the one in (27)A includes F-marking. Putting
those together we get:
(29) Q: What did Jack eat?
A: EXH1 Jack ate [[eel]F1]N
According to the Givenness rules, (29)A is felicitous, because:
(30) What did Jack eat? IMPLIES ∃X(EXH1 Jack ate X)
Since there are no F-marks left in ‘(EXH1 Jack ate X)’, there are no F-alternatives and so
EXH is innocuous. In the final section of the paper, we’ll spell out the interpretation of F-
and N-markings in such a way that when the Givenness rules are applied, an expression that
is N marked is treated in one and the same way whether or not it is also F-marked. But
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that shouldn’t be taken to mean there is no interaction between F-marking and N-marking,
focus and givenness. Consider the following example:
(31) Q: Did Karen buy a horse or did Marc buy a horse?
A: EXH1 [[KAREN]F1]N bought a horse.
The presence of EXH and its associated F-marker accords with the exhaustivity inference
one feels here: Marc did not buy a horse. But what about the N-marking? There is a
piece of preceding discourse, the first disjunct, that IMPLIES Karen buy a horse and all
subconstituents thereof, so why should there be any N-marking? Here’s where the focus
is relevant. No part of the preceding discourse IMPLIES the exhaustified proposition,
that Karen, but not Marc, bought a horse. So having no N-marking in (31)A would be
unacceptable. On the other hand, if Karen is N-marked, then the exhaustification plays no
role in Givenness, just as in (29)-(30) above. This is a special case of N-marking (Karen)
for the sake of a larger expression, the whole sentence.
The presence of N-marking on Karen will have the effect of attracting the nuclear
accent, due to the phonological rule in (17). The N-marking in turn was caused by the
F-marking. So an unsuspecting observer might misattribute the intonational prominence to
the F-marking, taking the accent placement to be a marker of exhaustivity.
In the two examples of exhaustivity discussed so far, I’ve posited an EXH operator based
on an intuition that the utterance gives rise to an exhaustive inference. I haven’t given a
theory of when EXH is present. In both (29) and (31) and in examples to be discussed, one
can easily see that a speaker without guile would desire to produce an utterance with an
exhaustive interpretation. Nevertheless, as the papers cited earlier make clear, there’s more
to the distribution of EXH than forthright conversation.
Armed now with a matured understanding of focus, givenness and exhaustivity, we
return to the puzzles with which we began.
7 Annotating the puzzles
We return now to the puzzles that triggered our investigation. Using the tools developed
above, we’ll show that across the three examples, expressions that are focused and given
(+F , -N) are never prominent relative to their surroundings. This resolves one of the
contradictions with which we began. Following that, we’ll turn our attention to the infelicity
of the crêpes example.
Our crêpes example is repeated in (32), newly annotated.
(32) Q: What food would Renee only2 eat t [in PARIS]F2? Crêpes
A: EXH1 She’d only2 eat [[CRÊPES]F1]N [in Paris]F2.
Concentrating first on the F-marking, EXH1 . . . F1 is what makes (32)A an exhaustive
answer. The presence of exhaustivity is what allowed us earlier to paraphrase (32)A with a
cleft:
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(33) It’s crêpes that she only eats in Paris.
only2 . . . F2 appears in the answer because it appears in the question. Together the two
foci and their associated operators should produce the proposition that: crêpes is such that
Renee eats them in Paris and nowhere else, and it’s the only such thing. Moving now
to N-marking, observe that crêpes must be N-marked because it has not been IMPLIED.
No further N-marking is necessary. To see this consider that the entire sentence satisfies
Givenness rule (I) because:
(34) (32)Q IMPLIES ∃X(EXH1 She’d only2 eat X [in Paris]F2)
The F-marking on in Paris does not trigger N-marking, unlike in (31) above. That’s because
in this case there is an antecedent, (32)Q, that IMPLIES the exhaustive/only meaning. Since
there is no N-marking on Paris and there is N-marking on crêpes, the nuclear accent falls
on crêpes making it more prominent than Paris as required by the our phonological rule in
(17).
Next, we turn to our radiology example:
(35) Q: Radiology? Why did you take radiology? Radiology
A: [They]N [only2]N [OFFERED]N [radiology]F2
In this case, there is no evidence of an EXH operator, at least not one that associates with an
expression within the answer. If there is any exhaustive inference, it’s that (35)A is the only
reason that radiology was taken. Evidence of the F-marking on radiology comes from the
intuition that A is saying that nothing but radiology was offered. Turning now to N-marking,
except for radiology, every word, including only requires an N-mark. No N-marking is
needed on higher constituents because:
(36) you take radiology IMPLIES ∃XYV (X YV ed radiology)
The F-marking on radiology does not trigger N-marking, again, unlike in (31) above. This
time the reason is that only itself is N-marked, an option I assume is unavailable to silent
EXH. Since there is no N-marking on radiology and there is N-marking on offered, the
nuclear accent falls on offered making it more prominent than radiology as required by the
rule in (17).
We turn now to our final example:
(37) A1: Jack owned a car and a yacht. Yacht
B: What did he do when he lost his money?
A2: EXH1 He soldN [[the-YACHT]F1]N
Given the context of A2’s remark, the question of selling the car must be salient. As this
was not confirmed, an eavesdropper would assume that the car was not sold. Indeed, (37)A2
is understood to convey that, hence the presence of EXH. . . F1. In this case, the F-marking
does trigger N-marking, as in (31). sold also requires N-marking since it is not Given.
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This means that the phonological rule in (17) is silent on their relative prominence and the
syntactic constraints with which we began lead the nuclear accent to the object. yacht, it
turns out, is not a focus and given phrase, despite the fact that yacht has been mentioned.
It’s another example of N-marking for the sake of a larger expression. This example should
be contrasted with (4) repeated below:
(38) A: Jack is getting better. He now has an apartment and a dog.
B: Has he NAMED the dog?
In this case, since apartments are not normally named, the question of naming the apartment
is not salient, so no EXH is called for and so there is no F-marking on dog to trigger
N-marking.
At this point, we’ve addressed the status of focused-given expressions. They uniformly
display reduced prominence. In the next section, we’ll briefly discuss the phonology of
F-marking and its role in focus-given phrases. For now we return to the murky status of the
crêpes example and we begin by noticing a telltale arrangement of foci and the operators
that associate with them.
(39) Q: What food would Renee only2 eat t [in Paris]F2? Crêpes
A: EXH1 She’d only2 eat [[CRÊPES]F1]N [in Paris]F2.
In (39)A, focus sensitive only intervenes between EXH and its associate, crêpes. Exam-
ples of this kind with pairs of overt operators have been discussed (Krifka 1991, 2004, Rooth
1996a, Wold 1996) with some debate about their acceptability. Beck & Vasishth (2009)
conducted an experimental study showing “that such configurations are very problematic”.
Beck (2016) traces the problem to the inner operator which cannot help but associate with
all the foci in its scope. Concretely, that means that the indices on EXH and only represent
intended but unrealizable interpretations.7 On that analysis, (39)A excludes Renee’s eating
anything but crêpes in Paris and that entailment spells trouble in the discourse in (39).
In the literature cited above, various combinations of overt focus sensitive operators are
considered, however the one that is most relevant to our concerns, only. . . only is, as far as I
know, not mentioned. Here’s an example of that type:
(40) Alan, Bob and Carl are in a restaurant enjoying a bottle of red wine together. Alan
remarks “Bob only drinks wine in RESTAURANTS” Bob corrects him with “I only
said I only drink WHITE wine in restaurants”.
(41) #I only1 said I only2 drink [[WHITE]F1]N wine in [restaurants]F2.
Bob’s remark sounds odd because only2 appears to associate with white giving rise to an
interpretation according to which Bob drinks white wine in restaurants but not red wine.
That conflicts with the fact that Bob is in a restaurant drinking red wine. The intended
7 Beck and Vasishth viewed their experiment results as evidence against Kratzer’s (1991)’s analysis of foci in
terms of distinguished variables, represented here as indices on the F-markers and adopted in the formalization
in the last section of this paper. This conclusion is unwarranted and was dropped in Beck (2016).
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interpretation glossed in (42) would have been felicitous in this discourse:
(42) It’s only about white wine that I said I only drink it in restaurants.
The trouble in (39) has to do with the arrangement of foci and the operators that associate
with them within the answer. Answerhood per se is not a factor. Here’s an example in which
the troublesome constellation is created in a correction context:
(43) {Darlene only gave peanuts to the ELEPHANTS}
#No, she only gave WATER to the elephants.
EXH1 She only2 gave [[WATER]F1]N [to the elephants]F2.
Assuming the difficulty in the crêpes example is indeed to do with nested operators
allows us to make sense of the following observation:
(44) “Rooth (2010) points out that (31b) [RS Crêpes] becomes felicitous if uttered with
‘a rising intonation indicating a partial answer on the first focus crêpes.’ We agree
with these judgments, and have verified them with several consultants.” Beaver &
Velleman (2011)
If rising intonation indicates a partial answer, it must mean there is no EXH operator, no
focus on crêpes and no intervention. crêpes is N-marked but not F-marked.
(45) A: She’d only2 eat [CRÊPES]N [in Paris]F2.
As reported earlier, the crêpes example is often initially perceived as felicitous and on
second thought sounds inappropriate. Suppose that speakers understand only as associating
just with crêpes:
(46) A: She’d only1 eat [[CRÊPES]F1]N in Paris.
The N-marking would still satisfy Givenness, so the intonation would not give a reason to
think there is problem and if crêpes is the only thing she eats in Paris, as (46) says, then it
must be the only thing she eats in Paris and nowhere else, assuming there is such a thing.
So (46) would satisfy the questioner and would do so exhaustively. Moreover, we might be
inclined to imagine the question is restricted to exotic foods. In that case, it’s less disturbing
to say that Renee eats only crêpes. The following example tries to control for that effect:
(47) Guest1:We’ve just finished an extensive study of who gets called on in our college
classes, with a break down by gender and ethnicity.
Host:I read the report. Can you tell our audience which group only gets called on
in PHILOSOPHY courses?
Guest2: Ah yes. Interesting. We only call on AMERICAN MEN in philosophy
courses. But then everyone is called on in those classes.
In this case, the alternatives to American men are fixed in the discourse, so if one were to
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choose (48) in place of (49), the result would be infelicitous. I do get a clearer negative
judgment in this case.
(48) Guest2:We only2 call on [[AMERICAN MEN]F2]N in philosophy classes.
(49) Guest2:EXH1 We only2 call on [[AMERICAN MEN]F1]N in [philosophy classes]F2.
There is another confound here pointed out to me by Simon Charlow. If crêpes were to
move prior to interpretation outside the scope of only it would eliminate nesting. In his
discussion of overt nested operators, Rooth (1996a) considered this possibility which is why
you’ll find examples there where both foci are locked inside an island. I don’t know why
QR doesn’t just save the crêpes example. Maybe it does for some speakers.
In stating our puzzles, we began with the two claims in (50). For each claim, we had
validating and contradicting examples. In both cases, exhaustivity turned out to be the
missing ingredient.
(50) (a) If an expression is focused but also Given, it doesn’t get an accent, or at least
not a nuclear accent.
(b) A focus-sensitive operator cannot associate with a reduced focused phrase
across an intervening accented expression.
The first conclusion appeared to be challenged by the yacht example. In the end, we
determined that yacht was not in fact Given. Although it was recently mentioned, it was
focused and associated with EXH. That association changed the meaning in such as way,
that N-marking was needed on yacht, for the sake of the exhaustified utterance. The second
conclusion turned out to be wrong in general. It’s not an intervening accented expression
that causes a problem, it’s an intervening focus, in this case, a focus whose presence has to
do with exhaustification.
I’ve restricted attention to a small number of key examples which might lead to spurious
generalizations, one of which I’d like to dispel. The intervening accented expression in the
crêpes example is a DP while in the radiology example it’s a verb. What follows are two
examples where matters are reversed.
(51) A: I steam any kind of vegetable – even eggplant or potatoes. Then there are
special cooking techniques that I reserve for particular vegetables.
B: Really? What method do you only use on celery?
A: #I only BRAISE celery.
EXH1 I only2 [[BRAISE]F1]N [celery]F2
This example is odd like the crêpes example due to the presence of nested foci. In this case,
the offending focus is on a verb, braise.
(52) A1: I gave Stella a book.
B: Just a book? Why?
A2: because I only1,N gave [MANNY]N [a book]F1.
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(52)A2 is ok, just like the radiology example, but this time the unoffending intervening
accented expression is a DP. There’s no call for an EXH associating with Manny; he isn’t
the only one who got a book.8
8 Focus phonology
F-marking is often hard to hear. The following are the results of laboratory studies:
(53) Phonetics of associated foci9
(a) If an expression is N-marked,
adding an F-mark associated with only increases duration and pitch promi-
nence.
(b) If an expression is pre-nuclear and not N-marked,
adding an F-mark associated with only increases duration and pitch promi-
nence.
(c) If an expression is post-nuclear and not N-marked,
adding an F-mark associated with only increases duration and intensity.
The statement in (53)c. applies to the words radiology and Paris in our examples (7) and
(10). While the presence of F-marking is hard to detect on lexical items in the absence of
phonetic measurements, Hoeksema & Zwarts (1991) observed that weak Dutch pronouns
could be used as detectors because they resist increased duration and intensity. Susanne
Tunstall independently made the same observation for English and von Fintel (1994)
employed pronouns as a tool for detecting foci, a tool which has since been used extensively.
Applying it here, we replace radiology with it in (7) to dramatic effect:
(54) Q: Why did you take radiology?
A: #because they only OFFERED it.
it cannot be F-marked and Given.10 Once F-marking it is ruled out in (54), for some reason,
8 This N-marking is also plausible - given B’s remark:
A1 EXH1 I gave Stella [a book]F1.
A2: because I only1 gave [MANNY]N [a book]F1.
9 Rooth (1996b), Beaver, Clark, Flemming, Jaeger & Wolters (2007), Féry & Ishihara (2009), Wagner, Breen,
Flemming, Shattuck-Hufnagael & Gibson (2010), Katz & Selkirk (2011). The language of N-marking and
F-marking is mine, not that of the authors whose results I’m summarizing.
10 I find (i) below more or less ok:
(i) The robot only pointed at Jane and Jane only pointed at IT.
So it’s the increased duration and intensity without accent that seems to be a problem for it. Verena Hehl
observed that pronominalization with that instead of it does not cause the kind of disruption seen in (54).
Krifka (2004) notes this contrast as well. Rooth (1996b) and Beaver & Clark (2008) say that phonological
reduction of a pronoun (any pronoun) is what causes the effect seen in (54).
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one interprets only as associating with offer and in this case that sounds nonsensical. A
comparison of (54) with (55) confirms that the problem lies in the F-marking not merely in
the lack of N-marking that steers the nuclear accent to the verb:
(55) Q: Why did you take radiology?
A: because they OFFERED it.
I’ve portrayed the pronunciation of radiology/Paris as jointly determined by the phonology
of N-marking and F-marking. As Féry & Ishihara (2009: 303) write, “focus boosts promi-
nence (higher pitch/longer duration), givenness weakens prominence (lower pitch/shorter
duration)” and an expression that is “both focused and given, is subject to both effects.” In
the remainder of this section, I briefly recount other approaches to muted foci like those on
radiology and Paris.
Rooth (1996, 2010), Büring (2015,16) and Beaver & Velleman (2011) offer accounts in
which foci compete, with the loser muted. They would begin with the assumption that offer
is focused as in (56) below and then they would show that it trumps radiology forcing it to
be less prominent.11
(56) Q: Radiology? Why did you take radiology?
A: [They]N [only2]N OFFEREDN,F [radiology]F2.
The additional F-marking that these accounts rely on is not implausible, for there is an
intuitive contrast between offer and take. But the contrast intuition is weaker or nonexistent
in the second lines of the examples in (57) presented in Selkirk (2008) as a challenge to
focus-competition analyses (Selkirk uses acute accents to mark pitch accents. G stands for
‘given’ and corresponds where marked to lack of N-marking).
(57) Only [Eleanor]F was introduced to Franklin by his mother.
And his whóle life, he lóved only [Eleanor]F,G
The New York Times gives only [newspaper subscriptions]F to the city’s poor.
I don’t thínk they can líve on only [newspaper subscriptions]F,G.
The effect brought about with the pronoun it may arise less dramatically with short lexical items. I
perceive it in Rooth’s (1992) celebrated rice example: people who GROW rice, generally only EAT rice. I often
hear that as excluding alternatives to eating, which is not the intended reading. This feeling goes away when
the noun phrase rice is expanded: people who GROW genetically modified rice, generally only EAT genetically
modified rice. Rooth (2010) suggests that the same is happening in our crêpes example - in Paris is too short
to be a muted focus. But here I don’t find that expansion helps:
(ii) What food would Rosa only eat at the beach in Belgium?
She’d only eat MUSSELS at the beach in Belgium.
11 In this particular case, as Büring discovered, the competition rules according to Rooth (1996b) or Büring
(2016) would either yield no winner or the wrong one depending on the scope of the focus on offer (‘scope of
focus’ is a term of art crucial to the rules of competition). Rooth (2010) is a response to that predicament.
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We were ordered to only think [good thoughts]F.
But we were bóred by only thinking [good thoughts]F,G.
In one of Beaver and Velleman’s own examples, repeated in (58) below, it is hard to see
what notion of contrast is being invoked. Earlier we discussed the N-marking of only in
this small discourse (see (24)). But N-marking is not sufficient in Beaver and Velleman’s
system to draw the primary accent away from vegetables. To accomplish that goal, “only
must be F-marked in addition to being N-marked, because it is being contrasted with what
has come before”.
(58) a. Mary eats vegetabels? Beaver and Velleman (21-22)
b. That’s not all.
She ONLYF,N eats vegetablesF
In Selkirk’s view there is no competition among foci, rather, for an expression to be
focused and G-marked, previous discourse must imply not only the expression’s content but
also the contribution of the focus marking. For the radiology example, that would imply a
focus in the antecedent12
(59) Q: [Radiology]F? Why did you take [radiology]F?
A: [They] [only2] OFFERED [radiology]F2,G.
In (59)Q, a focused antecedent for (59)A seems plausible, but that isn’t always the case.
Beaver and Velleman discuss Rooth’s (1992) example, people who grow rice, generally
only eat rice. They point out that the second occurrence of rice bears only secondary accent
even though the first occurrence is not focused. Assuming the second occurrence of rice
is focused and associated with only, the secondary accent would require F,G marking but
with no antecedent focus, as Selkirk’s theory would require. A similar point can be made
with the following dialogue:
(60) Q: How was your trip?
A1: Hmm. . . we ate crickets in Mexico.
A2: Unfortunately, we ONLY ate crickets in Mexico.
(60)A2 has several readings, one of which is that crickets were all we ate. That reading
12 I should add that an actual prior F-marking is not required. Selkirk’s G-Marking Condition is semantic. It
makes references to ‘focus semantic values’. Consider Vallduví’s (1990) example (287):
(i) {A last-minute guest arrives at the host’s house. The host has known the guest’s family for years}
Host: I’m glad you could come for dinner. Had I known before, I wouldn’t have made pig’s feet.
Guest: I love pig’s feet. It’s my SISTER who only eats prime cuts.
Clearly the guest understands the host to have implied that the guest likes only prime cuts. That’s sufficient to
treat prime cuts as focused and given. While Krifka’s (2004) term “second occurrence focus” is generally
applied to muted foci like on prime cuts none of the theories surveyed here follow Krifka in requiring an
antecedent focused utterance (Rooth 1996b example (25) addresses this point).
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corresponds to an LF in which only associates with a focus on crickets, which is then
focused and Given. If crickets is pronominalized, making the focus + Given phonology
difficult, another reading surfaces:
(61) Unfortunately, we [ONLY1]N ate them in [Mexico]F1.
Depending on the reading, crickets or Mexico would have to be F,G-marked in A2 on
Selkirk’s account, requiring the corresponding expression to be focused in A1.
9 Contrastive focus
In our discussion above of Beaver and Velleman’s analysis, an F-mark was added to offered:
(62) Q: Radiology? Why did you take radiology?
A: [They]N [only2]N OFFEREDN,F [radiology]F2.
The marking was supposed to represent a felt contrast with take. That intuition remains,
regardless of who is right about muted foci. In the proposed representation in (62)A,
no operator associates with that contrast F-mark. Earlier, we explained the difference in
acceptability between this example and the crêpes example in terms of an operator, EXH,
that associates with a focus in the scope of only. So if there is an operator associating with
a possible contrast focus, it must not interact with only the way EXH did. This could be
because it is attached directly to the contrasting expression or because it doesn’t interact
with only. (The latter option does not make sense on the Beck theory of nested foci adopted
here).
Kiss (1998) argued for a distinction between identificational focus and information
focus. Kiss’s “informational focus” corresponds more or less to N-marking. Among the
identificational foci, Kiss distinguished those that are [+exhaustive] and those that are
[+contrastive]. [+exhaustive] corresponds more or less to association with only or EXH.
Büring (2016: 203) proposes as much for Hungarian based on Horvath (2010). This leaves
[+contrastive] defined as operating “on a closed set of entities whose members are known to
the participants of the discourse” That fairly describes the added focus in (62). Repp (2016)
recommends the term explicit alternatives. The theory presented here needs to be further
developed to create a home for this category and whatever coherence relations might go
with it (Kehler 2005).
Zimmermann (2006) presents a different idea about linguistic devices categorized as
‘contrastive focus’. According to him, the key pragmatic feature is low expectation on the
part of the hearer. That type of contrast could involve an associated operator, if Chierchia
(2013: §2.3.2) is right that there are covert counterparts of even alongside covert counterparts
of only. And if there are covert evens, there could be trouble when they have an only in their
scope. Consider the following example:
(63) A: I’ve only2 eaten rabbit in [Paris]F2.
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B: That’s nothing. I’ve only eaten MEAT in Paris.
(63)B doesn’t work as intended, assuming the speaker means to say that Paris is the only
place she’s eaten meat and not that meat is the only thing she’s eaten in Paris. B’s intended
message can be paraphrased as:
(64) I’ve eaten meat in Paris and nowhere else.
Eating meat in Paris and nowhere else is more surprising than eating rabbit in Paris
and nowhere else.
The surprise part of (64) looks like the kind of thing you find with scalar even, leading to
(65):
(65) EVEN1 I’ve only2 eaten [[MEAT]F1]N in [Paris]F2.
And now we have the familiar nested configuration, in which only grabs the focus on meat
meant for the higher operator.
‘Contrastive focus’ is a cover term for distinct types of focus (Repp 2010). Some of
them are F-marking associated with a covert counterpart of only or even and some require
a different kind of analysis. And yet other prominences that are described as contrastive
focus might simply arise from uneven N-marking (see (58) in the previous section).
10 New
Kratzer & Selkirk (2017) insist that “grammar is blind to Newness: There are no phonologi-
cal, syntactic, or semantic operations that are sensitive to the mere newness of a constituent.”
The proposal made here adheres to that negative generalization, if by new we mean simply
‘not previously mentioned’. But if the intention is the relative notion of new, the one
captured in the rules for N-marking, then I understand the point to be that we must do away
with N-marking and instead use G-marking (Féry & Samek-Lodovici 2006, Selkirk 2008,
Kratzer & Selkirk 2017, Büring 2016: 74-76 and elsewhere). This would mean adding a
G-marker to any un-N-marked constituent discussed so far and removing all N-markers.
And it would mean rewriting our rules changing ‘N-marked’ to ‘not G-marked’ and ‘not
N-marked’ to ‘G-marked’. This may seem like a trivial move, but it would complicate
the precise statement of the semantics of givenness (see the next section). Here are some
considerations:
• For Kratzer & Selkirk (2017), information structure markers are syntactically potent
and not merely a device to aid in the statement of the pragmatics-phonology interface.
As such, G-markers may play a role in the production of marked word orders in
which given material precedes new material (Neeleman & Van De Koot 2016).
A left periphery operator, for example, might be attracting G-marked constituents
(pace Kučerová 2012 for whom givenness stays in the semantics). By contrast,
Rochemont (2013) argues that the novelty of a constituent is never motivation for its
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displacement (pace Petrova & Speyer 2011).
• The N-marking Phonology rule in (17) suffices for this paper. But a more serious
account of the interface may require relating prominence to givenness, as in the
works cited above. If we assume that information structure markers are privative
features then we would need to choose G marking.
• According to the Givenness rules, a given expression is a type of anaphor. And that
anaphora can be selective (Schwarzschild 1999: §5). Spelling this anaphora relation
out in detail could involve having a G-marker to hang an index on.
11 Formalization
In this section, you will find a precise formulation of the rules of Givenness and an inter-
pretation for EXH. Following Kratzer (1991), I treat F-markers as variables and I extend
that treatment to N-markers. I adopt Wold’s (1996) method for working this out with a
single assignment function parameter. Expressions are interpreted relative to a world and an
assignment function. Declarative sentences are assigned truth-values.
Following Beck’s (2016) discussion of nested operators, I interpret only/EXH unselec-
tively, so that an occurrence of one of these operators associates with all foci in its scope.
This follows Kratzer’s treatment, although the ingredients are there to make only selective
as Wold had it.
11.1 Three kinds of indices
(66) Plain indices, N-markers and F-markers.
N= {0,1,2,3, · · ·}, TYPE is the set of type labels.
plain indices: P = N× TYPE (eg 〈5,et〉 ∈ P)
N-markers: N = {Ni : i ∈ N× TYPE} (eg N〈5,et〉 ∈ N )
F-markers: F = {Fi : i ∈ N× TYPE} (eg F〈5,et〉 ∈ F)
The type of an index or marker constrains the kind of value it is assigned.
EXAMPLE g(N〈5,et〉) ∈ Det .
If the type label is e , it may be left off.
(67) Rules for interpreting F- and N-marked expressions
a. if Fi 6∈ dom(g),JαFiKw,g = JαKw,g
b. if Fi ∈ dom(g),JαFiKw,g = g(Fi)
c. if Ni 6∈ dom(g),JαNiKw,g = JαKw,g
d. if Ni ∈ dom(g),JαNiKw,g = g(Ni)
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EXAMPLES
F1 6∈ dom(g),N3 6∈ dom(g)⇒ J[Jack]F1]N3Kw,g = Jack
F1 6∈ dom(g),N3 ∈ dom(g)⇒ J[Jack]F1]N3Kw,g = g(N3)
F1 ∈ dom(g),N3 6∈ dom(g)⇒ J[Jack]F1]N3Kw,g = g(F1)
F1 ∈ dom(g),N3 ∈ dom(g)⇒ J[Jack]F1]N3Kw,g = g(N3)
11.2 Meaning for only/EXH
The meaning of EXH is given below. I assume EXH attaches to t-type expressions. My
definition is uninformed by recent advances in alternatives-research (Bar-Lev & Fox 2017).
I want to imbue EXH with the power to ignore any prior assignments to F-markers and
to start fresh. To that end, I introduce an operator ‘+’ on assignment functions defined as
follows:
(68) + operation on assignment functions
For any assignment functions g, h:
(i) dom([g+h]) = (dom(g)∪dom(h))
(ii) for any u ∈ dom([g+h]):
if u ∈ dom(h), then [g+h](u) = h(u)
if u 6∈ dom(h), then [g+h](u) = g(u)
(69) JEXH ϕKw,g = 1 i f f JϕKw,g = 1∧∀pst((p(w)= 1∧ p∈ ALTg−ϕ)⇒ p |= λw.JϕKw,g)
ALTg-ϕ
def
= {λw.JϕKw,g+h : dom(h) = F}
Observe that if ϕ contains no F-marking, then JEXH ϕKw,g = JϕKw,g.
This meaning for EXH will also serve to a first approximation as the meaning of only.
What’s missing is the presupposition and possible arguments for only not of type t.
11.3 Givenness rules
The Givenness rules rely on entailment generalized to all types. This generalization is carried
out by an operator ExClo which has the effect of existentially quantifying arguments:
(70) ExClo (existential closure – raising to type t)
If ϕ is a meaning of type t: ExClo(ϕ) = ϕ
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If α is a meaning of type ab: ExClo(α) = 1 iff ∃ua ExClo(α(u)) = 1
EXAMPLE ExClo(JattackKw,g) = 1 iff
∃xe ExClo(JattackKw,g(x)) = 1 iff
∃xe ∃ye ExClo(JattackKw,g(x)(y)) = 1 iff
∃xe ∃ye JattackKw,g(x)(y) = 1
∴ For any w, ExClo(JattackKw,g) = 1 iff someone was attacked in w
The next EXAMPLE presupposes with Karttunen (1977) that a Wh-interrogative denotes a
function that characterizes the set of its true propositional answers. For example,
Jwho smiled?Kw,g = λ p ∃x x is human in w∧ p = λw′ [x smiled in w′]∧ p(w) = 1
EXAMPLE ExClo(Jwho smiled?Kw,g) = 1 iff
∃p ExClo(Jwho smiledKw,g(p)) = 1 iff
∃p (Jwho smiled?Kw,g(p)) = 1 iff
∃p ∃x x is human in w∧ p = λw′ [x smiled in w′]∧ p(w) = 1 iff
∃x x is human in w∧ x smiled in w
∴ For any w, ExClo(Jwho smiled?Kw,g) = 1 iff someone smiled in w
For Yes/No questions, the propositional kernel, before any question operator is added, may
serve as a GIVENness antecedent.
An utterance in a context c is interpreted relative to a contextually supplied assignment
function, gc, that assigns values only to plain indices and only to those that are free in
the utterance. Since the Givenness Constraint will apply to any expression within an
utterance, it will apply to expressions containing locally free pronouns and traces that are
bound higher up. To take care of this, we’ll make use of assignment functions g′ that assign
values to all plain indices. Given (68) above and our assumptions about gc, if g′ assigns
values to all plain indices, then [g′+ gc] is just like gc for the indices that are free in the
utterance and all other indices get the values assigned by g′.
(71) Givenness Constraint
For every g′ such that dom(g′) = P , when β is uttered in context c, there must be
an antecedent α that is salient in c and (i) or (ii) below holds:
(i) ∃h (dom(h)⊆N ∧ JαKw,g′+gc = Jβ Kw,g′+gc+h) and β is type e.
(ii) ∀w [ExCLo(JαKw,g′+gc)= 1⇒∃h (dom(h)⊆N ∧ExClo(Jβ Kw,g′+gc+h))= 1]
EXCEPTIONS This constraint does not apply if:
β is not assigned a meaning (β is syncategorematic – eg EXH)
β is of the form [α]Ni (eg [Jill]Ni, [VPsee Fred]Ni)
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β has Ni as its sister: (eg [Jill]Ni)
The world quantifier in (ii) could be restricted to worlds compatible with salient common
ground propositions. That would allow it to cover cases where an antecedent is as much as
expressed (see footnote 12).
[EXAMPLE]
(72) {Q Who smiled ?}
A: [Jack]N〈1,e〉 smiled.
A′: EXH [[Jack]F〈2,e〉]N〈1,e〉 smiled.
For any g′, dom(g′) = P ,
i. ∃h (dom(h)⊆N ∧ExClo(JJackN〈1,e〉 smiledKw,g
′+gc+h)) = 1 iff
ii. ∃h (dom(h)⊆N ∧ JJackN〈1,e〉 smiledKw,g
′+gc+h) = 1 iff someone smiled in w
In line (ii), g′ and gc play no role. h assigns some entity to the index N〈1,e〉.
iii. ∃h (dom(h)⊆N ∧ExClo(JEXH [[Jack]F〈2,e〉]N〈1,e〉 smiledKw,g
′+gc+h)) = 1 iff
iv. ∃h (dom(h)⊆N ∧ JEXH [[Jack]F〈2,e〉]N〈1,e〉 smiledKw,g
′+gc+h) = 1 iff someone smiled in w.
In line (iv), g′ and gc play no role. h assigns some entity to the index N〈1,e〉 and that takes
care of ‘[[Jack]F〈2,e〉]N〈1,e〉’. EXH is idle.
Jack is the locus of prominence in either answer in (72). To an extent there is redundancy
in the grammar. In simple cases, question-answer congruence follows from givenness as
well as from the pragmatics of exhaustivity. That’s partly why “there does not seem to be a
one-to-one mapping between particular formal features (focus marking devices) and focus,
neither from a cross-linguistic perspective, nor within individual languages.” Zimmermann
& Onea (2011).
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